Claude Code Action: Malicious MCP Server Configuration in PRs Enables Remote Code Execution and Secret Exfiltration
Moderate severity
GitHub Reviewed
Published
May 20, 2026
in
anthropics/claude-code-action
•
Updated Jun 10, 2026
Package
Affected versions
< 1.0.74
Patched versions
1.0.74
Description
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Jun 10, 2026
Reviewed
Jun 10, 2026
Last updated
Jun 10, 2026
Due to the combination of checking out PR head branches (attacker-controlled), reading
.mcp.jsonfrom the working directory via default setting sources, and unconditionally enabling all project MCP servers viaenableAllProjectMcpServers, it was possible for an attacker who opened a PR containing a malicious.mcp.jsonfile to achieve arbitrary code execution on the GitHub Actions runner. This could lead to exfiltration of secrets available to the workflow (such as API keys and tokens) when a privileged user triggered the Claude action on the PR. Exploiting this required the ability to open a pull request against a repository using the claude-code-action and a privileged user or automatic trigger to invoke the action on that PR.Users pinned to a vulnerable version of claude-code-action are advised to update to the latest version. Users referencing anthropics/claude-code-action@v1, anthropics/claude-code-action@beta, anthropics/claude-code-action@main, or other non-pinned tags will have received this fix already
Claude Code thanks hackerone.com/reptou for reporting this issue.
References