Woodpecker gRPC agent_id metadata can be spoofed- cross-tenant agent impersonation
High severity
GitHub Reviewed
Published
Jun 3, 2026
in
woodpecker-ci/woodpecker
•
Updated Jul 14, 2026
Package
Affected versions
>= 3.0.0, < 3.14.1
Patched versions
3.14.1
Description
Published by the National Vulnerability Database
Jun 18, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Jul 14, 2026
Reviewed
Jul 14, 2026
Last updated
Jul 14, 2026
Impact
A vulnerability in Woodpecker CI's gRPC layer allowed any authenticated agent to impersonate any other agent on the same server by injecting a forged
agent_idvalue into outgoing gRPC metadata. The server correctly verified the JWT token but then discarded the verified agent identity in favor of the client-supplied value.Patches
Direct patch: woodpecker-ci/woodpecker#6567
Later proper fix: woodpecker-ci/woodpecker#6569
Workarounds
Disable org agents (
WOODPECKER_DISABLE_USER_AGENT_REGISTRATION=true) and delete existing onesResources
Public ref: woodpecker-ci/woodpecker#6541
Private com: https://github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker-security/issues/21
References