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The WP Import Export Lite plugin for WordPress is...
Moderate severity
Unreviewed
Published
Jul 3, 2026
to the GitHub Advisory Database
•
Updated Jul 3, 2026
The WP Import Export Lite plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to and including 3.9.30 via the wpie_import_upload_file_from_url AJAX action. The plugin's URL downloader first calls wp_safe_remote_get() (which correctly blocks private/reserved IP ranges), but when that call returns a WP_Error — the exact outcome for any blocked internal host — the Download::download_file() method falls back to GuzzleHttp\Client::request() with the original attacker-supplied URL and no SSRF protection (and with TLS verification disabled). This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and above, to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services such as the cloud metadata endpoint at 169.
The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
Learn more on MITRE.
CVE ID
CVE-2026-11397
GHSA ID
GHSA-w7wg-w2g9-vmjq
Source code
No known source code
Dependabot alerts are not supported on this advisory because it does not have a package from a supported ecosystem with an affected and fixed version.
The WP Import Export Lite plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to and including 3.9.30 via the wpie_import_upload_file_from_url AJAX action. The plugin's URL downloader first calls wp_safe_remote_get() (which correctly blocks private/reserved IP ranges), but when that call returns a WP_Error — the exact outcome for any blocked internal host — the Download::download_file() method falls back to GuzzleHttp\Client::request() with the original attacker-supplied URL and no SSRF protection (and with TLS verification disabled). This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and above, to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services such as the cloud metadata endpoint at 169.
References