refactor(fangs): update Csrf doc and with_trusted_origins validation

ohkami/src/fang/builtin/csrf.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 use crate::{Request, Response, IntoResponse, Fang, FangProc};
 use std::sync::Arc;
 
-/// # Built-in CSRF protection fang.
+/// # Built-in CSRF protection fang
 /// 
 /// The implementation is based on  the way of Go 1.25 net/http's `CrossOriginProtection`:
 /// 
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ use std::sync::Arc;
 /// If you have multiple servers, you can use `Csrf::with_trusted_origins`
 /// to specify trusted origins.
 /// 
+/// **NOTE**: wildcards (like `https://*.a.domain`) are not supported in trusted origins.
+/// 
 /// ```no_run
 /// use ohkami::{Ohkami, Route, fang::Csrf};
 ///
@@ -63,24 +65,25 @@ impl Csrf {
         let trusted_origins = trusted_origins.into_iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
 
         for origin in &trusted_origins {
-            let Some((scheme, rest)) = origin.split_once("://") else {
-                panic!("invalid origin `{origin}`: scheme is required")
+            let Some(("http" | "https", rest)) = origin.split_once("://") else {
+                panic!("[Csrf::with_trusted_origins] invalid origin `{origin}`: 'http' or 'https' scheme is required")
             };
-            if !matches!(scheme, "http" | "https") {
-                panic!("invalid origin `{origin}`: scheme must be 'http' or 'https'");
-            }
-            if rest.contains(['/', '?', '#']) {
-                panic!("invalid origin `{origin}`: path, query and fragment are not allowed");
-            }
             let (host, port) = rest.split_once(':').map_or((rest, None), |(h, p)| (h, Some(p)));
             if port.is_some_and(|p| !p.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit())) {
-                panic!("invalid origin `{origin}`: port must be a number");
-            }
-            if !host.chars().all(|c| matches!(c, 'a'..='z' | 'A'..='Z' | '0'..='9' | '-' | '.' | '_')) {
-                panic!("invalid origin `{origin}`: invalid host");
+                panic!("[Csrf::with_trusted_origins] invalid origin `{origin}`: port must be a number");
             }
             if !host.starts_with(|c: char| c.is_ascii_alphabetic()) {
-                panic!("invalid origin `{origin}`: host must start with an alphabetic character");
+                panic!("[Csrf::with_trusted_origins] invalid origin `{origin}`: host must start with an alphabetic character");
+            }
+            if !host.split('.').all(|part|
+                !part.is_empty() && part.chars().all(|c| matches!(c, 'a'..='z' | 'A'..='Z' | '0'..='9' | '-' | '_'))
+            ) {
+                if host.contains(['/', '?', '#']) {
+                    // helpful error message for common mistake
+                    panic!("[Csrf::with_trusted_origins] invalid origin `{origin}`: path, query and fragment are not allowed");
+                } else {
+                    panic!("[Csrf::with_trusted_origins] invalid origin `{origin}`: invalid host");
+                }
             }
         }