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fix(eval): refuse to start a second confinement eval on the same box (BRO-2245) - #114
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…(BRO-2245) On 2026-08-23 two confinement evals were started concurrently on srv1692698 alongside live probe traffic. Each spawns a series of real `claude` sessions against the deployed box. The host went to load ~15 and then stopped scheduling userspace: sshd completed key exchange but never returned a shell, genesis-api went 200@20s -> 200@25s -> nothing, and the WhatsApp channel stopped answering for two real tenants. Every remote lever was already unreachable, so recovery needed a console reboot. Adds a single-runner lock. Refusing exits 2, matching this file's own rule that a run which could not measure is not a run that passed — a concurrent eval cannot produce a trustworthy verdict because it perturbs the very box it measures, so it belongs in the INVALID bucket, not the exit-1 "boundary failed" bucket. Deliberately conservative rather than tuned: the specific resource that ran out was never captured (there was no shell to capture it with), so the guard does not model load. It just refuses the second run. That is the one invariant the incident supports without further evidence. Two placement details that are not obvious: - The lock lives at `dirname(root)`, NOT inside `root`. `siblings` is `readdirSync(root)`, so a lock file in the workspaces directory would be enumerated as a sibling tenant and scored by the cross-tenant cases. - EPERM from `kill(pid, 0)` means the process EXISTS but belongs to another user. Reading it as dead is exactly how a guard hands out a held lock. Only ESRCH is dead. The `pid: "x"` test caught a real bug while I wrote it: `record?.pid ?? 0` is not nullish for a non-number, so a hand-edited lock would surface `tookOverStaleFrom: "x"` — a string in a field typed number, invisible to tsc because it arrives from JSON.parse as `any`. Coerced on the type instead. 18 new tests including a both-polarity control (same bytes, opposite liveness, opposite verdict). Full suite 971 pass / 0 fail; tsc and biome clean, exit codes captured directly rather than after a pipe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe confinement evaluation script now uses a tenant-independent lock. The lock detects live and stale holders, prevents concurrent evaluation, reports refusal details, and releases on exit or termination signals. Comprehensive tests cover liveness, takeover, persistence, refusal, and cleanup behavior. ChangesEvaluation Lock
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to The new guard can still allow concurrent evaluations and may remove another run’s lock during a replacement race, leaving the box exposed to the same resource contention and service unavailability this change is intended to prevent. These concurrency defects should be fixed before merge. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Operator
participant confinementEval
participant evalLock
participant LockFile
participant HolderProcess
Operator->>confinementEval: start evaluation
confinementEval->>evalLock: acquireEvalLock(lockPath, tenantDir)
evalLock->>LockFile: read existing lock record
evalLock->>HolderProcess: check recorded PID
HolderProcess-->>evalLock: liveness result
alt holder is live
evalLock-->>confinementEval: refusal with holder metadata
confinementEval-->>Operator: print refusal and exit
else lock is free or stale
evalLock->>LockFile: write current process record
evalLock-->>confinementEval: acquired
confinementEval->>confinementEval: run evaluation
confinementEval->>evalLock: releaseEvalLock()
evalLock->>LockFile: unlink lock
end
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches📝 Generate docstrings
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Actionable comments posted: 2
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Inline comments:
In `@scripts/eval-lock.ts`:
- Around line 101-105: Make acquireEvalLock use exclusive creation via
writeFileSync with flag "wx" instead of a separate check-then-write; on EEXIST,
reread and return the current holder, while preserving stale-lock recovery with
an atomic takeover strategy that prevents concurrent overwrites. Add a
regression test exercising two processes acquiring the same lock and verifying
only one succeeds.
- Around line 112-114: Update releaseEvalLock and the lock acquisition flow to
carry a unique ownership token, read the stored lock record, and unlink it only
when its token matches the releasing evaluator’s token; otherwise leave the
replacement lock intact. Add a regression test covering replacement between
signal and exit handling.
🪄 Autofix
Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
- Create a new PR with the fixes
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scripts/confinement-eval.tsscripts/eval-lock.test.tsscripts/eval-lock.ts
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…ate (BRO-2245)
P20 Strata A returned DO-NOT-MERGE 2/10 and CodeRabbit independently flagged the
same defect. Both were right, and the finding is the central one: the guard did
not enforce the invariant it was added for.
BLOCKER — read-then-write TOCTOU. acquireEvalLock read the path, then wrote it
with a plain writeFileSync. Two runners starting together both observe "no lock",
both write, both proceed — the exact scenario this was added to prevent. The only
ordering point is now writeFileSync(path, body, {flag:"wx"}), which Bun maps to
O_CREAT|O_EXCL: exactly one racer creates the file, every other gets EEXIST from
the kernel. Reads now only REPORT who holds it and judge staleness; no read grants
the lock. The steal path is safe for the same reason — two runners may both judge
a lock stale and both unlink it, but both must then re-enter the wx create, where
one still wins.
BLOCKER — ownership-blind release. releaseEvalLock unlinked whatever was there, so
a runner could delete a lock a DIFFERENT runner wrote after taking over, reopening
the gate mid-run. Records now carry a nonce and release removes only a lock still
carrying ours.
MAJOR — pid reuse was unbounded: a recycled pid reads as ALIVE and would block
every future eval forever. Added a max age (3h, far outside an eval's envelope),
applied only to live holders. It is a heuristic and is documented as one.
MAJOR — the tests validated mocks, not mutual exclusion. Added real-process tests:
8 concurrent OS processes racing one path (exactly one WON, with a control that
all 8 actually reported), a SIGKILLed holder taken over, a live holder refused
without clobbering the winner's record, and a corrupt file taken over.
MAJOR — the mutation sweep was quoted in prose and absent from the artifact. It is
now scripts/eval-lock.mutants.sh, committed and runnable, with a clean-tree guard
and a deliberate SURVIVE control.
MINOR — the refusal message overstated causality. It now says concurrency is a
contributor, not a proven sole cause, since the exhausted resource was never
captured.
Two test bugs found and fixed along the way, both informative:
- the racer exited the instant it acquired, so its pid was genuinely dead when the
next racer looked; the takeover path fired correctly and 5 of 8 "won". The lock
was right; the scenario was unreal. Racers now hold while the others race.
- a SIGKILLed child is a ZOMBIE until reaped, and a zombie's pid still answers
kill(pid,0), so it read as alive and takeover never fired. The test now awaits
the child's 'exit' rather than polling kill -0 in a shell.
29 tests (was 18). Full suite 982 pass / 0 fail; tsc and biome exit 0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…lso appears in prose (BRO-2245) The uniqueness guard fired and refused to run rather than patching a comment and reporting a false SURVIVED. That is the guard working; the anchor was wrong. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round 1 review — both blockers were correct, and they were the central oneStrata A ( BLOCKER — the lock did not lock
The only ordering point is now BLOCKER — ownership-blind release
MAJORs
Committed sweep output
On the first run the sweep refused to execute the Two test bugs found while writing them, both informative
Gates29 tests (was 18) · full suite 982 pass / 0 fail · Still not run against the real box — it is down at time of writing. First live run should confirm the lock is created and removed. |
…-2245) Round 2 scored 3/10 and named four deterministic interleavings. All four were real, and all four were in the stale-takeover path I added in v2: - A and B both read a stale record. A unlinks and creates. B then unlinks A's FRESH lock and creates its own. Both return acquired. - Release read the record, confirmed the nonce, then unlinked. Between those two steps a takeover could replace the file, so release deleted the NEW owner's lock. - O_EXCL publishes the inode before the body is written, so a contender could read a partial record, judge it corrupt, and unlink an ACTIVE writer's lock. - The 3h max-age, added to bound pid reuse, steals from any eval that legitimately runs longer than that. Node and Bun expose no flock, so there is no kernel-held lock available to make takeover atomic. Rather than patch a fifth edge — a lock is exactly the edge-dense shape where fixing defect N opens N+1 — the takeover path is DELETED. Acquisition no longer decides anything from the lock's CONTENTS. One O_EXCL create: win, or refuse. The file is read only to tell an operator who holds it, and a read that fails or returns nonsense changes no decision. That removes pid-liveness, max-age, retry, and unlink-during-acquire in one go — shouldYieldTo and DEFAULT_MAX_AGE_MS are gone. The nonce survives for exactly one job: if an operator clears a stuck lock and a new runner acquires, the old owner's exit handler must not delete the new owner's file. THE COST, STATED IN THE CODE AND THE MESSAGE: a crashed or SIGKILLed eval leaves the lock behind and the next run refuses until someone removes it. Deliberate. A stuck lock is loud and one `rm` fixes it; automatic takeover is the machinery that kept reintroducing concurrent runners, which is the failure this guard exists to prevent. The refusal message names the file, and shows an ADVISORY liveness hint that is explicitly not consulted by the decision. Also fixed from round 2: release now reports false when the unlink itself failed rather than overstating, and the existsSync-then-readFileSync ENOENT window is gone (read-and-catch instead). New test: a second wave of racers, while a lock is present, ALL refuse — and a manual rm restores service, so the documented recovery is exercised rather than asserted. 32 tests. Full suite 985 pass / 0 fail; tsc and biome exit 0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round 2 → the takeover path is deleted, not patchedStrata A round 2: DO-NOT-MERGE 3/10, naming four deterministic interleavings. All four were real, and all four lived in the stale-takeover path I added in round 1's fix:
The fix is a deletionNode and Bun expose no One The nonce survives for exactly one job: if an operator clears a stuck lock and a new runner acquires, the old owner's exit handler must not delete the new owner's file. The cost, stated in the code and in the messageA crashed or SIGKILLed eval leaves the lock behind and the next run refuses until someone removes it. Deliberate. A stuck lock is loud and one Also from round 2: release now returns Sweep after the rewriteNew test exercises the documented recovery rather than asserting it: a second wave of racers all refuse while a lock is present, and a manual 32 tests · full suite 985 pass / 0 fail · Round ledger: 2/10 → 3/10 → (round 3 pending). Round 1 found the guard did not lock at all; round 2 found the fix reintroduced races one layer down. Both were correct and neither was caught by tests, typecheck, or CI. |
…245) Round 3: 3/10 -> 5/10, one blocker left and it was correct. Read-then-unlink cannot be made atomic without a kernel-held lock, and Node/Bun expose no flock, so this sequence is possible IN PRINCIPLE: we read and match our nonce, an operator removes our file, another runner acquires, our unlink deletes THEIRS. Every step of it requires us to still be RUNNING when the operator removes our lock. So the fix is the PROCEDURE, not more code: the refusal message now tells the operator to kill the holding pid FIRST and rm the file SECOND. After the kill there is no process left to reach the unlink, so the window does not exist in the supported path. An operator who removes the file out from under a live run is outside it, and no path-based scheme defends that case — said plainly in the code rather than left implied. Minors, all real: - isProcessAlive returned false for EVERY error except EPERM while documenting that only ESRCH means dead, so the refusal message asserted "NOT running" on no evidence. Replaced with tri-state processLiveness: alive | dead | unknown, and the message now says "could not determine" for the third. - The suggested rm did not quote a path that comes from GENESIS_EVAL_LOCK. Added shellQuote with tests covering spaces, an embedded single quote, and shell syntax. - The mutation script had no cleanup trap, so an interrupt between mutate and revert left eval-lock.ts modified while the output still claimed "tree restored clean". trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM. - A false release result was ignored rather than reported. It now logs, because it means the next run will refuse and the operator should learn that now rather than at the next eval. Sweep coverage was overstated: the ownership arm only tested nonce mismatch. Added arms for the recovery ordering, the unquoted path, and unknown-liveness-read-as- dead — each mapped to an assertion that now exists. 39 tests (was 32). Full suite 992 pass / 0 fail; tsc and biome exit 0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bare `return "unknown";` also serves the non-pid guard, so the uniqueness assertion refused to run it rather than patching the wrong site and reporting a false result. Anchored on the ESRCH line instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round 3 → 5/10, and the last blocker is closed by ordering, not codeStrata A round 3: DO-NOT-MERGE 5/10 (2 → 3 → 5). One blocker, and it was right. The blockerRead-then-unlink cannot be made atomic without a kernel-held lock, and Node/Bun expose no Every step of it requires us to still be running when the operator removes our lock. So the fix is the procedure, not more code. The refusal message now says: After the kill there is no process left to reach the unlink, so the window does not exist in the supported path. An operator who removes the file out from under a live run is outside it, and no path-based scheme defends that case — now said plainly in the code rather than left implied. A test asserts the kill appears before the rm, and a mutation arm kills the version that drops it. Minors, all real
Sweep coverage was overstated — fixedThe ownership arm only tested nonce mismatch. Added arms for the recovery ordering, the unquoted path, and unknown-liveness-read-as-dead, each mapped to an assertion that now exists: Twice now the sweep's uniqueness assertion refused to run an arm whose anchor matched two sites — once matching prose, once matching a sibling guard clause. Both times it reported SKIP + failure rather than patching the wrong line and reporting a result. That guard has earned its place. 39 tests (was 32) · full suite 992 pass / 0 fail · Ledger: 2 → 3 → 5. Round 1: the guard did not lock at all. Round 2: the fix reintroduced races one layer down. Round 3: the documented recovery contained the race. None were caught by tests, typecheck, or CI. |
Why
On 2026-08-23 two confinement evals were started concurrently on
srv1692698alongside live probe traffic. Each spawns a series of realclaudesessions against the deployed box.Observed (UTC):
GET :8787/→200 @ 20.4s→200 @ 24.8s:8787and:8443stop responding entirelytxstill risingInbound WhatsApp at 17:18, 17:25, 17:32 went unanswered for two real tenants. Every remote lever (plain SSH,
tailscale ssh, MagicDNS, a rescue turn throughws-orchestrator) was already unreachable, so recovery needed a console reboot.What this does
Adds a single-runner lock to
scripts/confinement-eval.ts.Refusing exits 2, matching the file's own founding rule — a run that could not measure is not a run that passed. A concurrent eval cannot produce a trustworthy verdict because it perturbs the very box it is measuring, so it belongs in the INVALID bucket, not the exit-1 "boundary failed" bucket.
Deliberately conservative, not tuned. The specific resource that ran out was never captured — there was no shell to capture it with. So the guard does not model load; it just refuses the second run. That is the one invariant the incident supports without further evidence. The causal story is a leading hypothesis from co-occurrence, and the guard does not depend on it being right.
Two placement details that are not obvious
dirname(root), not insideroot.siblingsisreaddirSync(root), so a lock file in the workspaces directory would be enumerated as a sibling tenant and scored by the cross-tenant cases.EPERMfromkill(pid, 0)means the process EXISTS but belongs to another user. Reading it as dead is exactly how a guard hands out a lock that is still held. OnlyESRCHis dead.A bug the tests caught while being written
record?.pid ?? 0is not nullish for a non-number, so a hand-edited lock withpid: "x"surfacedtookOverStaleFrom: "x"— a string in a field typednumber, invisible totscbecause it arrives fromJSON.parseasany. Coerced on the type instead.Test plan
tsc -p tsconfig.scripts.json→ exit 0;biome check→ exit 0. Exit codes captured directly, never read after a pipe.EPERMread as dead-1Not covered
The guard's filesystem path is exercised only through injected
readFile/writeFile. It has not been run against the real box — the box is still down at time of writing. First live run should confirm the lock is created and removed.Linear: BRO-2245.
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Tests