BoringSSLAEADContext in Netty Repeats Nonces
Package
Affected versions
>= 0.0.3.Final, < 0.0.11.Final
Patched versions
0.0.11.Final
Description
Published by the National Vulnerability Database
Jun 4, 2024
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Jun 5, 2024
Reviewed
Jun 5, 2024
Summary
BoringSSLAEADContext keeps track of how many OHTTP responses have been sent and uses this sequence number to calculate the appropriate nonce to use with the encryption algorithm.
Unfortunately, two separate errors combine which would allow an attacker to cause the sequence number to overflow and thus the nonce to repeat.
Details
https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/blob/1ddadb6473cd3be5491d114431ed4c1a9f316001/codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAEADContext.java#L112-L114
Impact
If the BoringSSLAEADContext is used to encrypt more than 2^32 messages then the AES-GCM nonce will repeat.
Repeating a nonce with AES-GCM results in both confidentiality and integrity compromise of data encrypted with the associated key.
References