Repository Visibility Manipulation via Git Push Options
| Field |
Value |
| Severity |
High |
| CVSS v3.1 Score |
7.1 |
| CVSS v3.1 Vector |
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N |
| CWE |
CWE-284: Improper Access Control |
| Affected File |
routers/private/hook_post_receive.go |
| Affected Function |
HookPostReceive() |
| Affected Lines |
173–225 |
| Prerequisite |
Attacker must have owner-level or admin collaborator access to the target repository |
Description
Gitea's post-receive git hook handler processes git push options — key-value pairs transmitted by a client during git push using the -o flag. Two undocumented push options, repo.private and repo.template, allow any user with repository owner or admin-collaborator access to toggle the visibility (private/public) and template status of a repository as a side effect of a normal git push.
This capability was originally intended solely for the "push-to-create" feature (automatically creating a repo on first push). However, the options are processed without restriction on already-existing repositories, and — critically — the visibility change bypasses every control that a proper settings change would trigger:
- No entry written to the repository's audit/activity log
- No webhook event fired (
repository event with visibility_changed action)
- No org-level notification to owners
- No team permission re-calculation
- No email alert to watchers
- The database update uses
UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime, which also suppresses the updated_at timestamp change
Vulnerable Code
routers/private/hook_post_receive.go:173–225
isPrivate := opts.GitPushOptions.Bool(private.GitPushOptionRepoPrivate) // "repo.private"
isTemplate := opts.GitPushOptions.Bool(private.GitPushOptionRepoTemplate) // "repo.template"
if isPrivate.Has() || isTemplate.Has() {
// ... loads repo and verifies pusher is owner or admin ...
if !perm.IsOwner() && !perm.IsAdmin() {
ctx.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, ...)
return
}
// FIXME: these options are not quite right, for example: changing visibility
// should do more works than just setting the is_private flag
// These options should only be used for "push-to-create"
if isPrivate.Has() && repo.IsPrivate != isPrivate.Value() {
// TODO: it needs to do more work
repo.IsPrivate = isPrivate.Value()
repo_model.UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime(ctx, repo, "is_private")
// ^^^ bypasses updated_at timestamp, audit trail suppressed
}
if isTemplate.Has() && repo.IsTemplate != isTemplate.Value() {
repo.IsTemplate = isTemplate.Value()
repo_model.UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime(ctx, repo, "is_template")
}
}
The push option constants are defined in modules/private/pushoptions.go:18–19:
GitPushOptionRepoPrivate = "repo.private"
GitPushOptionRepoTemplate = "repo.template"
Attack Scenario
Scenario A — Insider threat / rogue admin collaborator
An organization grants a contractor repo admin access to contribute to a private repository containing proprietary source code. The contractor, before their access is revoked, makes a private repo public for several minutes — long enough to clone, archive, or index the content — then makes it private again. The action leaves no audit trail distinguishable from a normal git push.
Scenario B — Supply-chain template poisoning
A repository marked as a template is used by CI/CD pipelines to generate new project repositories. An admin collaborator uses repo.template=false to silently remove the template designation, then makes changes to the repo's content, re-marks it as a template with repo.template=true, and waits for downstream consumers to regenerate projects from the now-backdoored template. The updated_at timestamp is unchanged due to UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime, making diff-detection harder.
Step-by-Step Reproduction
Prerequisites:
- A Gitea user account with either owner or admin-collaborator access to a private repository
git client with push access to the repository
Step 1 — Confirm the target repository is private
Step 2 — Clone the repository
git clone http://USER:PASSWORD@<gitea-host>/OWNER/REPO.git /tmp/target-repo
cd /tmp/target-repo
Step 3 — Make any commit (the push option rides on a real push)
echo "$(date)" >> .gitkeep
git add .gitkeep
git commit -m "routine update"
Step 4 — Execute the exploit push
# Make the repository public
git push http://USER:PASSWORD@<gitea-host>/OWNER/REPO.git main \
-o repo.private=false
# The push completes with a normal success message:
# remote: Processed 1 references in total
# To http://<gitea-host>/OWNER/REPO.git
# abc1234..def5678 main -> main
Step 5 — Verify the repository is now public
Step 6 — Restore and cover tracks
Re-make it private in the same session, leaving no visible audit trail
The repository activity feed shows only two normal push events. The visibility change is invisible.
Verification: confirm no activity log entry
Impact Details
| Impact |
Description |
| Data exfiltration |
Private source code, CI/CD secrets in plain-text files, environment configs become publicly cloneable for the window the repo is public |
| No audit trail |
UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime suppresses the updated_at change; no activity log entry; no webhook; no notification |
| Supply chain |
Combined with repo.template=true/false, an attacker can silently rotate repository template status, affecting all downstream repositories that generate from this template |
| Scope |
Affects all repos where the attacker has admin-collaborator access — not only repos they own |
Recommended Fix
Option 1 (preferred) — Remove the options from post-receive hook entirely. The repo.private and repo.template push options were designed for the push-to-create flow and have no legitimate use on existing repositories. They should be gated with:
// routers/private/hook_post_receive.go
if isPrivate.Has() || isTemplate.Has() {
if !wasEmpty {
// repo already existed — refuse these options on established repos
log.Warn("Repo push options repo.private/repo.template ignored for existing repo %s", repoName)
// do not process
} else {
// original push-to-create path only
...
}
}
Option 2 — Route through the full visibility-change service so that audit events, webhooks, and team re-syncs are triggered:
// Instead of the raw UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime call:
if err := repo_service.UpdateRepositoryVisibility(ctx, repo, isPrivate.Value()); err != nil {
...
}
Where UpdateRepositoryVisibility fires the repository webhook event and writes an activity log entry.
Repository Visibility Manipulation via Git Push Options
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:Nrouters/private/hook_post_receive.goHookPostReceive()Description
Gitea's post-receive git hook handler processes git push options — key-value pairs transmitted by a client during
git pushusing the-oflag. Two undocumented push options,repo.privateandrepo.template, allow any user with repository owner or admin-collaborator access to toggle the visibility (private/public) and template status of a repository as a side effect of a normal git push.This capability was originally intended solely for the "push-to-create" feature (automatically creating a repo on first push). However, the options are processed without restriction on already-existing repositories, and — critically — the visibility change bypasses every control that a proper settings change would trigger:
repositoryevent withvisibility_changedaction)UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime, which also suppresses theupdated_attimestamp changeVulnerable Code
routers/private/hook_post_receive.go:173–225The push option constants are defined in
modules/private/pushoptions.go:18–19:Attack Scenario
Scenario A — Insider threat / rogue admin collaborator
An organization grants a contractor repo admin access to contribute to a private repository containing proprietary source code. The contractor, before their access is revoked, makes a private repo public for several minutes — long enough to clone, archive, or index the content — then makes it private again. The action leaves no audit trail distinguishable from a normal git push.
Scenario B — Supply-chain template poisoning
A repository marked as a template is used by CI/CD pipelines to generate new project repositories. An admin collaborator uses
repo.template=falseto silently remove the template designation, then makes changes to the repo's content, re-marks it as a template withrepo.template=true, and waits for downstream consumers to regenerate projects from the now-backdoored template. Theupdated_attimestamp is unchanged due toUpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime, making diff-detection harder.Step-by-Step Reproduction
Prerequisites:
gitclient with push access to the repositoryStep 1 — Confirm the target repository is private
Step 2 — Clone the repository
Step 3 — Make any commit (the push option rides on a real push)
Step 4 — Execute the exploit push
Step 5 — Verify the repository is now public
Step 6 — Restore and cover tracks
Re-make it private in the same session, leaving no visible audit trail
The repository activity feed shows only two normal push events. The visibility change is invisible.
Verification: confirm no activity log entry
Impact Details
UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTimesuppresses theupdated_atchange; no activity log entry; no webhook; no notificationrepo.template=true/false, an attacker can silently rotate repository template status, affecting all downstream repositories that generate from this templateRecommended Fix
Option 1 (preferred) — Remove the options from post-receive hook entirely. The
repo.privateandrepo.templatepush options were designed for the push-to-create flow and have no legitimate use on existing repositories. They should be gated with:Option 2 — Route through the full visibility-change service so that audit events, webhooks, and team re-syncs are triggered:
Where
UpdateRepositoryVisibilityfires therepositorywebhook event and writes an activity log entry.