An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in the internal URL processing logic in Angular SSR. The logic normalizes URL segments by stripping leading slashes; however, it only removes a single leading slash.
When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the X-Forwarded-Prefix header, an attacker can provide a value starting with three slashes (e.g., ///evil.com).
- The application processes a redirect (e.g., from a router
redirectTo or i18n locale switch).
- Angular receives
///evil.com as the prefix.
- It strips one slash, leaving
//evil.com.
- The resulting string is used in the
Location header.
- Modern browsers interpret
// as a protocol-relative URL, redirecting the user from https://your-app.com to https://evil.com.
Impact
This vulnerability allows attackers to conduct large-scale phishing and SEO hijacking:
- Scale: A single request can poison a high-traffic route, impacting all users until the cache expires.
- SEO Poisoning: Search engine crawlers may follow and index these malicious redirects, causing the legitimate site to be delisted or associated with malicious domains.
- Trust: Because the initial URL belongs to the trusted domain, users and security tools are less likely to flag the redirect as malicious.
Attack Preconditions
- The application must use Angular SSR.
- The application must have routes that perform internal redirects.
- The infrastructure (Reverse Proxy/CDN) must pass the
X-Forwarded-Prefix header to the SSR process without sanitization.
- The cache must not vary on the
X-Forwarded-Prefix header.
Patches
- 21.2.0-rc.1
- 21.1.5
- 20.3.17
- 19.2.21
Workarounds
Until the patch is applied, developers should sanitize the X-Forwarded-Prefix header in theirserver.ts before the Angular engine processes the request:
app.use((req, res, next) => {
const prefix = req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix']?.trim();
if (prefix) {
// Sanitize by removing all leading slashes
req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'] = prefix.replace(/^[/\\]+/, '/');
}
next();
});
References
An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in the internal URL processing logic in Angular SSR. The logic normalizes URL segments by stripping leading slashes; however, it only removes a single leading slash.
When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the
X-Forwarded-Prefixheader, an attacker can provide a value starting with three slashes (e.g.,///evil.com).redirectToor i18n locale switch).///evil.comas the prefix.//evil.com.Locationheader.//as a protocol-relative URL, redirecting the user fromhttps://your-app.comtohttps://evil.com.Impact
This vulnerability allows attackers to conduct large-scale phishing and SEO hijacking:
Attack Preconditions
X-Forwarded-Prefixheader to the SSR process without sanitization.X-Forwarded-Prefixheader.Patches
Workarounds
Until the patch is applied, developers should sanitize the
X-Forwarded-Prefixheader in theirserver.tsbefore the Angular engine processes the request:References