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docs(repo): the STRIDE threat model and the rule that keeps it current (#244) - #487
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#244) One threat model for every reachable surface (HTTP API, access, project, lake, sources, build), each threat tied to its rule and its test or a declared gap; the instance administrator's identity powers made explicit; the phase-end rule in the roadmap, security.md and the PR template. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MFyANPkiUZYq6rvGD2sFLf
…244) Reviewer findings B1-B10 and N1-N8: precise verifications, split rows, missing threats added, rules stated in security.md §9. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MFyANPkiUZYq6rvGD2sFLf
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MFyANPkiUZYq6rvGD2sFLf
Owner review: source reads are audited (Direct Query and runs, each with its evidence); a release without hosted runners is a declared gap. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MFyANPkiUZYq6rvGD2sFLf
…ws (#244) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MFyANPkiUZYq6rvGD2sFLf
Fresh review F1-F6: cursor and password rows split with their tests; Direct Query records, Direct Query column policies and the sign-in session id in the log declared as gaps. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MFyANPkiUZYq6rvGD2sFLf
This was referenced Nov 15, 2026
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Part of #244 (PR 1 of 2: the model and the rule; the
threat-modelcheck follows in PR 2).Files and purposes
docs/architecture/threat-model.mddocs/architecture/security.mddocs/roadmap.md.github/pull_request_template.mddocs/README.mdsecurity.md, at the same rank.Shared governance files touched, for coordination with #486:
.github/pull_request_template.md(one appended line). This PR does not touchtools/ci/checks.tomlor the ruleset; PR 2 will.Case matrix
n/a:row per STRIDE category:http-api,access,project,lake,sources,build. The five required surfaces plusaccess, which the Owner's addition requires.Ruleexists, everyVerificationhas an allowed form, and everyopenapi.yamlpath is an entry point ofhttp-api.security.md §nresolves to a heading, every ADR file exists, and every test path exists.inventorylists every HTTP path, package and contract directory.roadmap.md§2,security.mdand the PR template carry the rule.gap:row is listed.The check of PR 2 (
threat_model.py) was run against this commit and exits 0. The per-surface counts below come from the earlier ad hoc script:n/a: <reason>form. The Owner approved it on 2026-11-15, but only for threats that truly do not apply. No row uses it now: TM-SOURCES-3 cites audit evidence, and TM-BUILD-5 is agap:.Gaps found, for the Owner to decide which become issues
test_sign_in_http.pywith both.columnsscenarios on every Direct Query engine.JsonFormatterwith such values.The three
TM-ACCESSgaps go to the release issue that precedes server mode in production. They are not fixed in #244. No issue is opened for any gap until the Owner decides (AGENTS.md §4).Reviewer pass
First pass: changes requested. Second pass: one new finding (N-B1), fixed by splitting TM-HTTP-5 and declaring the injection test as gap TM-HTTP-18.
First pass details: B1–B10 and N1–N8 are fixed in the second commit. Nine rows cited evidence that did not prove the threat; each now cites the test that does, or is a
gap:or aroadmap:row. Rows with several pieces of evidence are split. Missing threats are added: injection, path traversal of static files, session fixation and log injection. EveryRulenow states its rule.Third pass (fresh Reviewer, commit c36371f): findings F1–F6 fixed. F1 adds a cursor row with its own test. F2 limits the Direct Query row to row policies and adds column policies as a gap. F3 turns the Direct Query read record into a gap. F4 splits passwords from session ids. F5 turns the server-log row into a gap. F6 updates the counts.
Laws touched
Risk tier
B (documentation). Governed paths (
docs/, PR template):owner-merge. Reviewer pass: one independent pass on the accuracy of every row'sVerification.https://claude.ai/code/session_01MFyANPkiUZYq6rvGD2sFLf
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