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Preview issue triage prompt changes - #20352

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ewdurbin wants to merge 14 commits into
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codex/issue-triage-preview
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ewdurbin wants to merge 14 commits into
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codex/issue-triage-preview

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@ewdurbin

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Summary

Stacked on #20340.

Add a pull-request workflow that previews changes to agents/prompts/triage-issue.md against the five most recently created issues. Each issue is triaged independently with read-only repository access, then the results are consolidated into a single marked PR comment that is updated on subsequent runs.

The preview is restricted to same-repository PRs, leaves the Codex action's write-access actor restriction in place, and grants write permission only to the final PR-comment job. It does not modify issues or invoke release workflows.

Validation

  • npx prettier@3.9.0 --check .github/workflows/issue-triage-preview.yml
  • Verified the GitHub search query returns the five newest issues.
  • Exercised summary rendering for related issue/PR and empty-result cases, including newline and mention handling.
  • git diff --cached --check

@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Jul 13, 2026 •

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Issue triage preview

The issue triage preview is available in the workflow run summary.

@astral-sh-bot

astral-sh-bot Bot commented Jul 13, 2026 •

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uv test inventory changes

This PR no longer changes the tests when compared with the main base revision.

Comment on lines +58 to +61
uses: ./.github/workflows/issue-triage.yml # zizmor: ignore[secrets-inherit] Required for environment secrets in reusable workflows.
with:
issue: ${{ matrix.issue }}
secrets: inherit

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[P2] Do not run PR-controlled workflows with environment secrets

This local reusable workflow is resolved from the pull request revision, and its triage job enters the unprotected automations environment and receives OPENAI_API_KEY. Consequently, anyone able to push a same-repository branch can modify the called workflow or its Codex configuration and expose or misuse that credential before review. The same-repository check only excludes forks; it does not establish that the executed revision is trusted. Keep this preview secretless, or move the credentialed stage to protected default-branch workflow code behind an exact-SHA-bound approval and environment protection.

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I don't think this is legitimate?

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same repo branch == a maintainer's branch, so, likely not?

Comment on lines +52 to +55
uses: ./.github/workflows/issue-triage.yml # zizmor: ignore[secrets-inherit] Required for environment secrets in reusable workflows.
with:
issue: ${{ matrix.issue }}
secrets: inherit

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[P2] Prevent PR-controlled workflows from receiving automation secrets

This pull_request workflow invokes a repository-local reusable workflow from the pull request revision and passes secrets: inherit; that called workflow enters the automations environment and consumes OPENAI_API_KEY. A same-repository branch writer can therefore change any listed prompt/schema to trigger the run while also changing .github/workflows/issue-triage.yml, causing unreviewed code to receive or exfiltrate the environment credential before merge. The head-repository check blocks forks but does not establish that the branch author is entitled to environment secrets. Keep the PR stage secretless, or move API-backed processing behind an explicitly authorized stage that runs trusted default-branch code and treats PR content only as data.

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We should probably add some notes to the threat-model about this.

This branch was previously deployed

1 inactive deployment
automations — 3e89a839 Deployed Jul 17, 2026 by ewdurbin via review / report #42747
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3 participants