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Trivy: Helm chart tar bomb causes OOM via unbounded io.ReadAll in parser

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jun 4, 2026 in aquasecurity/trivy • Updated Jul 14, 2026

Package

gomod github.com/aquasecurity/trivy (Go)

Affected versions

< 0.71.0

Patched versions

0.71.0

Description

Summary

When Trivy scans a Helm chart archive (.tgz), its custom tar unpacker reads each entry with io.ReadAll(tr) and no size limit. An attacker who can place a malicious .tgz file in the scanned path can craft a small compressed archive that decompresses to gigabytes, causing the Trivy process to be killed by the OS OOM killer.

Affected configurations

Exploitation requires the attacker to place a crafted .tgz file in a location that Trivy will scan as a Helm chart. This applies to the following scan targets:

Command Condition
trivy config <dir> Directory contains a crafted .tgz Helm chart (misconfiguration scanning is always enabled)
trivy filesystem --scanners misconf <dir> Directory contains a crafted .tgz Helm chart and --scanners misconf is explicitly enabled
trivy image --scanners misconf <image> Image contains a crafted .tgz Helm chart and --scanners misconf is explicitly enabled

Realistic scenarios include:

  • A CI pipeline that runs trivy config . on a repository where a contributor can submit a pull request containing a crafted chart archive.
  • A pipeline that scans a container image with --scanners misconf, whose build context includes untrusted .tgz files.

Impact

An attacker who satisfies the conditions above can exhaust all available memory on the host running Trivy. The OS OOM killer will terminate the Trivy process and may affect other processes sharing the same host or CI runner.

The practical impact in CI environments is denial of service: the scan fails, the pipeline is blocked, and repeated submissions re-trigger the same condition. Cloud CI runners may also incur additional costs for consumed resources.

There is no impact on confidentiality or integrity of the scanned system.

Patches

Fixed in Trivy v0.71.0 (#10718). The custom tar unpacker was replaced with archive.LoadArchiveFiles from the official helm.sh/helm/v4 SDK, which enforces per-entry and total size limits and validates archive structure. Users should upgrade to v0.71.0 or later.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible:

  • Set a memory limit (cgroup/container) on the Trivy process to bound the blast radius.
  • Use --skip-dirs to exclude directories containing untrusted Helm chart archives from the scan.
  • Avoid scanning repositories or images with untrusted .tgz files.

Credits

Reported by @jamesgol.

References

@nikpivkin nikpivkin published to aquasecurity/trivy Jun 4, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Jun 25, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jul 14, 2026
Reviewed Jul 14, 2026
Last updated Jul 14, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements None
Privileges Required None
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability High
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(16th percentile)

Weaknesses

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource. Learn more on MITRE.

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated. Learn more on MITRE.

Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value

The product allocates memory based on an untrusted, large size value, but it does not ensure that the size is within expected limits, allowing arbitrary amounts of memory to be allocated. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-54448

GHSA ID

GHSA-q3fv-x8vg-qqm4

Source code

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