Fix GPIO Kconfig bug & add BT host driver #1

apopple · 2015-09-29T05:26:50Z

No description provided.

The Aspeed GPIO menu entry was added under "PCI GPIO expanders" which depends on PCI which may not be enabled for Aspeed. Move the entry to the "Memory mapped GPIO drivers" which describes the Aspeed GPIO driver more correctly. Signed-off-by: Alistair Popple <[email protected]>

This patch adds a simple device driver to expose the iBT interface on Aspeed chips as a character device (/dev/bt). Signed-off-by: Alistair Popple <[email protected]>

…ap_device_late_init Kernel fails to boot 50% of times (form build to build) with RT-patchset applied due to the following race - on late boot stages deferred_probe_work_func->omap_hsmmc_probe races with omap_device_late_ini. The same issue has been reported now on linux-next (4.3) by Keerthy [1] late_initcall - deferred_probe_initcal() tries to re-probe all pending driver's probe. - later on, some driver is probing in this case It's cpsw.c (but could be any other drivers) cpsw_init - platform_driver_register - really_probe - driver_bound - driver_deferred_probe_trigger and boot proceed. So, at this moment we have deferred_probe_work_func scheduled. late_initcall_sync - omap_device_late_init - omap_device_idle CPU1 CPU2 - deferred_probe_work_func - really_probe - omap_hsmmc_probe - pm_runtime_get_sync late_initcall_sync - omap_device_late_init if (od->_driver_status != BUS_NOTIFY_BOUND_DRIVER) { if (od->_state == OMAP_DEVICE_STATE_ENABLED) { - omap_device_idle [ops - IP is disabled] - [fail] - pm_runtime_put_sync - omap_hsmmc_runtime_suspend [ooops!] == log == omap_hsmmc 480b4000.mmc: unable to get vmmc regulator -517 davinci_mdio 4848500.mdio: davinci mdio revision 1.6 davinci_mdio 4848500.mdio: detected phy mask fffffff3 libphy: 4848500.mdio: probed davinci_mdio 4848500.mdio: phy[2]: device 4848500.mdio:02, driver unknown davinci_mdio 4848500.mdio: phy[3]: device 4848500.mdio:03, driver unknown omap_hsmmc 480b4000.mmc: unable to get vmmc regulator -517 cpsw 48484000.ethernet: Detected MACID = b4:99:4c:c7:d2:48 cpsw 48484000.ethernet: cpsw: Detected MACID = b4:99:4c:c7:d2:49 hctosys: unable to open rtc device (rtc0) omap_hsmmc 480b4000.mmc: omap_device_late_idle: enabled but no driver. Idling ldousb: disabling Unhandled fault: imprecise external abort (0x1406) at 0x00000000 [00000000] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: : 1406 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 58 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted 4.1.2-rt1-00467-g6da3c0a-dirty #5 Hardware name: Generic DRA74X (Flattened Device Tree) Workqueue: deferwq deferred_probe_work_func task: ee6ddb00 ti: edd3c000 task.ti: edd3c000 PC is at omap_hsmmc_runtime_suspend+0x1c/0x12c LR is at _od_runtime_suspend+0xc/0x24 pc : [<c0471998>] lr : [<c0029590>] psr: a0000013 sp : edd3dda0 ip : ee6ddb00 fp : c07be540 r10: 00000000 r9 : c07be540 r8 : 00000008 r7 : 00000000 r6 : ee646c10 r5 : ee646c10 r4 : edd79380 r3 : fa0b4100 r2 : 00000000 r1 : 00000000 r0 : ee646c10 Flags: NzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment kernel Control: 10c5387d Table: 8000406 DAC: 00000015 Process kworker/u4:1 (pid: 58, stack limit = 0xedd3c218) Stack: (0xedd3dda0 to 0xedd3e000) dda0: ee646c70 ee646c10 c0029584 00000000 00000008 c0029590 ee646c70 ee646c10 ddc0: c0029584 c03adfb8 ee646c10 00000004 0000000c c03adff0 ee646c10 00000004 dde0: 0000000c c03ae4ec 00000000 edd3c000 ee646c10 00000004 ee646c70 00000004 de00: fa0b4000 c03aec20 ee6ddb00 ee646c10 00000004 ee646c70 ee646c10 fffffdfb de20: edd79380 00000000 fa0b4000 c03aee90 fffffdfb edd79000 ee646c00 c0474290 de40: 00000000 edda24c0 edd79380 edc81f00 00000000 00000200 00000001 c06dd488 de60: edda3960 ee646c10 ee646c10 c0824cc4 fffffdfb c0880c94 00000002 edc92600 de80: c0836378 c03a7f84 ee646c10 c0824cc4 00000000 c0880c80 c0880c94 c03a6568 dea0: 00000000 ee646c10 c03a66ac ee4f8000 00000000 00000001 edc92600 c03a4b40 dec0: ee404c94 edc83c4c ee646c10 ee646c10 ee646c4 c03a63c4 ee646c10 ee646c10 dee0: c0814448 c03a5aa8 ee646c10 c0814220 edd3c000 c03a5ec0 c0814250 ee6be400 df00: edd3c000 c004e5b ee6ddb01 00000078 ee6ddb00 ee4f8000 ee6be418 edd3c000 df20: ee4f8028 00000088 c0836045 ee4f8000 ee6be400 c004e928 ee4f8028 00000000 df40: c004e8ec 00000000 ee6bf1c0 ee6be400 c004e8ec 00000000 00000000 00000000 df60: 00000000 c0053450 2e56fa97 00000000 afdffbd7 ee6be400 00000000 00000000 df80: edd3df80 edd3df80 00000000 00000000 edd3df9 edd3df9 edd3dfac ee6bf1c0 dfa0: c0053384 00000000 00000000 c000f668 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 dfc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 dfe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 f1fc9d7e febfbdff [<c0471998>] (omap_hsmmc_runtime_suspend) from [<c0029590>] (_od_runtime_suspend+0xc/0x24) [<c0029590>] (_od_runtime_suspend) from [<c03adfb8>] (__rpm_callback+0x24/0x3c) [<c03adfb8>] (__rpm_callback) from [<c03adff0>] (rpm_callback+0x20/0x80) [<c03adff0>] (rpm_callback) from [<c03ae4ec>] (rpm_suspend+0xe4/0x618) [<c03ae4ec>] (rpm_suspend) from [<c03aee90>] (__pm_runtime_idle+0x60/0x80) [<c03aee90>] (__pm_runtime_idle) from [<c0474290>] (omap_hsmmc_probe+0x6bc/0xa7c) [<c0474290>] (omap_hsmmc_probe) from [<c03a7f84>] (platform_drv_probe+0x44/0xa4) [<c03a7f84>] (platform_drv_probe) from [<c03a6568>] (driver_probe_device+0x170/0x2b4) [<c03a6568>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c03a4b40>] (bus_for_each_drv+0x64/0x98) [<c03a4b40>] (bus_for_each_drv) from [<c03a63c4>] (device_attach+0x70/0x88) [<c03a63c4>] (device_attach) from [<c03a5aa8>] (bus_probe_device+0x84/0xac) [<c03a5aa8>] (bus_probe_device) from [<c03a5ec0>] (deferred_probe_work_func+0x58/0x88) [<c03a5ec0>] (deferred_probe_work_func) from [<c004e5bc>] (process_one_work+0x134/0x464) [<c004e5bc>] (process_one_work) from [<c004e928>] (worker_thread+0x3c/0x4fc) [<c004e928>] (worker_thread) from [<c0053450>] (kthread+0xcc/0xe4) [<c0053450>] (kthread) from [<c000f668>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c) Code: e594302c e593202c e584205c e594302c (e5932128) ---[ end trace 0000000000000002 ]--- The issue happens because omap_device_late_init() do not take into account that some drivers are present, but their probes were not finished successfully and where deferred instead. This is the valid case, and omap_device_late_init() should not idle such devices. To fix this issue, the value of omap_device->_driver_status field should be checked not only for BUS_NOTIFY_BOUND_DRIVER (driver is present and has been bound to device successfully), but also checked for BUS_NOTIFY_BIND_DRIVER (driver about to be bound) - which means driver is present and there was try to bind it to device. [1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg441880.html Cc: Tero Kristo <[email protected]> Cc: Keerthy <[email protected]> Tested-by: Keerthy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Grygorii Strashko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>

On old ARM chips, unaligned accesses to memory are not trapped and fixed. On module load, symbols are relocated, and the relocation of __bug_table symbols is done on a u32 basis. Yet the section is not aligned to a multiple of 4 address, but to a multiple of 2. This triggers an Oops on pxa architecture, where address 0xbf0021ea is the first relocation in the __bug_table section : apply_relocate(): pxa3xx_nand: section 13 reloc 0 sym '' Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address bf0021ea pgd = e1cd0000 [bf0021ea] *pgd=c1cce851, *pte=c1cde04f, *ppte=c1cde01f Internal error: Oops: 23 [#1] ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 606 Comm: insmod Not tainted 4.2.0-rc8-next-20150828-cm-x300+ torvalds#887 Hardware name: CM-X300 module task: e1c68700 ti: e1c3e000 task.ti: e1c3e000 PC is at apply_relocate+0x2f4/0x3d4 LR is at 0xbf0021ea pc : [<c000e7c8>] lr : [<bf0021ea>] psr: 80000013 sp : e1c3fe30 ip : 60000013 fp : e49e8c60 r10: e49e8fa8 r9 : 00000000 r8 : e49e7c58 r7 : e49e8c38 r6 : e49e8a58 r5 : e49e8920 r4 : e49e8918 r3 : bf0021ea r2 : bf007034 r1 : 00000000 r0 : bf000000 Flags: Nzcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: 0000397f Table: c1cd0018 DAC: 00000051 Process insmod (pid: 606, stack limit = 0xe1c3e198) [<c000e7c8>] (apply_relocate) from [<c005ce5c>] (load_module+0x1248/0x1f5c) [<c005ce5c>] (load_module) from [<c005dc54>] (SyS_init_module+0xe4/0x170) [<c005dc54>] (SyS_init_module) from [<c000a420>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x38) Fix this by ensuring entries in __bug_table are all aligned to at least of multiple of 4. This transforms a module section __bug_table as : - [12] __bug_table PROGBITS 00000000 002232 000018 00 A 0 0 1 + [12] __bug_table PROGBITS 00000000 002232 000018 00 A 0 0 4 Signed-off-by: Robert Jarzmik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>

The renesas-irqc interrupt controller is cascaded to the GIC. Hence when propagating wake-up settings to its parent interrupt controller, the following lockdep warning is printed: ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 4.2.0-ape6evm-10725-g50fcd7643c034198 torvalds#280 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- s2ram/1072 is trying to acquire lock: (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}, at: [<c008d3fc>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0x98 but task is already holding lock: (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}, at: [<c008d3fc>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0x98 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 6 locks held by s2ram/1072: #0: (sb_writers#7){.+.+.+}, at: [<c012eb14>] __sb_start_write+0xa0/0xa8 #1: (&of->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c019396c>] kernfs_fop_write+0x4c/0x1bc #2: (s_active#24){.+.+.+}, at: [<c0193974>] kernfs_fop_write+0x54/0x1bc #3: (pm_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c008213c>] pm_suspend+0x10c/0x510 #4: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c02af3c4>] __device_suspend+0xdc/0x2cc #5: (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}, at: [<c008d3fc>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0x98 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 1072 Comm: s2ram Not tainted 4.2.0-ape6evm-10725-g50fcd7643c034198 torvalds#280 Hardware name: Generic R8A73A4 (Flattened Device Tree) [<c0018078>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c00144f0>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c00144f0>] (show_stack) from [<c0451f14>] (dump_stack+0x88/0x98) [<c0451f14>] (dump_stack) from [<c007b29c>] (__lock_acquire+0x15cc/0x20e4) [<c007b29c>] (__lock_acquire) from [<c007c6e0>] (lock_acquire+0xac/0x12c) [<c007c6e0>] (lock_acquire) from [<c0457c00>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x40/0x54) [<c0457c00>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c008d3fc>] (__irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0x98) [<c008d3fc>] (__irq_get_desc_lock) from [<c008ebbc>] (irq_set_irq_wake+0x20/0xf8) [<c008ebbc>] (irq_set_irq_wake) from [<c0260770>] (irqc_irq_set_wake+0x20/0x4c) [<c0260770>] (irqc_irq_set_wake) from [<c008ec28>] (irq_set_irq_wake+0x8c/0xf8) [<c008ec28>] (irq_set_irq_wake) from [<c02cb8c0>] (gpio_keys_suspend+0x74/0xc0) [<c02cb8c0>] (gpio_keys_suspend) from [<c02ae8cc>] (dpm_run_callback+0x54/0x124) Avoid this false positive by using a separate lockdep class for IRQC interrupts. Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]> Cc: Grygorii Strashko <[email protected]> Cc: Magnus Damm <[email protected]> Cc: Jason Cooper <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1441798974-25716-2-git-send-email-geert%[email protected] Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>

The renesas-intc-irqpin interrupt controller is cascaded to the GIC. Hence when propagating wake-up settings to its parent interrupt controller, the following lockdep warning is printed: ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 4.2.0-armadillo-10725-g50fcd7643c034198 torvalds#781 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- s2ram/1179 is trying to acquire lock: (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}, at: [<c005bb54>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x78/0x94 but task is already holding lock: (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}, at: [<c005bb54>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x78/0x94 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 7 locks held by s2ram/1179: #0: (sb_writers#7){.+.+.+}, at: [<c00c9708>] __sb_start_write+0x64/0xb8 #1: (&of->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0125a00>] kernfs_fop_write+0x78/0x1a0 #2: (s_active#23){.+.+.+}, at: [<c0125a08>] kernfs_fop_write+0x80/0x1a0 #3: (autosleep_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0058244>] pm_autosleep_lock+0x18/0x20 #4: (pm_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0057e50>] pm_suspend+0x54/0x248 #5: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c0243a20>] __device_suspend+0xdc/0x240 #6: (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}, at: [<c005bb54>] __irq_get_desc_lock+0x78/0x94 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 1179 Comm: s2ram Not tainted 4.2.0-armadillo-10725-g50fcd7643c034198 Hardware name: Generic R8A7740 (Flattened Device Tree) [<c00129f4>] (dump_backtrace) from [<c0012bec>] (show_stack+0x18/0x1c) [<c0012bd4>] (show_stack) from [<c03f5d94>] (dump_stack+0x20/0x28) [<c03f5d74>] (dump_stack) from [<c00514d4>] (__lock_acquire+0x67c/0x1b88) [<c0050e58>] (__lock_acquire) from [<c0052df8>] (lock_acquire+0x9c/0xbc) [<c0052d5c>] (lock_acquire) from [<c03fb068>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x58) [<c03fb024>] (_raw_spin_lock_irqsave) from [<c005bb54>] (__irq_get_desc_lock+0x78/0x94 [<c005badc>] (__irq_get_desc_lock) from [<c005c3d8>] (irq_set_irq_wake+0x28/0x100) [<c005c3b0>] (irq_set_irq_wake) from [<c01e50d0>] (intc_irqpin_irq_set_wake+0x24/0x4c) [<c01e50ac>] (intc_irqpin_irq_set_wake) from [<c005c17c>] (set_irq_wake_real+0x3c/0x50 [<c005c140>] (set_irq_wake_real) from [<c005c414>] (irq_set_irq_wake+0x64/0x100) [<c005c3b0>] (irq_set_irq_wake) from [<c02a19b4>] (gpio_keys_suspend+0x60/0xa0) [<c02a1954>] (gpio_keys_suspend) from [<c023b750>] (platform_pm_suspend+0x3c/0x5c) Avoid this false positive by using a separate lockdep class for INTC External IRQ Pin interrupts. Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]> Cc: Grygorii Strashko <[email protected]> Cc: Magnus Damm <[email protected]> Cc: Jason Cooper <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1441798974-25716-3-git-send-email-geert%[email protected] Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>

The OPP list needs to be protected against concurrent accesses. Using simple RCU read locks does the trick and gets rid of the following lockdep warning: =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.2.0-next-20150908 #1 Not tainted ------------------------------- drivers/base/power/opp.c:460 Missing rcu_read_lock() or dev_opp_list_lock protection! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 4 locks held by kworker/u8:0/6: #0: ("%s""deferwq"){++++.+}, at: [<c0040d8c>] process_one_work+0x118/0x4bc #1: (deferred_probe_work){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0040d8c>] process_one_work+0x118/0x4bc #2: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<c03b8194>] __device_attach+0x20/0x118 #3: (prepare_lock){+.+...}, at: [<c054bc08>] clk_prepare_lock+0x10/0xf8 stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 6 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Not tainted 4.2.0-next-20150908 #1 Hardware name: NVIDIA Tegra SoC (Flattened Device Tree) Workqueue: deferwq deferred_probe_work_func [<c001802c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c00135a4>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c00135a4>] (show_stack) from [<c02a8418>] (dump_stack+0x94/0xd4) [<c02a8418>] (dump_stack) from [<c03c6f6c>] (dev_pm_opp_find_freq_ceil+0x108/0x114) [<c03c6f6c>] (dev_pm_opp_find_freq_ceil) from [<c0551a3c>] (dfll_calculate_rate_request+0xb8/0x170) [<c0551a3c>] (dfll_calculate_rate_request) from [<c0551b10>] (dfll_clk_round_rate+0x1c/0x2c) [<c0551b10>] (dfll_clk_round_rate) from [<c054de2c>] (clk_calc_new_rates+0x1b8/0x228) [<c054de2c>] (clk_calc_new_rates) from [<c054e44c>] (clk_core_set_rate_nolock+0x44/0xac) [<c054e44c>] (clk_core_set_rate_nolock) from [<c054e4d8>] (clk_set_rate+0x24/0x34) [<c054e4d8>] (clk_set_rate) from [<c0512460>] (tegra124_cpufreq_probe+0x120/0x230) [<c0512460>] (tegra124_cpufreq_probe) from [<c03b9cbc>] (platform_drv_probe+0x44/0xac) [<c03b9cbc>] (platform_drv_probe) from [<c03b84c8>] (driver_probe_device+0x218/0x304) [<c03b84c8>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c03b69b0>] (bus_for_each_drv+0x60/0x94) [<c03b69b0>] (bus_for_each_drv) from [<c03b8228>] (__device_attach+0xb4/0x118) ata1: SATA link down (SStatus 0 SControl 300) [<c03b8228>] (__device_attach) from [<c03b77c8>] (bus_probe_device+0x88/0x90) [<c03b77c8>] (bus_probe_device) from [<c03b7be8>] (deferred_probe_work_func+0x58/0x8c) [<c03b7be8>] (deferred_probe_work_func) from [<c0040dfc>] (process_one_work+0x188/0x4bc) [<c0040dfc>] (process_one_work) from [<c004117c>] (worker_thread+0x4c/0x4f4) [<c004117c>] (worker_thread) from [<c0047230>] (kthread+0xe4/0xf8) [<c0047230>] (kthread) from [<c000f7d0>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24) Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <[email protected]> Fixes: c4fe70a ("clk: tegra: Add closed loop support for the DFLL") [[email protected]: Unlock rcu on error path] Signed-off-by: Vince Hsu <[email protected]> [[email protected]: Dropped second hunk that nested the rcu read lock unnecessarily] Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>

If filelayout_decode_layout fail, _filelayout_free_lseg will causes a double freeing of fh_array. [ 1179.279800] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 1179.280198] IP: [<ffffffffa027222d>] filelayout_free_fh_array.isra.11+0x1d/0x70 [nfs_layout_nfsv41_files] [ 1179.281010] PGD 0 [ 1179.281443] Oops: 0000 [#1] [ 1179.281831] Modules linked in: nfs_layout_nfsv41_files(OE) nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) xfs libcrc32c coretemp nfsd crct10dif_pclmul ppdev crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel auth_rpcgss ghash_clmulni_intel nfs_acl lockd vmw_balloon grace sunrpc parport_pc vmw_vmci parport shpchp i2c_piix4 vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm serio_raw mptspi scsi_transport_spi mptscsih e1000 mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: fscache] [ 1179.283891] CPU: 0 PID: 13336 Comm: cat Tainted: G OE 4.3.0-rc1-pnfs+ torvalds#244 [ 1179.284323] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014 [ 1179.285206] task: ffff8800501d48c0 ti: ffff88003e3c4000 task.ti: ffff88003e3c4000 [ 1179.285668] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa027222d>] [<ffffffffa027222d>] filelayout_free_fh_array.isra.11+0x1d/0x70 [nfs_layout_nfsv41_files] [ 1179.286612] RSP: 0018:ffff88003e3c77f8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 1179.287092] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88001fe78900 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1179.287731] RDX: ffffea0000f40760 RSI: ffff88001fe789c8 RDI: ffff88001fe789c0 [ 1179.288383] RBP: ffff88003e3c7810 R08: ffffea0000f40760 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1179.289170] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88001fe789c8 [ 1179.289959] R13: ffff88001fe789c0 R14: ffff88004ec05a80 R15: ffff88004f935b88 [ 1179.290791] FS: 00007f4e66bb5700(0000) GS:ffffffff81c29000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1179.291580] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1179.292209] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000203f8000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 [ 1179.292731] Stack: [ 1179.293195] ffff88001fe78900 00000000000000d0 ffff88001fe78178 ffff88003e3c7868 [ 1179.293676] ffffffffa0272737 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 ffff88001fe78800 [ 1179.294151] 00000000614fffce ffffffff81727671 ffff88001fe78100 ffff88001fe78100 [ 1179.294623] Call Trace: [ 1179.295092] [<ffffffffa0272737>] filelayout_alloc_lseg+0xa7/0x2d0 [nfs_layout_nfsv41_files] [ 1179.295625] [<ffffffff81727671>] ? out_of_line_wait_on_bit+0x81/0xb0 [ 1179.296133] [<ffffffffa040407e>] pnfs_layout_process+0xae/0x320 [nfsv4] [ 1179.296632] [<ffffffffa03e0a01>] nfs4_proc_layoutget+0x2b1/0x360 [nfsv4] [ 1179.297134] [<ffffffffa0402983>] pnfs_update_layout+0x853/0xb30 [nfsv4] [ 1179.297632] [<ffffffffa039db24>] ? nfs_get_lock_context+0x74/0x170 [nfs] [ 1179.298158] [<ffffffffa0271807>] filelayout_pg_init_read+0x37/0x50 [nfs_layout_nfsv41_files] [ 1179.298834] [<ffffffffa03a72d9>] __nfs_pageio_add_request+0x119/0x460 [nfs] [ 1179.299385] [<ffffffffa03a6bd7>] ? nfs_create_request.part.9+0x37/0x2e0 [nfs] [ 1179.299872] [<ffffffffa03a7cc3>] nfs_pageio_add_request+0xa3/0x1b0 [nfs] [ 1179.300362] [<ffffffffa03a8635>] readpage_async_filler+0x85/0x260 [nfs] [ 1179.300907] [<ffffffff81180cb1>] read_cache_pages+0x91/0xd0 [ 1179.301391] [<ffffffffa03a85b0>] ? nfs_read_completion+0x220/0x220 [nfs] [ 1179.301867] [<ffffffffa03a8dc8>] nfs_readpages+0x128/0x200 [nfs] [ 1179.302330] [<ffffffff81180ef3>] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x203/0x280 [ 1179.302784] [<ffffffff81180dc8>] ? __do_page_cache_readahead+0xd8/0x280 [ 1179.303413] [<ffffffff81181116>] ondemand_readahead+0x1a6/0x2f0 [ 1179.303855] [<ffffffff81181371>] page_cache_sync_readahead+0x31/0x50 [ 1179.304286] [<ffffffff811750a6>] generic_file_read_iter+0x4a6/0x5c0 [ 1179.304711] [<ffffffffa03a0316>] ? __nfs_revalidate_mapping+0x1f6/0x240 [nfs] [ 1179.305132] [<ffffffffa039ccf2>] nfs_file_read+0x52/0xa0 [nfs] [ 1179.305540] [<ffffffff811e343c>] __vfs_read+0xcc/0x100 [ 1179.305936] [<ffffffff811e3d15>] vfs_read+0x85/0x130 [ 1179.306326] [<ffffffff811e4a98>] SyS_read+0x58/0xd0 [ 1179.306708] [<ffffffff8172caaf>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76 [ 1179.307094] Code: c4 66 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 53 8b 07 49 89 f4 85 c0 74 47 48 8b 06 49 89 fd <48> 8b 38 48 85 ff 74 22 31 db eb 0c 48 63 d3 48 8b 3c d0 48 85 [ 1179.308357] RIP [<ffffffffa027222d>] filelayout_free_fh_array.isra.11+0x1d/0x70 [nfs_layout_nfsv41_files] [ 1179.309177] RSP <ffff88003e3c77f8> [ 1179.309582] CR2: 0000000000000000 Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>

If we didn't call ATMARP_MKIP before ATMARP_ENCAP the VCC descriptor is non-existant and we'll end up dereferencing a NULL ptr: [1033173.491930] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory accessirq event stamp: 123386 [1033173.493678] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN [1033173.493689] Modules linked in: [1033173.493697] CPU: 9 PID: 23815 Comm: trinity-c64 Not tainted 4.2.0-next-20150911-sasha-00043-g353d875-dirty #2545 [1033173.493706] task: ffff8800630c4000 ti: ffff880063110000 task.ti: ffff880063110000 [1033173.493823] RIP: clip_ioctl (net/atm/clip.c:320 net/atm/clip.c:689) [1033173.493826] RSP: 0018:ffff880063117a88 EFLAGS: 00010203 [1033173.493828] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000000c [1033173.493830] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffffb3f10720 RDI: 0000000000000014 [1033173.493832] RBP: ffff880063117b80 R08: ffff88047574d9a4 R09: 0000000000000000 [1033173.493834] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 1ffff1000c622f53 [1033173.493836] R13: ffff8800cb905500 R14: ffff8808d6da2000 R15: 00000000fffffdfd [1033173.493840] FS: 00007fa56b92d700(0000) GS:ffff880478000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [1033173.493843] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [1033173.493845] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000630e8000 CR4: 00000000000006a0 [1033173.493855] Stack: [1033173.493862] ffffffffb0b60444 000000000000eaea 0000000041b58ab3 ffffffffb3c3ce32 [1033173.493867] ffffffffb0b6f3e0 ffffffffb0b60444 ffffffffb5ea2e50 1ffff1000c622f5e [1033173.493873] ffff8800630c4cd8 00000000000ee09a ffffffffb3ec4888 ffffffffb5ea2de8 [1033173.493874] Call Trace: [1033173.494108] do_vcc_ioctl (net/atm/ioctl.c:170) [1033173.494113] vcc_ioctl (net/atm/ioctl.c:189) [1033173.494116] svc_ioctl (net/atm/svc.c:605) [1033173.494200] sock_do_ioctl (net/socket.c:874) [1033173.494204] sock_ioctl (net/socket.c:958) [1033173.494244] do_vfs_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:43 fs/ioctl.c:607) [1033173.494290] SyS_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:622 fs/ioctl.c:613) [1033173.494295] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:186) [1033173.494362] Code: fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 50 09 00 00 49 8b 9e 60 06 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 7b 14 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 48 89 fa 83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 14 09 00 All code ======== 0: fa cli 1: 48 c1 ea 03 shr $0x3,%rdx 5: 80 3c 02 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rdx,%rax,1) 9: 0f 85 50 09 00 00 jne 0x95f f: 49 8b 9e 60 06 00 00 mov 0x660(%r14),%rbx 16: 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 movabs $0xdffffc0000000000,%rax 1d: fc ff df 20: 48 8d 7b 14 lea 0x14(%rbx),%rdi 24: 48 89 fa mov %rdi,%rdx 27: 48 c1 ea 03 shr $0x3,%rdx 2b:* 0f b6 04 02 movzbl (%rdx,%rax,1),%eax <-- trapping instruction 2f: 48 89 fa mov %rdi,%rdx 32: 83 e2 07 and $0x7,%edx 35: 38 d0 cmp %dl,%al 37: 7f 08 jg 0x41 39: 84 c0 test %al,%al 3b: 0f 85 14 09 00 00 jne 0x955 Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== 0: 0f b6 04 02 movzbl (%rdx,%rax,1),%eax 4: 48 89 fa mov %rdi,%rdx 7: 83 e2 07 and $0x7,%edx a: 38 d0 cmp %dl,%al c: 7f 08 jg 0x16 e: 84 c0 test %al,%al 10: 0f 85 14 09 00 00 jne 0x92a [1033173.494366] RIP clip_ioctl (net/atm/clip.c:320 net/atm/clip.c:689) [1033173.494368] RSP <ffff880063117a88> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

Commit b6d3096 (Input: uinput - switch to using for_each_set_bit()) switched driver to use for_each_set_bit(). However during initial write of the uinput structure that contains min/max data for all possible axes none of them are reflected in dev->absbit yet and so we were skipping over all of them and were not allocating absinfo memory which caused crash later when driver tried to sens EV_ABS events: <1>[ 15.064330] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000024 <1>[ 15.064336] IP: [<ffffffff8163f142>] input_handle_event+0x232/0x4e0 <4>[ 15.064343] PGD 0 <4>[ 15.064345] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Fixes: b6d3096 Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Stephen Chandler Paul <[email protected]> Tested-by: Stephen Chandler Paul <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>

A deadlock trace is seen in netcp driver with lockup detector enabled. The trace log is provided below for reference. This patch fixes the bug by removing the usage of netcp_modules_lock within ndo_ops functions. ndo_{open/close/ioctl)() is already called with rtnl_lock held. So there is no need to hold another mutex for serialization across processes on multiple cores. So remove use of netcp_modules_lock mutex from these ndo ops functions. ndo_set_rx_mode() shouldn't be using a mutex as it is called from atomic context. In the case of ndo_set_rx_mode(), there can be call to this API without rtnl_lock held from an atomic context. As the underlying modules are expected to add address to a hardware table, it is to be protected across concurrent updates and hence a spin lock is used to synchronize the access. Same with ndo_vlan_rx_add_vid() & ndo_vlan_rx_kill_vid(). Probably the netcp_modules_lock is used to protect the module not being removed as part of rmmod. Currently this is not fully implemented and assumes the interface is brought down before doing rmmod of modules. The support for rmmmod while interface is up is expected in a future patch set when additional modules such as pa, qos are added. For now all of the tests such as if up/down, reboot, iperf works fine with this patch applied. Deadlock trace seen with lockup detector enabled is shown below for reference. [ 16.863014] ====================================================== [ 16.869183] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [ 16.875441] 4.1.6-01265-gfb1e101 #1 Tainted: G W [ 16.881176] ------------------------------------------------------- [ 16.887432] ifconfig/1662 is trying to acquire lock: [ 16.892386] (netcp_modules_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<c03e8110>] netcp_ndo_open+0x168/0x518 [ 16.900321] [ 16.900321] but task is already holding lock: [ 16.906144] (rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c053a418>] devinet_ioctl+0xf8/0x7e4 [ 16.913206] [ 16.913206] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 16.913206] [ 16.921372] [ 16.921372] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 16.928844] -> #1 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}: [ 16.932865] [<c06023f0>] mutex_lock_nested+0x68/0x4a8 [ 16.938521] [<c04c5758>] register_netdev+0xc/0x24 [ 16.943831] [<c03e65c0>] netcp_module_probe+0x214/0x2ec [ 16.949660] [<c03e8a54>] netcp_register_module+0xd4/0x140 [ 16.955663] [<c089654c>] keystone_gbe_init+0x10/0x28 [ 16.961233] [<c000977c>] do_one_initcall+0xb8/0x1f8 [ 16.966714] [<c0867e04>] kernel_init_freeable+0x148/0x1e8 [ 16.972720] [<c05f9994>] kernel_init+0xc/0xe8 [ 16.977682] [<c0010038>] ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c [ 16.982905] -> #0 (netcp_modules_lock){+.+.+.}: [ 16.987619] [<c006eab0>] lock_acquire+0x118/0x320 [ 16.992928] [<c06023f0>] mutex_lock_nested+0x68/0x4a8 [ 16.998582] [<c03e8110>] netcp_ndo_open+0x168/0x518 [ 17.004064] [<c04c48f0>] __dev_open+0xa8/0x10c [ 17.009112] [<c04c4b74>] __dev_change_flags+0x94/0x144 [ 17.014853] [<c04c4c3c>] dev_change_flags+0x18/0x48 [ 17.020334] [<c053a9fc>] devinet_ioctl+0x6dc/0x7e4 [ 17.025729] [<c04a59ec>] sock_ioctl+0x1d0/0x2a8 [ 17.030865] [<c0142844>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x41c/0x688 [ 17.036173] [<c0142ae4>] SyS_ioctl+0x34/0x5c [ 17.041046] [<c000ff60>] ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54 [ 17.046441] [ 17.046441] other info that might help us debug this: [ 17.046441] [ 17.054434] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 17.054434] [ 17.060343] CPU0 CPU1 [ 17.064862] ---- ---- [ 17.069381] lock(rtnl_mutex); [ 17.072522] lock(netcp_modules_lock); [ 17.078875] lock(rtnl_mutex); [ 17.084532] lock(netcp_modules_lock); [ 17.088366] [ 17.088366] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 17.088366] [ 17.094279] 1 lock held by ifconfig/1662: [ 17.098278] #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c053a418>] devinet_ioctl+0xf8/0x7e4 [ 17.105774] [ 17.105774] stack backtrace: [ 17.110124] CPU: 1 PID: 1662 Comm: ifconfig Tainted: G W 4.1.6-01265-gfb1e101 #1 [ 17.118637] Hardware name: Keystone [ 17.122123] [<c00178e4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0013cbc>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 17.129862] [<c0013cbc>] (show_stack) from [<c05ff450>] (dump_stack+0x84/0xc4) [ 17.137079] [<c05ff450>] (dump_stack) from [<c0068e34>] (print_circular_bug+0x210/0x330) [ 17.145161] [<c0068e34>] (print_circular_bug) from [<c006ab7c>] (validate_chain.isra.35+0xf98/0x13ac) [ 17.154372] [<c006ab7c>] (validate_chain.isra.35) from [<c006da60>] (__lock_acquire+0x52c/0xcc0) [ 17.163149] [<c006da60>] (__lock_acquire) from [<c006eab0>] (lock_acquire+0x118/0x320) [ 17.171058] [<c006eab0>] (lock_acquire) from [<c06023f0>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x68/0x4a8) [ 17.179140] [<c06023f0>] (mutex_lock_nested) from [<c03e8110>] (netcp_ndo_open+0x168/0x518) [ 17.187484] [<c03e8110>] (netcp_ndo_open) from [<c04c48f0>] (__dev_open+0xa8/0x10c) [ 17.195133] [<c04c48f0>] (__dev_open) from [<c04c4b74>] (__dev_change_flags+0x94/0x144) [ 17.203129] [<c04c4b74>] (__dev_change_flags) from [<c04c4c3c>] (dev_change_flags+0x18/0x48) [ 17.211560] [<c04c4c3c>] (dev_change_flags) from [<c053a9fc>] (devinet_ioctl+0x6dc/0x7e4) [ 17.219729] [<c053a9fc>] (devinet_ioctl) from [<c04a59ec>] (sock_ioctl+0x1d0/0x2a8) [ 17.227378] [<c04a59ec>] (sock_ioctl) from [<c0142844>] (do_vfs_ioctl+0x41c/0x688) [ 17.234939] [<c0142844>] (do_vfs_ioctl) from [<c0142ae4>] (SyS_ioctl+0x34/0x5c) [ 17.242242] [<c0142ae4>] (SyS_ioctl) from [<c000ff60>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54) [ 17.258855] netcp-1.0 2620110.netcp eth0: Link is Up - 1Gbps/Full - flow control off [ 17.271282] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:616 [ 17.279712] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1662, name: ifconfig [ 17.286500] INFO: lockdep is turned off. [ 17.290413] Preemption disabled at:[< (null)>] (null) [ 17.295728] [ 17.297214] CPU: 1 PID: 1662 Comm: ifconfig Tainted: G W 4.1.6-01265-gfb1e101 #1 [ 17.305735] Hardware name: Keystone [ 17.309223] [<c00178e4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0013cbc>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 17.316970] [<c0013cbc>] (show_stack) from [<c05ff450>] (dump_stack+0x84/0xc4) [ 17.324194] [<c05ff450>] (dump_stack) from [<c06023b0>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x28/0x4a8) [ 17.332112] [<c06023b0>] (mutex_lock_nested) from [<c03e9840>] (netcp_set_rx_mode+0x160/0x210) [ 17.340724] [<c03e9840>] (netcp_set_rx_mode) from [<c04c483c>] (dev_set_rx_mode+0x1c/0x28) [ 17.348982] [<c04c483c>] (dev_set_rx_mode) from [<c04c490c>] (__dev_open+0xc4/0x10c) [ 17.356724] [<c04c490c>] (__dev_open) from [<c04c4b74>] (__dev_change_flags+0x94/0x144) [ 17.364729] [<c04c4b74>] (__dev_change_flags) from [<c04c4c3c>] (dev_change_flags+0x18/0x48) [ 17.373166] [<c04c4c3c>] (dev_change_flags) from [<c053a9fc>] (devinet_ioctl+0x6dc/0x7e4) [ 17.381344] [<c053a9fc>] (devinet_ioctl) from [<c04a59ec>] (sock_ioctl+0x1d0/0x2a8) [ 17.388994] [<c04a59ec>] (sock_ioctl) from [<c0142844>] (do_vfs_ioctl+0x41c/0x688) [ 17.396563] [<c0142844>] (do_vfs_ioctl) from [<c0142ae4>] (SyS_ioctl+0x34/0x5c) [ 17.403873] [<c0142ae4>] (SyS_ioctl) from [<c000ff60>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54) [ 17.413772] IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_UP): eth0: link is not ready udhcpc (v1.20.2) started Sending discover... [ 18.690666] netcp-1.0 2620110.netcp eth0: Link is Up - 1Gbps/Full - flow control off Sending discover... [ 22.250972] netcp-1.0 2620110.netcp eth0: Link is Up - 1Gbps/Full - flow control off [ 22.258721] IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_CHANGE): eth0: link becomes ready [ 22.265458] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:616 [ 22.273896] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 342, name: kworker/1:1 [ 22.280854] INFO: lockdep is turned off. [ 22.284767] Preemption disabled at:[< (null)>] (null) [ 22.290074] [ 22.291568] CPU: 1 PID: 342 Comm: kworker/1:1 Tainted: G W 4.1.6-01265-gfb1e101 #1 [ 22.300255] Hardware name: Keystone [ 22.303750] Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work [ 22.308895] [<c00178e4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0013cbc>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 22.316643] [<c0013cbc>] (show_stack) from [<c05ff450>] (dump_stack+0x84/0xc4) [ 22.323867] [<c05ff450>] (dump_stack) from [<c06023b0>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x28/0x4a8) [ 22.331786] [<c06023b0>] (mutex_lock_nested) from [<c03e9840>] (netcp_set_rx_mode+0x160/0x210) [ 22.340394] [<c03e9840>] (netcp_set_rx_mode) from [<c04c9d18>] (__dev_mc_add+0x54/0x68) [ 22.348401] [<c04c9d18>] (__dev_mc_add) from [<c05ab358>] (igmp6_group_added+0x168/0x1b4) [ 22.356580] [<c05ab358>] (igmp6_group_added) from [<c05ad2cc>] (ipv6_dev_mc_inc+0x4f0/0x5a8) [ 22.365019] [<c05ad2cc>] (ipv6_dev_mc_inc) from [<c058f0d0>] (addrconf_dad_work+0x21c/0x33c) [ 22.373460] [<c058f0d0>] (addrconf_dad_work) from [<c0042850>] (process_one_work+0x214/0x8d0) [ 22.381986] [<c0042850>] (process_one_work) from [<c0042f54>] (worker_thread+0x48/0x4bc) [ 22.390071] [<c0042f54>] (worker_thread) from [<c004868c>] (kthread+0xf0/0x108) [ 22.397381] [<c004868c>] (kthread) from [<c0010038>] Trace related to incorrect usage of mutex inside ndo_set_rx_mode [ 24.086066] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:616 [ 24.094506] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1682, name: ifconfig [ 24.101291] INFO: lockdep is turned off. [ 24.105203] Preemption disabled at:[< (null)>] (null) [ 24.110511] [ 24.112005] CPU: 2 PID: 1682 Comm: ifconfig Tainted: G W 4.1.6-01265-gfb1e101 #1 [ 24.120518] Hardware name: Keystone [ 24.124018] [<c00178e4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0013cbc>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 24.131772] [<c0013cbc>] (show_stack) from [<c05ff450>] (dump_stack+0x84/0xc4) [ 24.138989] [<c05ff450>] (dump_stack) from [<c06023b0>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x28/0x4a8) [ 24.146908] [<c06023b0>] (mutex_lock_nested) from [<c03e9840>] (netcp_set_rx_mode+0x160/0x210) [ 24.155523] [<c03e9840>] (netcp_set_rx_mode) from [<c04c483c>] (dev_set_rx_mode+0x1c/0x28) [ 24.163787] [<c04c483c>] (dev_set_rx_mode) from [<c04c490c>] (__dev_open+0xc4/0x10c) [ 24.171531] [<c04c490c>] (__dev_open) from [<c04c4b74>] (__dev_change_flags+0x94/0x144) [ 24.179528] [<c04c4b74>] (__dev_change_flags) from [<c04c4c3c>] (dev_change_flags+0x18/0x48) [ 24.187966] [<c04c4c3c>] (dev_change_flags) from [<c053a9fc>] (devinet_ioctl+0x6dc/0x7e4) [ 24.196145] [<c053a9fc>] (devinet_ioctl) from [<c04a59ec>] (sock_ioctl+0x1d0/0x2a8) [ 24.203803] [<c04a59ec>] (sock_ioctl) from [<c0142844>] (do_vfs_ioctl+0x41c/0x688) [ 24.211373] [<c0142844>] (do_vfs_ioctl) from [<c0142ae4>] (SyS_ioctl+0x34/0x5c) [ 24.218676] [<c0142ae4>] (SyS_ioctl) from [<c000ff60>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54) [ 24.227156] IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_UP): eth1: link is not ready Signed-off-by: Murali Karicheri <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

Jonathan Liu reports that the recent addition of CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN causes wpa_supplicant to die due to the following kernel oops: Unhandled fault: page domain fault (0x81b) at 0x001017a2 pgd = ee1b8000 [001017a2] *pgd=6ebee831, *pte=6c35475f, *ppte=6c354c7f Internal error: : 81b [#1] SMP ARM Modules linked in: rt2800usb rt2x00usb rt2800librt2x00lib crc_ccitt mac80211 CPU: 1 PID: 202 Comm: wpa_supplicant Not tainted 4.3.0-rc2 #1 Hardware name: Allwinner sun7i (A20) Family task: ec872f80 ti: ee364000 task.ti: ee364000 PC is at do_alignment_ldmstm+0x1d4/0x238 LR is at 0x0 pc : [<c001d1d8>] lr : [<00000000>] psr: 600c0113 sp : ee365e18 ip : 00000000 fp : 00000002 r10: 001017a2 r9 : 00000002 r8 : 001017aa r7 : ee365fb0 r6 : e8820018 r5 : 001017a2 r4 : 00000003 r3 : d49e30e0 r2 : 00000000 r1 : ee365fbc r0 : 00000000 Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none[ 34.393106] Control: 10c5387d Table: 6e1b806a DAC: 00000051 Process wpa_supplicant (pid: 202, stack limit = 0xee364210) Stack: (0xee365e18 to 0xee366000) ... [<c001d1d8>] (do_alignment_ldmstm) from [<c001d510>] (do_alignment+0x1f0/0x904) [<c001d510>] (do_alignment) from [<c00092a0>] (do_DataAbort+0x38/0xb4) [<c00092a0>] (do_DataAbort) from [<c0013d7c>] (__dabt_usr+0x3c/0x40) Exception stack(0xee365fb0 to 0xee365ff8) 5fa0: 00000000 56c728c0 001017a2 d49e30e0 5fc0: 775448d2 597d4e74 00200800 7a9e1625 00802001 00000021 b6deec84 00000100 5fe0: 08020200 be9f4f20 0c0b0d0a b6d9b3e0 600c0010 ffffffff Code: e1a0a005 e1a0000c 1affffe8 e5913000 (e4ea3001) ---[ end trace 0acd3882fcfdf9dd ]--- This is caused by the alignment handler not being fixed up for the uaccess changes, and userspace issuing an unaligned LDM instruction. So, fix the problem by adding the necessary fixups. Reported-by: Jonathan Liu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jonathan Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>

kvm_set_cr0 may want to call kvm_zap_gfn_range and thus access the memslots array (SRCU protected). Using a mini SRCU critical section is ugly, and adding it to kvm_arch_vcpu_create doesn't work because the VMX vcpu_create callback calls synchronize_srcu. Fixes this lockdep splat: =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.3.0-rc1+ #1 Not tainted ------------------------------- include/linux/kvm_host.h:488 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 1 lock held by qemu-system-i38/17000: #0: (&(&kvm->mmu_lock)->rlock){+.+...}, at: kvm_zap_gfn_range+0x24/0x1a0 [kvm] [...] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x4e/0x84 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfd/0x130 kvm_zap_gfn_range+0x188/0x1a0 [kvm] kvm_set_cr0+0xde/0x1e0 [kvm] init_vmcb+0x760/0xad0 [kvm_amd] svm_create_vcpu+0x197/0x250 [kvm_amd] kvm_arch_vcpu_create+0x47/0x70 [kvm] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x302/0x7e0 [kvm] ? __lock_is_held+0x51/0x70 ? __fget+0x101/0x210 do_vfs_ioctl+0x2f4/0x560 ? __fget_light+0x29/0x90 SyS_ioctl+0x4c/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x73 Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>

ppp_dev_uninit() locks all_ppp_mutex while under rtnl mutex protection. ppp_create_interface() must then lock these mutexes in that same order to avoid possible deadlock. [ 120.880011] ====================================================== [ 120.880011] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [ 120.880011] 4.2.0 #1 Not tainted [ 120.880011] ------------------------------------------------------- [ 120.880011] ppp-apitest/15827 is trying to acquire lock: [ 120.880011] (&pn->all_ppp_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0145f56>] ppp_dev_uninit+0x64/0xb0 [ppp_generic] [ 120.880011] [ 120.880011] but task is already holding lock: [ 120.880011] (rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff812e4255>] rtnl_lock+0x12/0x14 [ 120.880011] [ 120.880011] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 120.880011] [ 120.880011] [ 120.880011] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 120.880011] [ 120.880011] -> #1 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}: [ 120.880011] [<ffffffff81073a6f>] lock_acquire+0xcf/0x10e [ 120.880011] [<ffffffff813ab18a>] mutex_lock_nested+0x56/0x341 [ 120.880011] [<ffffffff812e4255>] rtnl_lock+0x12/0x14 [ 120.880011] [<ffffffff812d9d94>] register_netdev+0x11/0x27 [ 120.880011] [<ffffffffa0147b17>] ppp_ioctl+0x289/0xc98 [ppp_generic] [ 120.880011] [<ffffffff8113b367>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x4ea/0x532 [ 120.880011] [<ffffffff8113b3fd>] SyS_ioctl+0x4e/0x7d [ 120.880011] [<ffffffff813ad7d7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f [ 120.880011] [ 120.880011] -> #0 (&pn->all_ppp_mutex){+.+.+.}: [ 120.880011] [<ffffffff8107334e>] __lock_acquire+0xb07/0xe76 [ 120.880011] [<ffffffff81073a6f>] lock_acquire+0xcf/0x10e [ 120.880011] [<ffffffff813ab18a>] mutex_lock_nested+0x56/0x341 [ 120.880011] [<ffffffffa0145f56>] ppp_dev_uninit+0x64/0xb0 [ppp_generic] [ 120.880011] [<ffffffff812d5263>] rollback_registered_many+0x19e/0x252 [ 120.880011] [<ffffffff812d5381>] rollback_registered+0x29/0x38 [ 120.880011] [<ffffffff812d53fa>] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x6a/0x77 [ 120.880011] [<ffffffffa0146a94>] ppp_release+0x42/0x79 [ppp_generic] [ 120.880011] [<ffffffff8112d9f6>] __fput+0xec/0x192 [ 120.880011] [<ffffffff8112dacc>] ____fput+0x9/0xb [ 120.880011] [<ffffffff8105447a>] task_work_run+0x66/0x80 [ 120.880011] [<ffffffff81001801>] prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x8c/0xa7 [ 120.880011] [<ffffffff81001900>] syscall_return_slowpath+0xe4/0x104 [ 120.880011] [<ffffffff813ad931>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f [ 120.880011] [ 120.880011] other info that might help us debug this: [ 120.880011] [ 120.880011] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 120.880011] [ 120.880011] CPU0 CPU1 [ 120.880011] ---- ---- [ 120.880011] lock(rtnl_mutex); [ 120.880011] lock(&pn->all_ppp_mutex); [ 120.880011] lock(rtnl_mutex); [ 120.880011] lock(&pn->all_ppp_mutex); [ 120.880011] [ 120.880011] *** DEADLOCK *** Fixes: 8cb775b ("ppp: fix device unregistration upon netns deletion") Reported-by: Sedat Dilek <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

Andrey reported a panic: [ 7249.865507] BUG: unable to handle kernel pointer dereference at 000000b4 [ 7249.865559] IP: [<c16afeca>] icmp_route_lookup+0xaa/0x320 [ 7249.865598] *pdpt = 0000000030f7f001 *pde = 0000000000000000 [ 7249.865637] Oops: 0000 [#1] ... [ 7249.866811] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.3.0-999-generic #201509220155 [ 7249.866876] Hardware name: MSI MS-7250/MS-7250, BIOS 080014 08/02/2006 [ 7249.866916] task: c1a5ab00 ti: c1a52000 task.ti: c1a52000 [ 7249.866949] EIP: 0060:[<c16afeca>] EFLAGS: 00210246 CPU: 0 [ 7249.866981] EIP is at icmp_route_lookup+0xaa/0x320 [ 7249.867012] EAX: 00000000 EBX: f483ba48 ECX: 00000000 EDX: f2e18a00 [ 7249.867045] ESI: 000000c0 EDI: f483ba70 EBP: f483b9ec ESP: f483b974 [ 7249.867077] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 [ 7249.867108] CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b4 CR3: 36ee07c0 CR4: 000006f0 [ 7249.867141] Stack: [ 7249.867165] 320310ee 00000000 00000042 320310ee 00000000 c1aeca00 f3920240 f0c69180 [ 7249.867268] f483ba04 f855058b a89b66cd f483ba44 f8962f4b 00000000 e659266c f483ba54 [ 7249.867361] 8004753c f483ba5c f8962f4b f2031140 000003c1 ffbd8fa0 c16b0e00 00000064 [ 7249.867448] Call Trace: [ 7249.867494] [<f855058b>] ? e1000_xmit_frame+0x87b/0xdc0 [e1000e] [ 7249.867534] [<f8962f4b>] ? tcp_in_window+0xeb/0xb10 [nf_conntrack] [ 7249.867576] [<f8962f4b>] ? tcp_in_window+0xeb/0xb10 [nf_conntrack] [ 7249.867615] [<c16b0e00>] ? icmp_send+0xa0/0x380 [ 7249.867648] [<c16b102f>] icmp_send+0x2cf/0x380 [ 7249.867681] [<f89c8126>] nf_send_unreach+0xa6/0xc0 [nf_reject_ipv4] [ 7249.867714] [<f89cd0da>] reject_tg+0x7a/0x9f [ipt_REJECT] [ 7249.867746] [<f88c29a7>] ipt_do_table+0x317/0x70c [ip_tables] [ 7249.867780] [<f895e0a6>] ? __nf_conntrack_find_get+0x166/0x3b0 [nf_conntrack] [ 7249.867838] [<f895eea8>] ? nf_conntrack_in+0x398/0x600 [nf_conntrack] [ 7249.867889] [<f84c0035>] iptable_filter_hook+0x35/0x80 [iptable_filter] [ 7249.867933] [<c16776a1>] nf_iterate+0x71/0x80 [ 7249.867970] [<c1677715>] nf_hook_slow+0x65/0xc0 [ 7249.868002] [<c1681811>] __ip_local_out_sk+0xc1/0xd0 [ 7249.868034] [<c1680f30>] ? ip_forward_options+0x1a0/0x1a0 [ 7249.868066] [<c1681836>] ip_local_out_sk+0x16/0x30 [ 7249.868097] [<c1684054>] ip_send_skb+0x14/0x80 [ 7249.868129] [<c16840f4>] ip_push_pending_frames+0x34/0x40 [ 7249.868163] [<c16844a2>] ip_send_unicast_reply+0x282/0x310 [ 7249.868196] [<c16a0863>] tcp_v4_send_reset+0x1b3/0x380 [ 7249.868227] [<c16a1b63>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x323/0x990 [ 7249.868257] [<c16776a1>] ? nf_iterate+0x71/0x80 [ 7249.868289] [<c167dc2b>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x8b/0x230 [ 7249.868322] [<c167df4c>] ip_local_deliver+0x4c/0xa0 [ 7249.868353] [<c167dba0>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x390/0x390 [ 7249.868384] [<c167d88c>] ip_rcv_finish+0x7c/0x390 [ 7249.868415] [<c167e280>] ip_rcv+0x2e0/0x420 ... Prior to the VRF change the oif was not set in the flow struct, so the VRF support should really have only added the vrf_master_ifindex lookup. Fixes: 613d09b ("net: Use VRF device index for lookups on TX") Cc: Andrey Melnikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Ahern <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

it was broken by 35d5d20 "mtd: mxc_nand: cleanup copy_spare function" else we get the following error : [ 22.709507] ubi0: attaching mtd3 [ 23.613470] ubi0: scanning is finished [ 23.617278] ubi0: empty MTD device detected [ 23.623219] Unhandled fault: imprecise external abort (0x1c06) at 0x9e62f0ec [ 23.630291] pgd = 9df80000 [ 23.633005] [9e62f0ec] *pgd=8e60041e(bad) [ 23.637064] Internal error: : 1c06 [#1] SMP ARM [ 23.641605] Modules linked in: [ 23.644687] CPU: 0 PID: 99 Comm: ubiattach Not tainted 4.2.0-dirty #22 [ 23.651222] Hardware name: Freescale i.MX53 (Device Tree Support) [ 23.657322] task: 9e687300 ti: 9dcfc000 task.ti: 9dcfc000 [ 23.662744] PC is at memcpy16_toio+0x4c/0x74 [ 23.667026] LR is at mxc_nand_command+0x484/0x640 [ 23.671739] pc : [<803f9c08>] lr : [<803faeb0>] psr: 60000013 [ 23.671739] sp : 9dcfdb10 ip : 9e62f0ea fp : 9dcfdb1c [ 23.683222] r10: a09c1000 r9 : 0000001a r8 : ffffffff [ 23.688453] r7 : ffffffff r6 : 9e674810 r5 : 9e674810 r4 : 000000b6 [ 23.694985] r3 : a09c16a4 r2 : a09c16a4 r1 : a09c16a4 r0 : 0000ffff [ 23.701521] Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user [ 23.708662] Control: 10c5387d Table: 8df80019 DAC: 00000015 [ 23.714413] Process ubiattach (pid: 99, stack limit = 0x9dcfc210) [ 23.720514] Stack: (0x9dcfdb10 to 0x9dcfe000) [ 23.724881] db00: 9dcfdb6c 9dcfdb20 803faeb0 803f9bc8 [ 23.733069] db20: 803f227c 803f9b74 ffffffff 9e674810 9e674810 9e674810 00000040 9e62f010 [ 23.741255] db40: 803faa2c 9e674b40 9e674810 803faa2c 00000400 803faa2c 00000000 9df42800 [ 23.749441] db60: 9dcfdb9c 9dcfdb70 803f2024 803faa38 9e4201cc 00000000 803f0a78 9e674b40 [ 23.757627] db80: 803f1f80 9e674810 00000400 00000400 9dcfdc14 9dcfdba0 803f3bd8 803f1f8c [ 23.765814] dba0: 9e4201cc 00000000 00000580 00000000 00000000 800718c0 0000007f 00001000 [ 23.774000] dbc0: 9df42800 000000e0 00000000 00000000 9e4201cc 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 23.782186] dbe0: 00000580 00000580 00000000 9e674810 9dcfdc20 9dcfdce8 9df42800 00580000 [ 23.790372] dc00: 00000000 00000400 9dcfdc6c 9dcfdc18 803f3f94 803f39a4 9dcfdc20 00000000 [ 23.798558] dc20: 00000000 00000400 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 9df42800 00000000 [ 23.806744] dc40: 9dcfdd0c 00580000 00000000 00000400 00000000 9df42800 9dee1000 9d802000 [ 23.814930] dc60: 9dcfdc94 9dcfdc70 803eb63c 803f3f38 00000400 9dcfdce8 9df42800 dead4ead [ 23.823116] dc80: 803eb5f4 00000000 9dcfdcc4 9dcfdc98 803e82ac 803eb600 00000400 9dcfdce8 [ 23.831301] dca0: 9df42800 00000400 9dee0000 00000000 00000400 00000000 9dcfdd1c 9dcfdcc8 [ 23.839488] dcc0: 80406048 803e8230 00000400 9dcfdce8 9df42800 9dcfdc78 00000008 00000000 [ 23.847673] dce0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000004 00000000 9df42800 9dee0000 00000000 [ 23.855859] dd00: 9d802030 00000000 9dc8b214 9d802000 9dcfdd44 9dcfdd20 804066cc 80405f50 [ 23.864047] dd20: 00000400 9dc8b200 9d802030 9df42800 9dee0000 9dc8b200 9dcfdd84 9dcfdd48 [ 23.872233] dd40: 8040a544 804065ac 9e401c80 000080d0 9dcfdd84 00000001 800fc828 9df42400 [ 23.880418] dd60: 00000000 00000080 9dc8b200 9dc8b200 9dc8b200 9dee0000 9dcfdddc 9dcfdd8 [ 23.888605] dd80: 803fb560 8040a440 9dcfddc4 9dcfdd98 800f1428 9dee1000 a0acf000 00000000 [ 23.896792] dda0: 00000000 ffffffff 00000006 00000000 9dee0000 9dee0000 00005600 00000080 [ 23.904979] ddc0: 9dc8b200 a0acf000 9dc8b200 8112514c 9dcfde24 9dcfdde0 803fc08c 803fb4f0 [ 23.913165] dde0: 9e401c80 00000013 9dcfde04 9dcfddf8 8006bbf8 8006ba00 9dcfde24 00000000 [ 23.921351] de00: 9dee0000 00000065 9dee0000 00000001 9dc8b200 8112514c 9dcfde84 9dcfde28 [ 23.929538] de20: 8040afa0 803fb948 ffffffff 00000000 9dc8b214 9dcfde40 800f1428 800f11dc [ 23.937724] de40: 9dc8b21 9dc8b20c 9dc8b204 9dee1000 9dc8b214 8069bb60 fffff000 fffff000 [ 23.945911] de60: 9e7b5400 00000000 9dee0000 9dee1000 00001000 9e7b5400 9dcfdecc 9dcfde88 [ 23.954097] de80: 803ff1bc 8040a630 9dcfdea4 9dcfde98 00000800 00000800 9dcfdecc 9dcfdea8 [ 23.962284] dea0: 803e8f6c 00000000 7e87ab70 9e7b5400 80113e30 00000003 9dcfc000 00000000 [ 23.970470] dec0: 9dcfdf04 9dcfded0 804008cc 803feb98 ffffffff 00000003 00000000 00000000 [ 23.978656] dee0: 00000000 00000000 9e7cb000 9dc193e0 7e87ab70 9dd92140 9dcfdf7c 9dcfdf08 [ 23.986842] df00: 80113b5c 8040080c 800fbed8 8006bbf0 9e7cb000 00000003 9e7cb000 9dd92140 [ 23.995029] df20: 9dc193e0 9dd92148 9dcfdf4c 9dcfdf38 8011022c 800fbe78 8000f9cc 9e687300 [ 24.003216] df40: 9dcfdf6c 9dcfdf50 8011f798 8007ffe8 7e87ab70 9dd92140 00000003 9dd92140 [ 24.011402] df60: 40186f40 7e87ab70 9dcfc000 00000000 9dcfdfa4 9dcfdf8 80113e30 8011373c [ 24.019588] df80: 7e87ab70 7e87ab70 7e87aea9 00000036 8000fb8 9dcfc000 00000000 9dcfdfa8 [ 24.027775] dfa0: 8000f9a0 80113e00 7e87ab70 7e87ab70 00000003 40186f40 7e87ab70 00000000 [ 24.035962] dfc0: 7e87ab70 7e87ab70 7e87aea9 00000036 00000000 00000000 76fd1f70 00000000 [ 24.044148] dfe0: 76f80f8c 7e87ab2 00009810 76f80fc4 60000010 00000003 00000000 00000000 [ 24.052328] Backtrace: [ 24.054806] [<803f9bbc>] (memcpy16_toio) from [<803faeb0>] (mxc_nand_command+0x484/0x640) [ 24.062996] [<803faa2c>] (mxc_nand_command) from [<803f2024>] (nand_write_page+0xa4/0x154) [ 24.071264] r10:9df42800 r9:00000000 r8:803faa2c r7:00000400 r6:803faa2c r5:9e674810 [ 24.079180] r4:9e674b40 [ 24.081738] [<803f1f80>] (nand_write_page) from [<803f3bd8>] (nand_do_write_ops+0x240/0x444) [ 24.090180] r8:00000400 r7:00000400 r6:9e674810 r5:803f1f80 r4:9e674b40 [ 24.096970] [<803f3998>] (nand_do_write_ops) from [<803f3f94>] (nand_write+0x68/0x88) [ 24.104804] r10:00000400 r9:00000000 r8:00580000 r7:9df42800 r6:9dcfdce8 r5:9dcfdc20 [ 24.112719] r4:9e674810 [ 24.115287] [<803f3f2c>] (nand_write) from [<803eb63c>] (part_write+0x48/0x50) [ 24.122514] r10:9d802000 r9:9dee1000 r8:9df42800 r7:00000000 r6:00000400 r5:00000000 [ 24.130429] r4:00580000 [ 24.132989] [<803eb5f4>] (part_write) from [<803e82ac>] (mtd_write+0x88/0xa0) [ 24.140129] r5:00000000 r4:803eb5f4 [ 24.143748] [<803e8224>] (mtd_write) from [<80406048>] (ubi_io_write+0x104/0x65c) [ 24.151235] r7:00000000 r6:00000400 r5:00000000 r4:9dee0000 [ 24.156968] [<80405f44>] (ubi_io_write) from [<804066cc>] (ubi_io_write_ec_hdr+0x12c/0x190) [ 24.165323] r10:9d802000 r9:9dc8b214 r8:00000000 r7:9d802030 r6:00000000 r5:9dee0000 [ 24.173239] r4:9df42800 [ 24.175798] [<804065a0>] (ubi_io_write_ec_hdr) from [<8040a544>] (ubi_early_get_peb+0x110/0x1f0) [ 24.184587] r6:9dc8b200 r5:9dee0000 r4:9df42800 [ 24.189262] [<8040a434>] (ubi_early_get_peb) from [<803fb560>] (create_vtbl+0x7c/0x238) [ 24.197271] r10:9dee0000 r9:9dc8b200 r8:9dc8b200 r7:9dc8b200 r6:00000080 r5:00000000 [ 24.205187] r4:9df42400 [ 24.207746] [<803fb4e4>] (create_vtbl) from [<803fc08c>] (ubi_read_volume_table+0x750/0xa64) [ 24.216187] r10:8112514c r9:9dc8b200 r8:a0acf000 r7:9dc8b200 r6:00000080 r5:00005600 [ 24.224103] r4:9dee0000 [ 24.226662] [<803fb93c>] (ubi_read_volume_table) from [<8040afa0>] (ubi_attach+0x97c/0x152c) [ 24.235103] r10:8112514c r9:9dc8b200 r8:00000001 r7:9dee0000 r6:00000065 r5:9dee0000 [ 24.243018] r4:00000000 [ 24.245579] [<8040a624>] (ubi_attach) from [<803ff1bc>] (ubi_attach_mtd_dev+0x630/0xbac) [ 24.253673] r10:9e7b5400 r9:00001000 r8:9dee1000 r7:9dee0000 r6:00000000 r5:9e7b5400 [ 24.261588] r4:fffff000 [ 24.264148] [<803feb8c>] (ubi_attach_mtd_dev) from [<804008cc>] (ctrl_cdev_ioctl+0xcc/0x1cc) [ 24.272589] r10:00000000 r9:9dcfc000 r8:00000003 r7:80113e30 r6:9e7b5400 r5:7e87ab70 [ 24.280505] r4:00000000 [ 24.283070] [<80400800>] (ctrl_cdev_ioctl) from [<80113b5c>] (do_vfs_ioctl+0x42c/0x6c4) [ 24.291077] r6:9dd92140 r5:7e87ab70 r4:9dc193e0 [ 24.295753] [<80113730>] (do_vfs_ioctl) from [<80113e30>] (SyS_ioctl+0x3c/0x64) [ 24.303066] r10:00000000 r9:9dcfc000 r8:7e87ab70 r7:40186f40 r6:9dd92140 r5:00000003 [ 24.310981] r4:9dd92140 [ 24.313549] [<80113df4>] (SyS_ioctl) from [<8000f9a0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54) [ 24.321123] r9:9dcfc000 r8:8000fb84 r7:00000036 r6:7e87aea9 r5:7e87ab70 r4:7e87ab70 [ 24.328957] Code: e1c300b0 e1510002 e1a03001 1afffff9 (e89da800) [ 24.335066] ---[ end trace ab1cb17887f21bbb ]--- [ 24.340249] Unhandled fault: imprecise external abort (0x1c06) at 0x7ee8bcf0 [ 24.347310] pgd = 9df3c000 [ 24.350023] [7ee8bcf0] *pgd=8dcbf831, *pte=8eb3334f, *ppte=8eb3383f Segmentation fault Fixes: 35d5d20 ("mtd: mxc_nand: cleanup copy_spare function") Signed-off-by: Eric Bénard <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Uwe Kleine-König <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Baruch Siach <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Brian Norris <[email protected]>

…t initialized. In case something goes wrong with power well initialization we were calling intel_prepare_ddi during boot while encoder list isnt't initilized. [ 9.618747] i915 0000:00:02.0: Invalid ROM contents [ 9.631446] [drm] failed to find VBIOS tables [ 9.720036] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000 00000058 [ 9.721986] IP: [<ffffffffa014eb72>] ddi_get_encoder_port+0x82/0x190 [i915] [ 9.723736] PGD 0 [ 9.724286] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 9.725386] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp snd_hda_intel(+) coretemp crc 32c_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core serio_raw snd_pcm snd_timer i915(+) parport _pc parport pinctrl_sunrisepoint pinctrl_intel nfsd nfs_acl [ 9.730635] CPU: 0 PID: 497 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.3.0-rc2-eywa-10 967-g72de2cfd-dirty #2 [ 9.732785] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Cannonlake Client platform/Skyla ke DT DDR4 RVP8, BIOS CNLSE2R1.R00.X021.B00.1508040310 08/04/2015 [ 9.735785] task: ffff88008a704700 ti: ffff88016a1ac000 task.ti: ffff88016a1a c000 [ 9.737584] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa014eb72>] [<ffffffffa014eb72>] ddi_get_enco der_port+0x82/0x190 [i915] [ 9.739934] RSP: 0000:ffff88016a1af710 EFLAGS: 00010296 [ 9.741184] RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: ffff88008a9edc98 RCX: 0000000000000001 [ 9.742934] RDX: 000000000000004e RSI: ffffffff81fc1e82 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 9.744634] RBP: ffff88016a1af730 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000578 [ 9.746333] R10: 0000000000001065 R11: 0000000000000578 R12: fffffffffffffff8 [ 9.748033] R13: ffff88016a1af7a8 R14: ffff88016a1af794 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 9.749733] FS: 00007eff2e1e07c0(0000) GS:ffff88016fc00000(0000) knlGS:00000 00000000000 [ 9.751683] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 9.753083] CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 000000016922b000 CR4: 00000000003406f0 [ 9.754782] Stack: [ 9.755332] ffff88008a9edc98 ffff88008a9ed800 ffffffffa01d07b0 00000000fffb9 09e [ 9.757232] ffff88016a1af7d8 ffffffffa0154ea7 0000000000000246 ffff88016a370 080 [ 9.759182] ffff88016a370080 ffff88008a9ed800 0000000000000246 ffff88008a9ed c98 [ 9.761132] Call Trace: [ 9.761782] [<ffffffffa0154ea7>] intel_prepare_ddi+0x67/0x860 [i915] [ 9.763332] [<ffffffff81a56996>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x26/0x40 [ 9.765031] [<ffffffffa00fad01>] ? gen9_read32+0x141/0x360 [i915] [ 9.766531] [<ffffffffa00b43e1>] skl_set_power_well+0x431/0xa80 [i915] [ 9.768181] [<ffffffffa00b4a63>] skl_power_well_enable+0x13/0x20 [i915] [ 9.769781] [<ffffffffa00b2188>] intel_power_well_enable+0x28/0x50 [i915] [ 9.771481] [<ffffffffa00b4d52>] intel_display_power_get+0x92/0xc0 [i915] [ 9.773180] [<ffffffffa00b4fcb>] intel_display_set_init_power+0x3b/0x40 [i91 5] [ 9.774980] [<ffffffffa00b5170>] intel_power_domains_init_hw+0x120/0x520 [i9 15] [ 9.776780] [<ffffffffa0194c61>] i915_driver_load+0xb21/0xf40 [i915] So let's protect this case. My first attempt was to remove the intel_prepare_ddi, but Daniel had pointed out this is really needed to restore those registers values. And Imre pointed out that this case was without the flag protection and this was actually where things were going bad. So I've just checked and this indeed solves my issue. The regressing intel_prepare_ddi call was added in commit 1d2b952 Author: Damien Lespiau <[email protected]> Date: Fri Mar 6 18:50:53 2015 +0000 drm/i915/skl: Restore the DDI translation tables when enabling PW1 Cc: Imre Deak <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Imre Deak <[email protected]> [Jani: regression reference] Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <[email protected]>

…ut event A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with the listening socket but released with the new association socket. The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening socket lock. Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called. BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0] ... RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30 RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48 RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0 R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0) Stack: ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000 <d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00 <d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 ... With lockdep debugging: ===================================== [ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ] ------------------------------------- CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at: [<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp] but there are no more locks to release! other info that might help us debug this: 2 locks held by CslRx/12087: #0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0 #1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp] Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event critical section. Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

Fixes the following lockdep splat: [ 1.244527] ============================================= [ 1.245193] [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] [ 1.245193] 4.2.0-rc1+ #37 Not tainted [ 1.245193] --------------------------------------------- [ 1.245193] cp/742 is trying to acquire lock: [ 1.245193] (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff812b3f69>] ubifs_init_security+0x29/0xb0 [ 1.245193] [ 1.245193] but task is already holding lock: [ 1.245193] (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81198e7f>] path_openat+0x3af/0x1280 [ 1.245193] [ 1.245193] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1.245193] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 1.245193] [ 1.245193] CPU0 [ 1.245193] ---- [ 1.245193] lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9); [ 1.245193] lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9); [ 1.245193] [ 1.245193] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 1.245193] [ 1.245193] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 1.245193] [ 1.245193] 2 locks held by cp/742: [ 1.245193] #0: (sb_writers#5){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff811ad37f>] mnt_want_write+0x1f/0x50 [ 1.245193] #1: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81198e7f>] path_openat+0x3af/0x1280 [ 1.245193] [ 1.245193] stack backtrace: [ 1.245193] CPU: 2 PID: 742 Comm: cp Not tainted 4.2.0-rc1+ #37 [ 1.245193] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140816_022509-build35 04/01/2014 [ 1.245193] ffffffff8252d530 ffff88007b023a38 ffffffff814f6f49 ffffffff810b56c5 [ 1.245193] ffff88007c30cc80 ffff88007b023af8 ffffffff810a150d ffff88007b023a68 [ 1.245193] 000000008101302a ffff880000000000 00000008f447e23f ffffffff8252d500 [ 1.245193] Call Trace: [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff814f6f49>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x65 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff810b56c5>] ? console_unlock+0x1c5/0x510 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff810a150d>] __lock_acquire+0x1a6d/0x1ea0 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff8109fa78>] ? __lock_is_held+0x58/0x80 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff810a1a93>] lock_acquire+0xd3/0x270 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff812b3f69>] ? ubifs_init_security+0x29/0xb0 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff814fc83b>] mutex_lock_nested+0x6b/0x3a0 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff812b3f69>] ? ubifs_init_security+0x29/0xb0 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff812b3f69>] ? ubifs_init_security+0x29/0xb0 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff812b3f69>] ubifs_init_security+0x29/0xb0 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff8128e286>] ubifs_create+0xa6/0x1f0 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff81198e7f>] ? path_openat+0x3af/0x1280 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff81195d15>] vfs_create+0x95/0xc0 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff8119929c>] path_openat+0x7cc/0x1280 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff8109ffe3>] ? __lock_acquire+0x543/0x1ea0 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff81088f20>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x90/0xc0 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff81088c00>] ? calc_global_load_tick+0x60/0x90 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff81088f20>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x90/0xc0 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff811a9cef>] ? __alloc_fd+0xaf/0x180 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff8119ac55>] do_filp_open+0x75/0xd0 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff814ffd86>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x26/0x40 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff811a9cef>] ? __alloc_fd+0xaf/0x180 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff81189bd9>] do_sys_open+0x129/0x200 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff81189cc9>] SyS_open+0x19/0x20 [ 1.245193] [<ffffffff81500717>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f While the lockdep splat is a false positive, becuase path_openat holds i_mutex of the parent directory and ubifs_init_security() tries to acquire i_mutex of a new inode, it reveals that taking i_mutex in ubifs_init_security() is in vain because it is only being called in the inode allocation path and therefore nobody else can see the inode yet. Cc: [email protected] # 3.20- Reported-and-tested-by: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]> Reviewed-and-tested-by: Dongsheng Yang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: [email protected]

My system keeps crashing with below message. vmstat_update() schedules a delayed work in current cpu and expects the work runs in the cpu. schedule_delayed_work() is expected to make delayed work run in local cpu. The problem is timer can be migrated with NO_HZ. __queue_work() queues work in timer handler, which could run in a different cpu other than where the delayed work is scheduled. The end result is the delayed work runs in different cpu. The patch makes __queue_delayed_work records local cpu earlier. Where the timer runs doesn't change where the work runs with the change. [ 28.010131] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 28.010609] kernel BUG at ../mm/vmstat.c:1392! [ 28.011099] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN [ 28.011860] Modules linked in: [ 28.012245] CPU: 0 PID: 289 Comm: kworker/0:3 Tainted: G W4.3.0-rc3+ torvalds#634 [ 28.013065] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140709_153802- 04/01/2014 [ 28.014160] Workqueue: events vmstat_update [ 28.014571] task: ffff880117682580 ti: ffff8800ba428000 task.ti: ffff8800ba428000 [ 28.015445] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8115f921>] [<ffffffff8115f921>]vmstat_update+0x31/0x80 [ 28.016282] RSP: 0018:ffff8800ba42fd80 EFLAGS: 00010297 [ 28.016812] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88011a858dc0 RCX:0000000000000000 [ 28.017585] RDX: ffff880117682580 RSI: ffffffff81f14d8c RDI:ffffffff81f4df8d [ 28.018366] RBP: ffff8800ba42fd90 R08: 0000000000000001 R09:0000000000000000 [ 28.019169] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000121 R12:ffff8800baa9f640 [ 28.019947] R13: ffff88011a81e340 R14: ffff88011a823700 R15:0000000000000000 [ 28.020071] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011a800000(0000)knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 28.020071] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 28.020071] CR2: 00007ff6144b01d0 CR3: 00000000b8e93000 CR4:00000000000006f0 [ 28.020071] Stack: [ 28.020071] ffff88011a858dc0 ffff8800baa9f640 ffff8800ba42fe00ffffffff8106bd88 [ 28.020071] ffffffff8106bd0b 0000000000000096 0000000000000000ffffffff82f9b1e8 [ 28.020071] ffffffff829f0b10 0000000000000000 ffffffff81f18460ffff88011a81e340 [ 28.020071] Call Trace: [ 28.020071] [<ffffffff8106bd88>] process_one_work+0x1c8/0x540 [ 28.020071] [<ffffffff8106bd0b>] ? process_one_work+0x14b/0x540 [ 28.020071] [<ffffffff8106c214>] worker_thread+0x114/0x460 [ 28.020071] [<ffffffff8106c100>] ? process_one_work+0x540/0x540 [ 28.020071] [<ffffffff81071bf8>] kthread+0xf8/0x110 [ 28.020071] [<ffffffff81071b00>] ?kthread_create_on_node+0x200/0x200 [ 28.020071] [<ffffffff81a6522f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [ 28.020071] [<ffffffff81071b00>] ?kthread_create_on_node+0x200/0x200 Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] # v2.6.31+

Dmitry Vyukov reported the following using trinity and the memory error detector AddressSanitizer (https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel). [ 124.575597] ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address ffff88002e280000 [ 124.576801] ffff88002e280000 is located 131938492886538 bytes to the left of 28857600-byte region [ffffffff81282e0a, ffffffff82e0830a) [ 124.578633] Accessed by thread T10915: [ 124.579295] inlined in describe_heap_address ./arch/x86/mm/asan/report.c:164 [ 124.579295] #0 ffffffff810dd277 in asan_report_error ./arch/x86/mm/asan/report.c:278 [ 124.580137] #1 ffffffff810dc6a0 in asan_check_region ./arch/x86/mm/asan/asan.c:37 [ 124.581050] #2 ffffffff810dd423 in __tsan_read8 ??:0 [ 124.581893] #3 ffffffff8107c093 in get_wchan ./arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c:444 The address checks in the 64bit implementation of get_wchan() are wrong in several ways: - The lower bound of the stack is not the start of the stack page. It's the start of the stack page plus sizeof (struct thread_info) - The upper bound must be: top_of_stack - TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING - 2 * sizeof(unsigned long). The 2 * sizeof(unsigned long) is required because the stack pointer points at the frame pointer. The layout on the stack is: ... IP FP ... IP FP. So we need to make sure that both IP and FP are in the bounds. Fix the bound checks and get rid of the mix of numeric constants, u64 and unsigned long. Making all unsigned long allows us to use the same function for 32bit as well. Use READ_ONCE() when accessing the stack. This does not prevent a concurrent wakeup of the task and the stack changing, but at least it avoids TOCTOU. Also check task state at the end of the loop. Again that does not prevent concurrent changes, but it avoids walking for nothing. Add proper comments while at it. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Based-on-patch-from: Wolfram Gloger <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: kasan-dev <[email protected]> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]> Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]> Cc: Wolfram Gloger <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>

…fy a fault SunDong reported the following on https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=103841 I think I find a linux bug, I have the test cases is constructed. I can stable recurring problems in fedora22(4.0.4) kernel version, arch for x86_64. I construct transparent huge page, when the parent and child process with MAP_SHARE, MAP_PRIVATE way to access the same huge page area, it has the opportunity to lead to huge page copy on write failure, and then it will munmap the child corresponding mmap area, but then the child mmap area with VM_MAYSHARE attributes, child process munmap this area can trigger VM_BUG_ON in set_vma_resv_flags functions (vma - > vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE). There were a number of problems with the report (e.g. it's hugetlbfs that triggers this, not transparent huge pages) but it was fundamentally correct in that a VM_BUG_ON in set_vma_resv_flags() can be triggered that looks like this vma ffff8804651fd0d0 start 00007fc474e00000 end 00007fc475e00000 next ffff8804651fd018 prev ffff8804651fd188 mm ffff88046b1b1800 prot 8000000000000027 anon_vma (null) vm_ops ffffffff8182a7a0 pgoff 0 file ffff88106bdb9800 private_data (null) flags: 0x84400fb(read|write|shared|mayread|maywrite|mayexec|mayshare|dontexpand|hugetlb) ------------ kernel BUG at mm/hugetlb.c:462! SMP Modules linked in: xt_pkttype xt_LOG xt_limit [..] CPU: 38 PID: 26839 Comm: map Not tainted 4.0.4-default #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R810/0TT6JF, BIOS 2.7.4 04/26/2012 set_vma_resv_flags+0x2d/0x30 The VM_BUG_ON is correct because private and shared mappings have different reservation accounting but the warning clearly shows that the VMA is shared. When a private COW fails to allocate a new page then only the process that created the VMA gets the page -- all the children unmap the page. If the children access that data in the future then they get killed. The problem is that the same file is mapped shared and private. During the COW, the allocation fails, the VMAs are traversed to unmap the other private pages but a shared VMA is found and the bug is triggered. This patch identifies such VMAs and skips them. Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Reported-by: SunDong <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]> Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

Since 9eb1e57 drm/dp/mst: make sure mst_primary mstb is valid in work function we validate the mstb structs in the work function, and doing that takes a reference. So we should never get here with the work function running using the mstb device, only if the work function hasn't run yet or is running for another mstb. So we don't need to sync the work here, this was causing lockdep spew as below. [ +0.000160] ============================================= [ +0.000001] [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] [ +0.000002] 3.10.0-320.el7.rhel72.stable.backport.3.x86_64.debug #1 Tainted: G W ------------ [ +0.000001] --------------------------------------------- [ +0.000001] kworker/4:2/1262 is trying to acquire lock: [ +0.000001] ((&mgr->work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810b29a5>] flush_work+0x5/0x2e0 [ +0.000007] but task is already holding lock: [ +0.000001] ((&mgr->work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810b57e4>] process_one_work+0x1b4/0x710 [ +0.000004] other info that might help us debug this: [ +0.000001] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ +0.000002] CPU0 [ +0.000000] ---- [ +0.000001] lock((&mgr->work)); [ +0.000002] lock((&mgr->work)); [ +0.000001] *** DEADLOCK *** [ +0.000001] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ +0.000002] 2 locks held by kworker/4:2/1262: [ +0.000001] #0: (events_long){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff810b57e4>] process_one_work+0x1b4/0x710 [ +0.000004] #1: ((&mgr->work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810b57e4>] process_one_work+0x1b4/0x710 [ +0.000003] stack backtrace: [ +0.000003] CPU: 4 PID: 1262 Comm: kworker/4:2 Tainted: G W ------------ 3.10.0-320.el7.rhel72.stable.backport.3.x86_64.debug #1 [ +0.000001] Hardware name: LENOVO 20EGS0R600/20EGS0R600, BIOS GNET71WW (2.19 ) 02/05/2015 [ +0.000008] Workqueue: events_long drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work [drm_kms_helper] [ +0.000001] ffffffff82c26c90 00000000a527b914 ffff88046399bae8 ffffffff816fe04d [ +0.000004] ffff88046399bb58 ffffffff8110f47f ffff880461438000 0001009b840fc003 [ +0.000002] ffff880461438a98 0000000000000000 0000000804dc26e1 ffffffff824a2c00 [ +0.000003] Call Trace: [ +0.000004] [<ffffffff816fe04d>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [ +0.000004] [<ffffffff8110f47f>] __lock_acquire+0x115f/0x1250 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff8110fd49>] lock_acquire+0x99/0x1e0 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff810b29a5>] ? flush_work+0x5/0x2e0 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff810b29ee>] flush_work+0x4e/0x2e0 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff810b29a5>] ? flush_work+0x5/0x2e0 [ +0.000004] [<ffffffff81025905>] ? native_sched_clock+0x35/0x80 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff81025959>] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff810da1f5>] ? local_clock+0x25/0x30 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff8110dca9>] ? mark_held_locks+0xb9/0x140 [ +0.000003] [<ffffffff810b4ed5>] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x95/0x160 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff810b4ee8>] __cancel_work_timer+0xa8/0x160 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff810b4fb0>] cancel_work_sync+0x10/0x20 [ +0.000007] [<ffffffffa0160d17>] drm_dp_destroy_mst_branch_device+0x27/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] [ +0.000006] [<ffffffffa0163968>] drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work+0x78/0xa0 [drm_kms_helper] [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff810b5850>] process_one_work+0x220/0x710 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff810b57e4>] ? process_one_work+0x1b4/0x710 [ +0.000005] [<ffffffff810b5e5b>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x3a0 [ +0.000003] [<ffffffff810b5d40>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff810beced>] kthread+0xed/0x100 [ +0.000003] [<ffffffff810bec00>] ? insert_kthread_work+0x80/0x80 [ +0.000003] [<ffffffff817121d8>] ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90 v2: add flush_work. Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]>

When function graph tracer is enabled, the following operation will trigger panic: mount -t debugfs nodev /sys/kernel echo next_tgid > /sys/kernel/tracing/set_ftrace_filter echo function_graph > /sys/kernel/tracing/current_tracer ls /proc/ ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 198.501417] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address cb88537fdc8ba316 [ 198.506126] pgd = ffffffc008f79000 [ 198.509363] [cb88537fdc8ba316] *pgd=00000000488c6003, *pud=00000000488c6003, *pmd=0000000000000000 [ 198.517726] Internal error: Oops: 94000005 [#1] SMP [ 198.518798] Modules linked in: [ 198.520582] CPU: 1 PID: 1388 Comm: ls Tainted: G [ 198.521800] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 198.522852] task: ffffffc0fa9e8000 ti: ffffffc0f9ab0000 task.ti: ffffffc0f9ab0000 [ 198.524306] PC is at next_tgid+0x30/0x100 [ 198.525205] LR is at return_to_handler+0x0/0x20 [ 198.526090] pc : [<ffffffc0002a1070>] lr : [<ffffffc0000907c0>] pstate: 60000145 [ 198.527392] sp : ffffffc0f9ab3d40 [ 198.528084] x29: ffffffc0f9ab3d40 x28: ffffffc0f9ab0000 [ 198.529406] x27: ffffffc000d6a000 x26: ffffffc000b786e8 [ 198.530659] x25: ffffffc0002a1900 x24: ffffffc0faf16c00 [ 198.531942] x23: ffffffc0f9ab3ea0 x22: 0000000000000002 [ 198.533202] x21: ffffffc000d85050 x20: 0000000000000002 [ 198.534446] x19: 0000000000000002 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 198.535719] x17: 000000000049fa08 x16: ffffffc000242efc [ 198.537030] x15: 0000007fa472b54c x14: ffffffffff000000 [ 198.538347] x13: ffffffc0fada84a0 x12: 0000000000000001 [ 198.539634] x11: ffffffc0f9ab3d70 x10: ffffffc0f9ab3d70 [ 198.540915] x9 : ffffffc0000907c0 x8 : ffffffc0f9ab3d40 [ 198.542215] x7 : 0000002e330f08f0 x6 : 0000000000000015 [ 198.543508] x5 : 0000000000000f08 x4 : ffffffc0f9835ec0 [ 198.544792] x3 : cb88537fdc8ba316 x2 : cb88537fdc8ba306 [ 198.546108] x1 : 0000000000000002 x0 : ffffffc000d85050 [ 198.547432] [ 198.547920] Process ls (pid: 1388, stack limit = 0xffffffc0f9ab0020) [ 198.549170] Stack: (0xffffffc0f9ab3d40 to 0xffffffc0f9ab4000) [ 198.582568] Call trace: [ 198.583313] [<ffffffc0002a1070>] next_tgid+0x30/0x100 [ 198.584359] [<ffffffc0000907bc>] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70 [ 198.585503] [<ffffffc0000907bc>] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70 [ 198.586574] [<ffffffc0000907bc>] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70 [ 198.587660] [<ffffffc0000907bc>] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70 [ 198.588896] Code: aa0003f5 2a0103f4 b4000102 91004043 (885f7c60) [ 198.591092] ---[ end trace 6a346f8f20949ac8 ]--- This is because when using function graph tracer, if the traced function return value is in multi regs ([x0-x7]), return_to_handler may corrupt them. So in return_to_handler, the parameter regs should be protected properly. Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.18+ Signed-off-by: Li Bin <[email protected]> Acked-by: AKASHI Takahiro <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>

Commit 1a3d595 ("MIPS: Tidy up FPU context switching") removed FP context saving from the asm-written resume function in favour of reusing existing code to perform the same task. However it only removed the FP context saving code from the r4k_switch.S implementation of resume. Octeon uses its own implementation in octeon_switch.S, so remove FP context saving there too in order to prevent attempting to save context twice. That formerly led to an exception from the second save as follows because the FPU had already been disabled by the first save: do_cpu invoked from kernel context![#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 2 Comm: kthreadd Not tainted 4.3.0-rc2-dirty #2 task: 800000041f84a008 ti: 800000041f864000 task.ti: 800000041f864000 $ 0 : 0000000000000000 0000000010008ce1 0000000000100000 ffffffffbfffffff $ 4 : 800000041f84a008 800000041f84ac08 800000041f84c000 0000000000000004 $ 8 : 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 $12 : 0000000010008ce3 0000000000119c60 0000000000000036 800000041f864000 $16 : 800000041f84ac08 800000000792ce80 800000041f84a008 ffffffff81758b00 $20 : 0000000000000000 ffffffff8175ae50 0000000000000000 ffffffff8176c740 $24 : 0000000000000006 ffffffff81170300 $28 : 800000041f864000 800000041f867d90 0000000000000000 ffffffff815f3fa0 Hi : 0000000000fa8257 Lo : ffffffffe15cfc00 epc : ffffffff8112821c resume+0x9c/0x200 ra : ffffffff815f3fa0 __schedule+0x3f0/0x7d8 Status: 10008ce2 KX SX UX KERNEL EXL Cause : 1080002c (ExcCode 0b) PrId : 000d0601 (Cavium Octeon+) Modules linked in: Process kthreadd (pid: 2, threadinfo=800000041f864000, task=800000041f84a008, tls=0000000000000000) Stack : ffffffff81604218 ffffffff815f7e08 800000041f84a008 ffffffff811681b0 800000041f84a008 ffffffff817e9878 0000000000000000 ffffffff81770000 ffffffff81768340 ffffffff81161398 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff815f4424 0000000000000000 ffffffff81161d68 ffffffff81161be8 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff8111e16c 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff8112821c>] resume+0x9c/0x200 [<ffffffff815f3fa0>] __schedule+0x3f0/0x7d8 [<ffffffff815f4424>] schedule+0x34/0x98 [<ffffffff81161d68>] kthreadd+0x180/0x198 [<ffffffff8111e16c>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c Tested using cavium_octeon_defconfig on an EdgeRouter Lite. Fixes: 1a3d595 ("MIPS: Tidy up FPU context switching") Reported-by: Aaro Koskinen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: Aleksey Makarov <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: Chandrakala Chavva <[email protected]> Cc: David Daney <[email protected]> Cc: Leonid Rosenboim <[email protected]> Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/11166/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>

My colleague ran into a program stall on a x86_64 server, where n_tty_read() was waiting for data even if there was data in the buffer in the pty. kernel stack for the stuck process looks like below. #0 [ffff88303d107b58] __schedule at ffffffff815c4b20 #1 [ffff88303d107bd0] schedule at ffffffff815c513e #2 [ffff88303d107bf0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff815c7818 #3 [ffff88303d107ca0] wait_woken at ffffffff81096bd2 #4 [ffff88303d107ce0] n_tty_read at ffffffff8136fa23 #5 [ffff88303d107dd0] tty_read at ffffffff81368013 #6 [ffff88303d107e20] __vfs_read at ffffffff811a3704 #7 [ffff88303d107ec0] vfs_read at ffffffff811a3a57 #8 [ffff88303d107f00] sys_read at ffffffff811a4306 #9 [ffff88303d107f50] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath at ffffffff815c86d7 There seems to be two problems causing this issue. First, in drivers/tty/n_tty.c, __receive_buf() stores the data and updates ldata->commit_head using smp_store_release() and then checks the wait queue using waitqueue_active(). However, since there is no memory barrier, __receive_buf() could return without calling wake_up_interactive_poll(), and at the same time, n_tty_read() could start to wait in wait_woken() as in the following chart. __receive_buf() n_tty_read() ------------------------------------------------------------------------ if (waitqueue_active(&tty->read_wait)) /* Memory operations issued after the RELEASE may be completed before the RELEASE operation has completed */ add_wait_queue(&tty->read_wait, &wait); ... if (!input_available_p(tty, 0)) { smp_store_release(&ldata->commit_head, ldata->read_head); ... timeout = wait_woken(&wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, timeout); ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The second problem is that n_tty_read() also lacks a memory barrier call and could also cause __receive_buf() to return without calling wake_up_interactive_poll(), and n_tty_read() to wait in wait_woken() as in the chart below. __receive_buf() n_tty_read() ------------------------------------------------------------------------ spin_lock_irqsave(&q->lock, flags); /* from add_wait_queue() */ ... if (!input_available_p(tty, 0)) { /* Memory operations issued after the RELEASE may be completed before the RELEASE operation has completed */ smp_store_release(&ldata->commit_head, ldata->read_head); if (waitqueue_active(&tty->read_wait)) __add_wait_queue(q, wait); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&q->lock,flags); /* from add_wait_queue() */ ... timeout = wait_woken(&wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, timeout); ------------------------------------------------------------------------ There are also other places in drivers/tty/n_tty.c which have similar calls to waitqueue_active(), so instead of adding many memory barrier calls, this patch simply removes the call to waitqueue_active(), leaving just wake_up*() behind. This fixes both problems because, even though the memory access before or after the spinlocks in both wake_up*() and add_wait_queue() can sneak into the critical section, it cannot go past it and the critical section assures that they will be serialized (please see "INTER-CPU ACQUIRING BARRIER EFFECTS" in Documentation/memory-barriers.txt for a better explanation). Moreover, the resulting code is much simpler. Latency measurement using a ping-pong test over a pty doesn't show any visible performance drop. Signed-off-by: Kosuke Tatsukawa <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Since commit 2b018d5 ("pppoe: drop PPPOX_ZOMBIEs in pppoe_release"), pppoe_release() calls dev_put(po->pppoe_dev) if sk is in the PPPOX_ZOMBIE state. But pppoe_flush_dev() can set sk->sk_state to PPPOX_ZOMBIE _and_ reset po->pppoe_dev to NULL. This leads to the following oops: [ 570.140800] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000004e0 [ 570.142931] IP: [<ffffffffa018c701>] pppoe_release+0x50/0x101 [pppoe] [ 570.144601] PGD 3d119067 PUD 3dbc1067 PMD 0 [ 570.144601] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 570.144601] Modules linked in: l2tp_ppp l2tp_netlink l2tp_core ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel pppoe pppox ppp_generic slhc loop crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel jitterentropy_rng sha256_generic hmac drbg ansi_cprng aesni_intel aes_x86_64 ablk_helper cryptd lrw gf128mul glue_helper acpi_cpufreq evdev serio_raw processor button ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 virtio_net virtio_blk virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio [ 570.144601] CPU: 1 PID: 15738 Comm: ppp-apitest Not tainted 4.2.0 #1 [ 570.144601] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Debian-1.8.2-1 04/01/2014 [ 570.144601] task: ffff88003d30d600 ti: ffff880036b60000 task.ti: ffff880036b60000 [ 570.144601] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa018c701>] [<ffffffffa018c701>] pppoe_release+0x50/0x101 [pppoe] [ 570.144601] RSP: 0018:ffff880036b63e08 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 570.144601] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880034340000 RCX: 0000000000000206 [ 570.144601] RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff88003d30dd20 RDI: ffff88003d30dd20 [ 570.144601] RBP: ffff880036b63e28 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 570.144601] R10: 00007ffee9b50420 R11: ffff880034340078 R12: ffff8800387ec780 [ 570.144601] R13: ffff8800387ec7b0 R14: ffff88003e222aa0 R15: ffff8800387ec7b0 [ 570.144601] FS: 00007f5672f48700(0000) GS:ffff88003fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 570.144601] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 570.144601] CR2: 00000000000004e0 CR3: 0000000037f7e000 CR4: 00000000000406a0 [ 570.144601] Stack: [ 570.144601] ffffffffa018f240 ffff8800387ec780 ffffffffa018f240 ffff8800387ec7b0 [ 570.144601] ffff880036b63e48 ffffffff812caabe ffff880039e4e000 0000000000000008 [ 570.144601] ffff880036b63e58 ffffffff812cabad ffff880036b63ea8 ffffffff811347f5 [ 570.144601] Call Trace: [ 570.144601] [<ffffffff812caabe>] sock_release+0x1a/0x75 [ 570.144601] [<ffffffff812cabad>] sock_close+0xd/0x11 [ 570.144601] [<ffffffff811347f5>] __fput+0xff/0x1a5 [ 570.144601] [<ffffffff811348cb>] ____fput+0x9/0xb [ 570.144601] [<ffffffff81056682>] task_work_run+0x66/0x90 [ 570.144601] [<ffffffff8100189e>] prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x8c/0xa7 [ 570.144601] [<ffffffff81001a26>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x16d/0x19b [ 570.144601] [<ffffffff813babb1>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f [ 570.144601] Code: 48 8b 83 c8 01 00 00 a8 01 74 12 48 89 df e8 8b 27 14 e1 b8 f7 ff ff ff e9 b7 00 00 00 8a 43 12 a8 0b 74 1c 48 8b 83 a8 04 00 00 <48> 8b 80 e0 04 00 00 65 ff 08 48 c7 83 a8 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 570.144601] RIP [<ffffffffa018c701>] pppoe_release+0x50/0x101 [pppoe] [ 570.144601] RSP <ffff880036b63e08> [ 570.144601] CR2: 00000000000004e0 [ 570.200518] ---[ end trace 46956baf17349563 ]--- pppoe_flush_dev() has no reason to override sk->sk_state with PPPOX_ZOMBIE. pppox_unbind_sock() already sets sk->sk_state to PPPOX_DEAD, which is the correct state given that sk is unbound and po->pppoe_dev is NULL. Fixes: 2b018d5 ("pppoe: drop PPPOX_ZOMBIEs in pppoe_release") Tested-by: Oleksii Berezhniak <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d63527e ] syzbot reported: tipc: Node number set to 1055423674 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 6017 Comm: kworker/3:5 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc1-syzkaller-00246-g900241a5cc15 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events tipc_net_finalize_work RIP: 0010:tipc_mon_reinit_self+0x11c/0x210 net/tipc/monitor.c:719 ... RSP: 0018:ffffc9000356fb68 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000003ee87cba RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8dbc56a7 RDI: ffff88804c2cc010 RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000007 R13: fffffbfff2111097 R14: ffff88804ead8000 R15: ffff88804ead9010 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888097ab9000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000f720eb00 CR3: 000000000e182000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> tipc_net_finalize+0x10b/0x180 net/tipc/net.c:140 process_one_work+0x9cc/0x1b70 kernel/workqueue.c:3238 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3319 [inline] worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf10 kernel/workqueue.c:3400 kthread+0x3c2/0x780 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> ... RIP: 0010:tipc_mon_reinit_self+0x11c/0x210 net/tipc/monitor.c:719 ... RSP: 0018:ffffc9000356fb68 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000003ee87cba RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8dbc56a7 RDI: ffff88804c2cc010 RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000007 R13: fffffbfff2111097 R14: ffff88804ead8000 R15: ffff88804ead9010 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888097ab9000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000f720eb00 CR3: 000000000e182000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 There is a racing condition between workqueue created when enabling bearer and another thread created when disabling bearer right after that as follow: enabling_bearer | disabling_bearer --------------- | ---------------- tipc_disc_timeout() | { | bearer_disable() ... | { schedule_work(&tn->work); | tipc_mon_delete() ... | { } | ... | write_lock_bh(&mon->lock); | mon->self = NULL; | write_unlock_bh(&mon->lock); | ... | } tipc_net_finalize_work() | } { | ... | tipc_net_finalize() | { | ... | tipc_mon_reinit_self() | { | ... | write_lock_bh(&mon->lock); | mon->self->addr = tipc_own_addr(net); | write_unlock_bh(&mon->lock); | ... | } | ... | } | ... | } | 'mon->self' is set to NULL in disabling_bearer thread and dereferenced later in enabling_bearer thread. This commit fixes this issue by validating 'mon->self' before assigning node address to it. Reported-by: [email protected] Fixes: 46cb01e ("tipc: update mon's self addr when node addr generated") Signed-off-by: Tung Nguyen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 461f24b ] Intel Merrifield SoC uses these endpoints for tracing and they cannot be re-allocated if being used because the side band flow control signals are hard wired to certain endpoints: • 1 High BW Bulk IN (IN#1) (RTIT) • 1 1KB BW Bulk IN (IN#8) + 1 1KB BW Bulk OUT (Run Control) (OUT#8) In device mode, since RTIT (EP#1) and EXI/RunControl (EP#8) uses External Buffer Control (EBC) mode, these endpoints are to be mapped to EBC mode (to be done by EXI target driver). Additionally TRB for RTIT and EXI are maintained in STM (System Trace Module) unit and the EXI target driver will as well configure the TRB location for EP #1 IN and EP#8 (IN and OUT). Since STM/PTI and EXI hardware blocks manage these endpoints and interface to OTG3 controller through EBC interface, there is no need to enable any events (such as XferComplete etc) for these end points. Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ferry Toth <[email protected]> Acked-by: Thinh Nguyen <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9b04461 ] Running lib_ubsan.ko on arm64 (without CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP) panics the kernel: [ 31.616546] Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: test_ubsan_out_of_bounds+0x158/0x158 [test_ubsan] [ 31.646817] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 179 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2 #1 PREEMPT [ 31.648153] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 31.648970] Call trace: [ 31.649345] show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) [ 31.650960] dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0x84 [ 31.651559] dump_stack+0x18/0x24 [ 31.652264] panic+0x138/0x3b4 [ 31.652812] __ktime_get_real_seconds+0x0/0x10 [ 31.653540] test_ubsan_load_invalid_value+0x0/0xa8 [test_ubsan] [ 31.654388] init_module+0x24/0xff4 [test_ubsan] [ 31.655077] do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x280 [ 31.655680] do_init_module+0x58/0x2b4 That happens because the test corrupts other data in the stack: 400: d5384108 mrs x8, sp_el0 404: f9426d08 ldr x8, [x8, torvalds#1240] 408: f85f83a9 ldur x9, [x29, #-8] 40c: eb09011f cmp x8, x9 410: 54000301 b.ne 470 <test_ubsan_out_of_bounds+0x154> // b.any As there is no guarantee the compiler will order the local variables as declared in the module: volatile char above[4] = { }; /* Protect surrounding memory. */ volatile int arr[4]; volatile char below[4] = { }; /* Protect surrounding memory. */ There is another problem where the out-of-bound index is 5 which is larger than the extra surrounding memory for protection. So, use a struct to enforce the ordering, and fix the index to be 4. Also, remove some of the volatiles and rely on OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR() Signed-off-by: Mostafa Saleh <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

We found a timeout problem with the pldm command on our system. The reason is that the MCTP-I3C driver has a race condition when receiving multiple-packet messages in multi-thread, resulting in a wrong packet order problem. We identified this problem by adding a debug message to the mctp_i3c_read function. According to the MCTP spec, a multiple-packet message must be composed in sequence, and if there is a wrong sequence, the whole message will be discarded and wait for the next SOM. For example, SOM → Pkt Seq #2 → Pkt Seq #1 → Pkt Seq #3 → EOM. Therefore, we try to solve this problem by adding a mutex to the mctp_i3c_read function. Before the modification, when a command requesting a multiple-packet message response is sent consecutively, an error usually occurs within 100 loops. After the mutex, it can go through 40000 loops without any error, and it seems to run well. Fixes: c8755b2 ("mctp i3c: MCTP I3C driver") Signed-off-by: Leo Yang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] [[email protected]: dropped already answered question from changelog] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 2d2d4f6) Signed-off-by: Andrew Jeffery <[email protected]>

commit fee4d17 upstream. Commit a595138 ("arm64: errata: Add newer ARM cores to the spectre_bhb_loop_affected() lists") added some additional CPUs to the Spectre-BHB workaround, including some new arrays for designs that require new 'k' values for the workaround to be effective. Unfortunately, the new arrays omitted the sentinel entry and so is_midr_in_range_list() will walk off the end when it doesn't find a match. With UBSAN enabled, this leads to a crash during boot when is_midr_in_range_list() is inlined (which was more common prior to c8c2647 ("arm64: Make _midr_in_range_list() an exported function")): | Internal error: aarch64 BRK: 00000000f2000001 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | pstate: 804000c5 (Nzcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : spectre_bhb_loop_affected+0x28/0x30 | lr : is_spectre_bhb_affected+0x170/0x190 | [...] | Call trace: | spectre_bhb_loop_affected+0x28/0x30 | update_cpu_capabilities+0xc0/0x184 | init_cpu_features+0x188/0x1a4 | cpuinfo_store_boot_cpu+0x4c/0x60 | smp_prepare_boot_cpu+0x38/0x54 | start_kernel+0x8c/0x478 | __primary_switched+0xc8/0xd4 | Code: 6b09011f 54000061 52801080 d65f03c0 (d4200020) | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- | Kernel panic - not syncing: aarch64 BRK: Fatal exception Add the missing sentinel entries. Cc: Lee Jones <[email protected]> Cc: James Morse <[email protected]> Cc: Doug Anderson <[email protected]> Cc: Shameer Kolothum <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Fixes: a595138 ("arm64: errata: Add newer ARM cores to the spectre_bhb_loop_affected() lists") Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit a3d8f0a upstream. A BUG was reported as below when CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP and try_verify_in_tasklet are enabled. [ 129.444685][ T934] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at drivers/md/dm-bufio.c:2421 [ 129.444723][ T934] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 934, name: kworker/1:4 [ 129.444740][ T934] preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 [ 129.444756][ T934] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 [ 129.444781][ T934] Preemption disabled at: [ 129.444789][ T934] [<ffffffd816231900>] shrink_work+0x21c/0x248 [ 129.445167][ T934] kernel BUG at kernel/sched/walt/walt_debug.c:16! [ 129.445183][ T934] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 129.445204][ T934] Skip md ftrace buffer dump for: 0x1609e0 [ 129.447348][ T934] CPU: 1 PID: 934 Comm: kworker/1:4 Tainted: G W OE 6.6.56-android15-8-o-g6f82312b30b9-debug #1 1400000003000000474e5500b3187743670464e8 [ 129.447362][ T934] Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Parrot QRD, Alpha-M (DT) [ 129.447373][ T934] Workqueue: dm_bufio_cache shrink_work [ 129.447394][ T934] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 129.447406][ T934] pc : android_rvh_schedule_bug+0x0/0x8 [sched_walt_debug] [ 129.447435][ T934] lr : __traceiter_android_rvh_schedule_bug+0x44/0x6c [ 129.447451][ T934] sp : ffffffc0843dbc90 [ 129.447459][ T934] x29: ffffffc0843dbc90 x28: ffffffffffffffff x27: 0000000000000c8b [ 129.447479][ T934] x26: 0000000000000040 x25: ffffff804b3d6260 x24: ffffffd816232b68 [ 129.447497][ T934] x23: ffffff805171c5b4 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffffd816231900 [ 129.447517][ T934] x20: ffffff80306ba898 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffffc084159030 [ 129.447535][ T934] x17: 00000000d2b5dd1f x16: 00000000d2b5dd1f x15: ffffffd816720358 [ 129.447554][ T934] x14: 0000000000000004 x13: ffffff89ef978000 x12: 0000000000000003 [ 129.447572][ T934] x11: ffffffd817a823c4 x10: 0000000000000202 x9 : 7e779c5735de9400 [ 129.447591][ T934] x8 : ffffffd81560d004 x7 : 205b5d3938373434 x6 : ffffffd8167397c8 [ 129.447610][ T934] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffffffc0843db9e0 [ 129.447629][ T934] x2 : 0000000000002f15 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 129.447647][ T934] Call trace: [ 129.447655][ T934] android_rvh_schedule_bug+0x0/0x8 [sched_walt_debug 1400000003000000474e550080cce8a8a78606b6] [ 129.447681][ T934] __might_resched+0x190/0x1a8 [ 129.447694][ T934] shrink_work+0x180/0x248 [ 129.447706][ T934] process_one_work+0x260/0x624 [ 129.447718][ T934] worker_thread+0x28c/0x454 [ 129.447729][ T934] kthread+0x118/0x158 [ 129.447742][ T934] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 129.447761][ T934] Code: ???????? ???????? ???????? d2b5dd1f (d4210000) [ 129.447772][ T934] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- dm_bufio_lock will call spin_lock_bh when try_verify_in_tasklet is enabled, and __scan will be called in atomic context. Fixes: 7cd3267 ("dm bufio: remove dm_bufio_cond_resched()") Signed-off-by: LongPing Wei <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9cf7e13 ] A vmemmap altmap is a device-provided region used to provide backing storage for struct pages. For each namespace, the altmap should belong to that same namespace. If the namespaces are created unaligned, there is a chance that the section vmemmap start address could also be unaligned. If the section vmemmap start address is unaligned, the altmap page allocated from the current namespace might be used by the previous namespace also. During the free operation, since the altmap is shared between two namespaces, the previous namespace may detect that the page does not belong to its altmap and incorrectly assume that the page is a normal page. It then attempts to free the normal page, which leads to a kernel crash. Kernel attempted to read user page (18) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000018 Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000530c7c Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries CPU: 32 PID: 2104 Comm: ndctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W NIP: c000000000530c7c LR: c000000000530e00 CTR: 0000000000007ffe REGS: c000000015e57040 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G W MSR: 800000000280b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 84482404 CFAR: c000000000530dfc DAR: 0000000000000018 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c000000000530e00 c000000015e572e0 c000000002c5cb00 c00c000101008040 GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000007 0000000000000001 000000000000001f GPR08: 0000000000000005 0000000000000000 0000000000000018 0000000000002000 GPR12: c0000000001d2fb0 c0000060de6b0080 0000000000000000 c0000060dbf90020 GPR16: c00c000101008000 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 c000000125b20f00 GPR20: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff c00c000101007fff GPR24: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR28: 0000000004040201 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 c00c000101008040 NIP [c000000000530c7c] get_pfnblock_flags_mask+0x7c/0xd0 LR [c000000000530e00] free_unref_page_prepare+0x130/0x4f0 Call Trace: free_unref_page+0x50/0x1e0 free_reserved_page+0x40/0x68 free_vmemmap_pages+0x98/0xe0 remove_pte_table+0x164/0x1e8 remove_pmd_table+0x204/0x2c8 remove_pud_table+0x1c4/0x288 remove_pagetable+0x1c8/0x310 vmemmap_free+0x24/0x50 section_deactivate+0x28c/0x2a0 __remove_pages+0x84/0x110 arch_remove_memory+0x38/0x60 memunmap_pages+0x18c/0x3d0 devm_action_release+0x30/0x50 release_nodes+0x68/0x140 devres_release_group+0x100/0x190 dax_pmem_compat_release+0x44/0x80 [dax_pmem_compat] device_for_each_child+0x8c/0x100 [dax_pmem_compat_remove+0x2c/0x50 [dax_pmem_compat] nvdimm_bus_remove+0x78/0x140 [libnvdimm] device_remove+0x70/0xd0 Another issue is that if there is no altmap, a PMD-sized vmemmap page will be allocated from RAM, regardless of the alignment of the section start address. If the section start address is not aligned to the PMD size, a VM_BUG_ON will be triggered when setting the PMD-sized page to page table. In this patch, we are aligning the section vmemmap start address to PAGE_SIZE. After alignment, the start address will not be part of the current namespace, and a normal page will be allocated for the vmemmap mapping of the current section. For the remaining sections, altmaps will be allocated. During the free operation, the normal page will be correctly freed. In the same way, a PMD_SIZE vmemmap page will be allocated only if the section start address is PMD_SIZE-aligned; otherwise, it will fall back to a PAGE-sized vmemmap allocation. Without this patch ================== NS1 start NS2 start _________________________________________________________ | NS1 | NS2 | --------------------------------------------------------- | Altmap| Altmap | .....|Altmap| Altmap | ........... | NS1 | NS1 | | NS2 | NS2 | In the above scenario, NS1 and NS2 are two namespaces. The vmemmap for NS1 comes from Altmap NS1, which belongs to NS1, and the vmemmap for NS2 comes from Altmap NS2, which belongs to NS2. The vmemmap start for NS2 is not aligned, so Altmap NS2 is shared by both NS1 and NS2. During the free operation in NS1, Altmap NS2 is not part of NS1's altmap, causing it to attempt to free an invalid page. With this patch =============== NS1 start NS2 start _________________________________________________________ | NS1 | NS2 | --------------------------------------------------------- | Altmap| Altmap | .....| Normal | Altmap | Altmap |....... | NS1 | NS1 | | Page | NS2 | NS2 | If the vmemmap start for NS2 is not aligned then we are allocating a normal page. NS1 and NS2 vmemmap will be freed correctly. Fixes: 368a059 ("powerpc/book3s64/vmemmap: switch radix to use a different vmemmap handling function") Co-developed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Donet Tom <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8f98ec2b442977c618f7256cec88eb17dde3f2b9.1741609795.git.donettom@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit f1aff4b upstream. The blammed commit copied to argv the size of the reallocated argv, instead of the size of the old_argv, thus reading and copying from past the old_argv allocated memory. Following BUG_ON was hit: [ 3.038929][ T1] kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1040! [ 3.039147][ T1] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP ... [ 3.056489][ T1] Call trace: [ 3.056591][ T1] __fortify_panic+0x10/0x18 (P) [ 3.056773][ T1] dm_split_args+0x20c/0x210 [ 3.056942][ T1] dm_table_add_target+0x13c/0x360 [ 3.057132][ T1] table_load+0x110/0x3ac [ 3.057292][ T1] dm_ctl_ioctl+0x424/0x56c [ 3.057457][ T1] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0xec [ 3.057634][ T1] invoke_syscall+0x58/0x10c [ 3.057804][ T1] el0_svc_common+0xa8/0xdc [ 3.057970][ T1] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [ 3.058123][ T1] el0_svc+0x50/0xac [ 3.058266][ T1] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x60/0xc4 [ 3.058452][ T1] el0t_64_sync+0x1b0/0x1b4 [ 3.058620][ T1] Code: f800865e a9bf7bfd 910003fd 941f48aa (d4210000) [ 3.058897][ T1] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 3.059083][ T1] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception Fix it by copying the size of src, and not the size of dst, as it was. Fixes: 5a2a6c4 ("dm: always update the array size in realloc_argv on success") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c457dc1 ] When memory is insufficient, the allocation of nfs_lock_context in nfs_get_lock_context() fails and returns -ENOMEM. If we mistakenly treat an nfs4_unlockdata structure (whose l_ctx member has been set to -ENOMEM) as valid and proceed to execute rpc_run_task(), this will trigger a NULL pointer dereference in nfs4_locku_prepare. For example: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000000c PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u64:0 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2-dirty #60 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 Workqueue: rpciod rpc_async_schedule RIP: 0010:nfs4_locku_prepare+0x35/0xc2 Code: 89 f2 48 89 fd 48 c7 c7 68 69 ef b5 53 48 8b 8e 90 00 00 00 48 89 f3 RSP: 0018:ffffbbafc006bdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000000000000004b RBX: ffff9b964fc1fa00 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: fffffffffffffff4 RDI: ffff9ba53fddbf40 RBP: ffff9ba539934000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffbbafc006bc38 R10: ffffffffb6b689c8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff9ba539934030 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000004248060 R15: ffffffffb56d1c30 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9ba5881f0000(0000) knlGS:00000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000000c CR3: 000000093f244000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> __rpc_execute+0xbc/0x480 rpc_async_schedule+0x2f/0x40 process_one_work+0x232/0x5d0 worker_thread+0x1da/0x3d0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x10d/0x240 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: 000000000000000c ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Free the allocated nfs4_unlockdata when nfs_get_lock_context() fails and return NULL to terminate subsequent rpc_run_task, preventing NULL pointer dereference. Fixes: f30cb75 ("NFS: Always wait for I/O completion before unlock") Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5884314 ] MACsec offload is not supported in switchdev mode for uplink representors. When switching to the uplink representor profile, the MACsec offload feature must be cleared from the netdevice's features. If left enabled, attempts to add offloads result in a null pointer dereference, as the uplink representor does not support MACsec offload even though the feature bit remains set. Clear NETIF_F_HW_MACSEC in mlx5e_fix_uplink_rep_features(). Kernel log: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000f: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000078-0x000000000000007f] CPU: 29 UID: 0 PID: 4714 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc4_for_upstream_debug_2025_03_02_17_35 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0x128/0x1dd0 Code: d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 ad 15 00 00 8b 35 91 5c fe 03 85 f6 75 29 49 8d 7e 60 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 a6 15 00 00 4d 3b 76 60 0f 85 fd 0b 00 00 65 ff RSP: 0018:ffff888147a4f160 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 000000000000000f RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000078 RBP: ffff888147a4f2e0 R08: ffffffffa05d2c19 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000018 R15: ffff888152de0000 FS: 00007f855e27d800(0000) GS:ffff88881ee80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004e5768 CR3: 000000013ae7c005 CR4: 0000000000372eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x3d/0xa0 ? exc_general_protection+0x144/0x220 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 ? mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core] ? __mutex_lock+0x128/0x1dd0 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 ? mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core] ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1ae0/0x1ae0 ? lock_acquire+0x1c2/0x530 ? macsec_upd_offload+0x145/0x380 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40 ? kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 ? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x77/0x90 ? __kmalloc_noprof+0x249/0x6b0 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0xb5/0x240 ? mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5e_macsec_add_rxsa+0x11a0/0x11a0 [mlx5_core] macsec_update_offload+0x26c/0x820 ? macsec_set_mac_address+0x4b0/0x4b0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x284/0x400 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x47/0x50 macsec_upd_offload+0x2c8/0x380 ? macsec_update_offload+0x820/0x820 ? __nla_parse+0x22/0x30 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0x15e/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1cc/0x2a0 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0x240/0x240 ? cap_capable+0xd4/0x330 genl_rcv_msg+0x3ea/0x670 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x2a0/0x2a0 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 ? macsec_update_offload+0x820/0x820 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12b/0x390 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x2a0/0x2a0 ? netlink_ack+0xd80/0xd80 ? rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0xf90/0xf90 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0xcd/0xac0 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x155/0xac0 ? _copy_from_iter+0x1bb/0x12c0 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x440/0x700 ? netlink_attachskb+0x760/0x760 ? lock_acquire+0x1c2/0x530 ? __might_fault+0xbb/0x170 netlink_sendmsg+0x749/0xc10 ? netlink_unicast+0x700/0x700 ? __might_fault+0xbb/0x170 ? netlink_unicast+0x700/0x700 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 ____sys_sendmsg+0x53f/0x760 ? import_iovec+0x7/0x10 ? kernel_sendmsg+0x30/0x30 ? __copy_msghdr+0x3c0/0x3c0 ? filter_irq_stacks+0x90/0x90 ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x28/0xa30 ___sys_sendmsg+0xeb/0x170 ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x110/0x110 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 ? lock_acquire+0x1c2/0x530 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x116/0x3b0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x1da/0x3b0 ? lock_downgrade+0x680/0x680 ? __delete_object+0x21/0x50 __sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x180 ? __sys_sendmsg_sock+0x20/0x20 ? kmem_cache_free+0x14c/0x4e0 ? __x64_sys_close+0x78/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f855e113367 Code: 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b9 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 RSP: 002b:00007ffd15e90c88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00007f855e113367 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffd15e90cf0 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffd15e90dbc R08: 0000000000000028 R09: 000000000045d100 R10: 00007f855e011dd8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000019 R13: 0000000067c6b785 R14: 00000000004a1e80 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Modules linked in: 8021q garp mrp sch_ingress openvswitch nsh mlx5_ib mlx5_fwctl mlx5_dpll mlx5_core rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm ib_uverbs ib_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: mlx5_core] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 8ff0ac5 ("net/mlx5: Add MACsec offload Tx command support") Signed-off-by: Carolina Jubran <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shahar Shitrit <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dragos Tatulea <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 1f77c05 upstream. This fixes a kernel panic seen during release FW in a stress test scenario where WLAN and BT FW download occurs simultaneously, and due to a HW bug, chip sends out only 1 bootloader signatures. When driver receives the bootloader signature, it enters FW download mode, but since no consequtive bootloader signatures seen, FW file is not requested. After 60 seconds, when FW download times out, release_firmware causes a kernel panic. [ 2601.949184] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000312e6f006573 [ 2601.992076] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000111802000 [ 2601.992080] [0000312e6f006573] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 2601.992087] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000021 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 2601.992091] Modules linked in: algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg btnxpuart(O) pciexxx(O) mlan(O) overlay fsl_jr_uio caam_jr caamkeyblob_desc caamhash_desc caamalg_desc crypto_engine authenc libdes crct10dif_ce polyval_ce snd_soc_fsl_easrc snd_soc_fsl_asoc_card imx8_media_dev(C) snd_soc_fsl_micfil polyval_generic snd_soc_fsl_xcvr snd_soc_fsl_sai snd_soc_imx_audmux snd_soc_fsl_asrc snd_soc_imx_card snd_soc_imx_hdmi snd_soc_fsl_aud2htx snd_soc_fsl_utils imx_pcm_dma dw_hdmi_cec flexcan can_dev [ 2602.001825] CPU: 2 PID: 20060 Comm: hciconfig Tainted: G C O 6.6.23-lts-next-06236-gb586a521770e #1 [ 2602.010182] Hardware name: NXP i.MX8MPlus EVK board (DT) [ 2602.010185] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 2602.010191] pc : _raw_spin_lock+0x34/0x68 [ 2602.010201] lr : free_fw_priv+0x20/0xfc [ 2602.020561] sp : ffff800089363b30 [ 2602.020563] x29: ffff800089363b30 x28: ffff0000d0eb5880 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 2602.020570] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff0000d728b330 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 2602.020577] x23: ffff0000dc856f38 [ 2602.033797] x22: ffff800089363b70 x21: ffff0000dc856000 [ 2602.033802] x20: ff00312e6f006573 x19: ffff0000d0d9ea80 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 2602.033809] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000aaaad80dd480 [ 2602.083320] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 00000000000001b9 x12: 0000000000000002 [ 2602.083326] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000a60 x9 : ffff800089363a30 [ 2602.083333] x8 : ffff0001793d75c0 x7 : ffff0000d6dbc400 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 2602.083339] x5 : 00000000410fd030 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001 [ 2602.083346] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ff00312e6f006573 [ 2602.083354] Call trace: [ 2602.083356] _raw_spin_lock+0x34/0x68 [ 2602.083364] release_firmware+0x48/0x6c [ 2602.083370] nxp_setup+0x3c4/0x540 [btnxpuart] [ 2602.083383] hci_dev_open_sync+0xf0/0xa34 [ 2602.083391] hci_dev_open+0xd8/0x178 [ 2602.083399] hci_sock_ioctl+0x3b0/0x590 [ 2602.083405] sock_do_ioctl+0x60/0x118 [ 2602.083413] sock_ioctl+0x2f4/0x374 [ 2602.091430] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0xf0 [ 2602.091437] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 [ 2602.091445] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0 [ 2602.091452] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [ 2602.091457] el0_svc+0x40/0xe4 [ 2602.091465] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c [ 2602.091470] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 Fixes: e3c4891 ("Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Handle FW Download Abort scenario") Fixes: 689ca16 ("Bluetooth: NXP: Add protocol support for NXP Bluetooth chipsets") Signed-off-by: Neeraj Sanjay Kale <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bin Lan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: He Zhe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit af288a4 upstream. Commit b15c872 ("hwpoison, memory_hotplug: allow hwpoisoned pages to be offlined) add page poison checks in do_migrate_range in order to make offline hwpoisoned page possible by introducing isolate_lru_page and try_to_unmap for hwpoisoned page. However folio lock must be held before calling try_to_unmap. Add it to fix this problem. Warning will be produced if folio is not locked during unmap: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at ./include/linux/swapops.h:400! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 411 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc1-00016-g3c434c7ee82a-dirty #41 Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c lr : try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c Call trace: try_to_unmap_one+0xb08/0xd3c (P) try_to_unmap_one+0x3dc/0xd3c (L) rmap_walk_anon+0xdc/0x1f8 rmap_walk+0x3c/0x58 try_to_unmap+0x88/0x90 unmap_poisoned_folio+0x30/0xa8 do_migrate_range+0x4a0/0x568 offline_pages+0x5a4/0x670 memory_block_action+0x17c/0x374 memory_subsys_offline+0x3c/0x78 device_offline+0xa4/0xd0 state_store+0x8c/0xf0 dev_attr_store+0x18/0x2c sysfs_kf_write+0x44/0x54 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x118/0x1a8 vfs_write+0x3a8/0x4bc ksys_write+0x6c/0xf8 __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28 invoke_syscall+0x44/0x100 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x30/0xd0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xcc el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c Code: f9407be0 b5fff320 d4210000 17ffff97 (d4210000) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: b15c872 ("hwpoison, memory_hotplug: allow hwpoisoned pages to be offlined") Signed-off-by: Ma Wupeng <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Acked-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]> Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> Cc: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: He Zhe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 1020630 upstream. We must serialize calls to sctp_udp_sock_stop() and sctp_udp_sock_start() or risk a crash as syzbot reported: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000d: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6551 Comm: syz.1.44 Not tainted 6.14.0-syzkaller-g7f2ff7b62617 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 RIP: 0010:kernel_sock_shutdown+0x47/0x70 net/socket.c:3653 Call Trace: <TASK> udp_tunnel_sock_release+0x68/0x80 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel_core.c:181 sctp_udp_sock_stop+0x71/0x160 net/sctp/protocol.c:930 proc_sctp_do_udp_port+0x264/0x450 net/sctp/sysctl.c:553 proc_sys_call_handler+0x3d0/0x5b0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:601 iter_file_splice_write+0x91c/0x1150 fs/splice.c:738 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:935 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0x18f/0x6c0 fs/splice.c:1158 splice_direct_to_actor+0x342/0xa30 fs/splice.c:1102 do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1201 [inline] do_splice_direct+0x174/0x240 fs/splice.c:1227 do_sendfile+0xafd/0xe50 fs/read_write.c:1368 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1429 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1415 [inline] __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1d8/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1415 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] Fixes: 046c052 ("sctp: enable udp tunneling socks") Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/T/#u Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]> Acked-by: Xin Long <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> [Minor conflict resolved due to code context change.] Signed-off-by: Jianqi Ren <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: He Zhe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ef1d345 ] If a faulty CXL memory device returns a broken zero LSA size in its memory device information (Identify Memory Device (Opcode 4000h), CXL spec. 3.1, 8.2.9.9.1.1), a divide error occurs in the libnvdimm driver: Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:nd_label_data_init+0x10e/0x800 [libnvdimm] Code and flow: 1) CXL Command 4000h returns LSA size = 0 2) config_size is assigned to zero LSA size (CXL pmem driver): drivers/cxl/pmem.c: .config_size = mds->lsa_size, 3) max_xfer is set to zero (nvdimm driver): drivers/nvdimm/label.c: max_xfer = min_t(size_t, ndd->nsarea.max_xfer, config_size); 4) A subsequent DIV_ROUND_UP() causes a division by zero: drivers/nvdimm/label.c: /* Make our initial read size a multiple of max_xfer size */ drivers/nvdimm/label.c: read_size = min(DIV_ROUND_UP(read_size, max_xfer) * max_xfer, drivers/nvdimm/label.c- config_size); Fix this by checking the config size parameter by extending an existing check. Signed-off-by: Robert Richter <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5da692e ] A cache device failing to resume due to mapping errors should not be retried, as the failure leaves a partially initialized policy object. Repeating the resume operation risks triggering BUG_ON when reloading cache mappings into the incomplete policy object. Reproduce steps: 1. create a cache metadata consisting of 512 or more cache blocks, with some mappings stored in the first array block of the mapping array. Here we use cache_restore v1.0 to build the metadata. cat <<EOF >> cmeta.xml <superblock uuid="" block_size="128" nr_cache_blocks="512" \ policy="smq" hint_width="4"> <mappings> <mapping cache_block="0" origin_block="0" dirty="false"/> </mappings> </superblock> EOF dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0" cache_restore -i cmeta.xml -o /dev/mapper/cmeta --metadata-version=2 dmsetup remove cmeta 2. wipe the second array block of the mapping array to simulate data degradations. mapping_root=$(dd if=/dev/sdc bs=1c count=8 skip=192 \ 2>/dev/null | hexdump -e '1/8 "%u\n"') ablock=$(dd if=/dev/sdc bs=1c count=8 skip=$((4096*mapping_root+2056)) \ 2>/dev/null | hexdump -e '1/8 "%u\n"') dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdc bs=4k count=1 seek=$ablock 3. try bringing up the cache device. The resume is expected to fail due to the broken array block. dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0" dmsetup create cdata --table "0 65536 linear /dev/sdc 8192" dmsetup create corig --table "0 524288 linear /dev/sdc 262144" dmsetup create cache --notable dmsetup load cache --table "0 524288 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \ /dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 writethrough smq 0" dmsetup resume cache 4. try resuming the cache again. An unexpected BUG_ON is triggered while loading cache mappings. dmsetup resume cache Kernel logs: (snip) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm-cache-policy-smq.c:752! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 332 Comm: dmsetup Not tainted 6.13.4 #3 RIP: 0010:smq_load_mapping+0x3e5/0x570 Fix by disallowing resume operations for devices that failed the initial attempt. Signed-off-by: Ming-Hung Tsai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1b9366c ] If waiting for gpu reset done in KFD release_work, thers is WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected #2 kfd_create_process kfd_process_mutex flush kfd release work #1 kfd release work wait for amdgpu reset work #0 amdgpu_device_gpu_reset kgd2kfd_pre_reset kfd_process_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock((work_completion)(&p->release_work)); lock((wq_completion)kfd_process_wq); lock((work_completion)(&p->release_work)); lock((wq_completion)amdgpu-reset-dev); To fix this, KFD create process move flush release work outside kfd_process_mutex. Signed-off-by: Philip Yang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 88f7f56 ] When a bio with REQ_PREFLUSH is submitted to dm, __send_empty_flush() generates a flush_bio with REQ_OP_WRITE | REQ_PREFLUSH | REQ_SYNC, which causes the flush_bio to be throttled by wbt_wait(). An example from v5.4, similar problem also exists in upstream: crash> bt 2091206 PID: 2091206 TASK: ffff2050df92a300 CPU: 109 COMMAND: "kworker/u260:0" #0 [ffff800084a2f7f0] __switch_to at ffff80004008aeb8 #1 [ffff800084a2f820] __schedule at ffff800040bfa0c4 #2 [ffff800084a2f880] schedule at ffff800040bfa4b4 #3 [ffff800084a2f8a0] io_schedule at ffff800040bfa9c4 #4 [ffff800084a2f8c0] rq_qos_wait at ffff8000405925bc #5 [ffff800084a2f940] wbt_wait at ffff8000405bb3a0 #6 [ffff800084a2f9a0] __rq_qos_throttle at ffff800040592254 #7 [ffff800084a2f9c0] blk_mq_make_request at ffff80004057cf38 #8 [ffff800084a2fa60] generic_make_request at ffff800040570138 #9 [ffff800084a2fae0] submit_bio at ffff8000405703b4 #10 [ffff800084a2fb50] xlog_write_iclog at ffff800001280834 [xfs] #11 [ffff800084a2fbb0] xlog_sync at ffff800001280c3c [xfs] #12 [ffff800084a2fbf0] xlog_state_release_iclog at ffff800001280df4 [xfs] #13 [ffff800084a2fc10] xlog_write at ffff80000128203c [xfs] #14 [ffff800084a2fcd0] xlog_cil_push at ffff8000012846dc [xfs] #15 [ffff800084a2fda0] xlog_cil_push_work at ffff800001284a2c [xfs] #16 [ffff800084a2fdb0] process_one_work at ffff800040111d08 #17 [ffff800084a2fe00] worker_thread at ffff8000401121cc #18 [ffff800084a2fe70] kthread at ffff800040118de4 After commit 2def284 ("xfs: don't allow log IO to be throttled"), the metadata submitted by xlog_write_iclog() should not be throttled. But due to the existence of the dm layer, throttling flush_bio indirectly causes the metadata bio to be throttled. Fix this by conditionally adding REQ_IDLE to flush_bio.bi_opf, which makes wbt_should_throttle() return false to avoid wbt_wait(). Signed-off-by: Jinliang Zheng <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tianxiang Peng <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hao Peng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 46d22b4 ] queue->state_change is set as part of nvmet_tcp_set_queue_sock(), but if the TCP connection isn't established when nvmet_tcp_set_queue_sock() is called then queue->state_change isn't set and sock->sk->sk_state_change isn't replaced. As such we don't need to restore sock->sk->sk_state_change if queue->state_change is NULL. This avoids NULL pointer dereferences such as this: [ 286.462026][ C0] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 286.462814][ C0] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode [ 286.463796][ C0] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page [ 286.464392][ C0] PGD 8000000140620067 P4D 8000000140620067 PUD 114201067 PMD 0 [ 286.465086][ C0] Oops: Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI [ 286.465559][ C0] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1628 Comm: nvme Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2+ #11 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 286.466393][ C0] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 [ 286.467147][ C0] RIP: 0010:0x0 [ 286.467420][ C0] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6. [ 286.467977][ C0] RSP: 0018:ffff8883ae008580 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 286.468425][ C0] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88813fd34100 RCX: ffffffffa386cc43 [ 286.469019][ C0] RDX: 1ffff11027fa68b6 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88813fd34100 [ 286.469545][ C0] RBP: ffff88813fd34160 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed1027fa682c [ 286.470072][ C0] R10: ffff88813fd34167 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88813fd344c3 [ 286.470585][ C0] R13: ffff88813fd34112 R14: ffff88813fd34aec R15: ffff888132cdd268 [ 286.471070][ C0] FS: 00007fe3c04c7d80(0000) GS:ffff88840743f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 286.471644][ C0] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 286.472543][ C0] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000012daca000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 286.473500][ C0] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 286.474467][ C0] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 286.475453][ C0] Call Trace: [ 286.476102][ C0] <IRQ> [ 286.476719][ C0] tcp_fin+0x2bb/0x440 [ 286.477429][ C0] tcp_data_queue+0x190f/0x4e60 [ 286.478174][ C0] ? __build_skb_around+0x234/0x330 [ 286.478940][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.479659][ C0] ? __pfx_tcp_data_queue+0x10/0x10 [ 286.480431][ C0] ? tcp_try_undo_loss+0x640/0x6c0 [ 286.481196][ C0] ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90 [ 286.482046][ C0] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x30 [ 286.482769][ C0] ? ktime_get+0x66/0x150 [ 286.483433][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.484146][ C0] tcp_rcv_established+0x6e4/0x2050 [ 286.484857][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.485523][ C0] ? ipv4_dst_check+0x160/0x2b0 [ 286.486203][ C0] ? __pfx_tcp_rcv_established+0x10/0x10 [ 286.486917][ C0] ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0 [ 286.487595][ C0] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x4d6/0x9b0 [ 286.488279][ C0] tcp_v4_rcv+0x2af8/0x3e30 [ 286.488904][ C0] ? raw_local_deliver+0x51b/0xad0 [ 286.489551][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.490198][ C0] ? __pfx_tcp_v4_rcv+0x10/0x10 [ 286.490813][ C0] ? __pfx_raw_local_deliver+0x10/0x10 [ 286.491487][ C0] ? __pfx_nf_confirm+0x10/0x10 [nf_conntrack] [ 286.492275][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.492900][ C0] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x8f/0x370 [ 286.493579][ C0] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x297/0x420 [ 286.494268][ C0] ip_local_deliver+0x168/0x430 [ 286.494867][ C0] ? __pfx_ip_local_deliver+0x10/0x10 [ 286.495498][ C0] ? __pfx_ip_local_deliver_finish+0x10/0x10 [ 286.496204][ C0] ? ip_rcv_finish_core+0x19a/0x1f20 [ 286.496806][ C0] ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0 [ 286.497414][ C0] ip_rcv+0x455/0x6e0 [ 286.497945][ C0] ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10 [ 286.498550][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.499137][ C0] ? __pfx_ip_rcv_finish+0x10/0x10 [ 286.499763][ C0] ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0 [ 286.500327][ C0] ? dl_scaled_delta_exec+0xd1/0x2c0 [ 286.500922][ C0] ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10 [ 286.501480][ C0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x166/0x1b0 [ 286.502173][ C0] ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10 [ 286.502903][ C0] ? lock_acquire+0x2b2/0x310 [ 286.503487][ C0] ? process_backlog+0x372/0x1350 [ 286.504087][ C0] ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0 [ 286.504642][ C0] process_backlog+0x3b9/0x1350 [ 286.505214][ C0] ? process_backlog+0x372/0x1350 [ 286.505779][ C0] __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xa6/0x490 [ 286.506363][ C0] net_rx_action+0x92e/0xe10 [ 286.506889][ C0] ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10 [ 286.507437][ C0] ? timerqueue_add+0x1f0/0x320 [ 286.507977][ C0] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x68/0x540 [ 286.508492][ C0] ? lock_acquire+0x2b2/0x310 [ 286.509043][ C0] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20 [ 286.509607][ C0] ? handle_softirqs+0x1aa/0x7d0 [ 286.510187][ C0] handle_softirqs+0x1f2/0x7d0 [ 286.510754][ C0] ? __pfx_handle_softirqs+0x10/0x10 [ 286.511348][ C0] ? irqtime_account_irq+0x181/0x290 [ 286.511937][ C0] ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x85d/0x3450 [ 286.512510][ C0] do_softirq.part.0+0x89/0xc0 [ 286.513100][ C0] </IRQ> [ 286.513548][ C0] <TASK> [ 286.513953][ C0] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x112/0x140 [ 286.514522][ C0] ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x85d/0x3450 [ 286.515072][ C0] __dev_queue_xmit+0x872/0x3450 [ 286.515619][ C0] ? nft_do_chain+0xe16/0x15b0 [nf_tables] [ 286.516252][ C0] ? __pfx___dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x10 [ 286.516817][ C0] ? selinux_ip_postroute+0x43c/0xc50 [ 286.517433][ C0] ? __pfx_selinux_ip_postroute+0x10/0x10 [ 286.518061][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.518606][ C0] ? ip_output+0x164/0x4a0 [ 286.519149][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.519671][ C0] ? ip_finish_output2+0x17d5/0x1fb0 [ 286.520258][ C0] ip_finish_output2+0xb4b/0x1fb0 [ 286.520787][ C0] ? __pfx_ip_finish_output2+0x10/0x10 [ 286.521355][ C0] ? __ip_finish_output+0x15d/0x750 [ 286.521890][ C0] ip_output+0x164/0x4a0 [ 286.522372][ C0] ? __pfx_ip_output+0x10/0x10 [ 286.522872][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.523402][ C0] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4c/0x60 [ 286.524031][ C0] ? __pfx_ip_finish_output+0x10/0x10 [ 286.524605][ C0] ? __ip_queue_xmit+0x999/0x2260 [ 286.525200][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.525744][ C0] ? ipv4_dst_check+0x16a/0x2b0 [ 286.526279][ C0] ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0 [ 286.526793][ C0] __ip_queue_xmit+0x1883/0x2260 [ 286.527324][ C0] ? __skb_clone+0x54c/0x730 [ 286.527827][ C0] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x209b/0x37a0 [ 286.528374][ C0] ? __pfx___tcp_transmit_skb+0x10/0x10 [ 286.528952][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.529472][ C0] ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90 [ 286.530152][ C0] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x12/0x120 [ 286.530691][ C0] tcp_write_xmit+0xb81/0x88b0 [ 286.531224][ C0] ? mod_memcg_state+0x4d/0x60 [ 286.531736][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.532253][ C0] __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x90/0x320 [ 286.532826][ C0] tcp_send_fin+0x141/0xb50 [ 286.533352][ C0] ? __pfx_tcp_send_fin+0x10/0x10 [ 286.533908][ C0] ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xab/0x140 [ 286.534495][ C0] inet_shutdown+0x243/0x320 [ 286.535077][ C0] nvme_tcp_alloc_queue+0xb3b/0x2590 [nvme_tcp] [ 286.535709][ C0] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x129/0x260 [ 286.536314][ C0] ? __pfx_nvme_tcp_alloc_queue+0x10/0x10 [nvme_tcp] [ 286.536996][ C0] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x54/0x1e0 [ 286.537550][ C0] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50 [ 286.538127][ C0] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x129/0x260 [ 286.538664][ C0] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 286.539249][ C0] ? nvme_tcp_alloc_admin_queue+0xd5/0x340 [nvme_tcp] [ 286.539892][ C0] ? __wake_up+0x40/0x60 [ 286.540392][ C0] nvme_tcp_alloc_admin_queue+0xd5/0x340 [nvme_tcp] [ 286.541047][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.541589][ C0] nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl+0x8b/0x7a0 [nvme_tcp] [ 286.542254][ C0] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4c/0x60 [ 286.542887][ C0] ? __pfx_nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl+0x10/0x10 [nvme_tcp] [ 286.543568][ C0] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x12/0x120 [ 286.544166][ C0] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x35/0x60 [ 286.544792][ C0] ? nvme_change_ctrl_state+0x196/0x2e0 [nvme_core] [ 286.545477][ C0] nvme_tcp_create_ctrl+0x839/0xb90 [nvme_tcp] [ 286.546126][ C0] nvmf_dev_write+0x3db/0x7e0 [nvme_fabrics] [ 286.546775][ C0] ? rw_verify_area+0x69/0x520 [ 286.547334][ C0] vfs_write+0x218/0xe90 [ 286.547854][ C0] ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x190 [ 286.548408][ C0] ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xdb/0x120 [ 286.549037][ C0] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x93/0x280 [ 286.549659][ C0] ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 [ 286.550259][ C0] ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x190 [ 286.550840][ C0] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x8e/0x280 [ 286.551516][ C0] ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xdb/0x120 [ 286.552180][ C0] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x93/0x280 [ 286.552834][ C0] ? ksys_read+0xf5/0x1c0 [ 286.553386][ C0] ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10 [ 286.553964][ C0] ksys_write+0xf5/0x1c0 [ 286.554499][ C0] ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 [ 286.555072][ C0] ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xdb/0x120 [ 286.555698][ C0] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x93/0x280 [ 286.556319][ C0] ? do_syscall_64+0x54/0x190 [ 286.556866][ C0] do_syscall_64+0x93/0x190 [ 286.557420][ C0] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x17/0x60 [ 286.557986][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.558526][ C0] ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0 [ 286.559087][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.559659][ C0] ? count_memcg_events.constprop.0+0x4a/0x60 [ 286.560476][ C0] ? exc_page_fault+0x7a/0x110 [ 286.561064][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.561647][ C0] ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0 [ 286.562257][ C0] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x171/0xa00 [ 286.562839][ C0] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x4a2/0xa00 [ 286.563453][ C0] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x84/0x270 [ 286.564112][ C0] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 [ 286.564677][ C0] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x84/0x270 [ 286.565317][ C0] ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xdb/0x120 [ 286.565922][ C0] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 286.566542][ C0] RIP: 0033:0x7fe3c05e6504 [ 286.567102][ C0] Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d c5 8b 10 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 [ 286.568931][ C0] RSP: 002b:00007fff76444f58 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 286.569807][ C0] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000003b40d930 RCX: 00007fe3c05e6504 [ 286.570621][ C0] RDX: 00000000000000cf RSI: 000000003b40d930 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 286.571443][ C0] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 00000000000000cf R09: 000000003b40d930 [ 286.572246][ C0] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000000003b40cd60 [ 286.573069][ C0] R13: 00000000000000cf R14: 00007fe3c07417f8 R15: 00007fe3c073502e [ 286.573886][ C0] </TASK> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/5hdonndzoqa265oq3bj6iarwtfk5dewxxjtbjvn5uqnwclpwt6@a2n6w3taxxex/ Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]> Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bc7e097 ] btrfs_prelim_ref() calls the old and new reference variables in the incorrect order. This causes a NULL pointer dereference because oldref is passed as NULL to trace_btrfs_prelim_ref_insert(). Note, trace_btrfs_prelim_ref_insert() is being called with newref as oldref (and oldref as NULL) on purpose in order to print out the values of newref. To reproduce: echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/btrfs/btrfs_prelim_ref_insert/enable Perform some writeback operations. Backtrace: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 115949067 P4D 115949067 PUD 11594a067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1188 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2-tester+ #47 PREEMPT(voluntary) 7ca2cef72d5e9c600f0c7718adb6462de8149622 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-2-gc13ff2cd-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:trace_event_raw_event_btrfs__prelim_ref+0x72/0x130 Code: e8 43 81 9f ff 48 85 c0 74 78 4d 85 e4 0f 84 8f 00 00 00 49 8b 94 24 c0 06 00 00 48 8b 0a 48 89 48 08 48 8b 52 08 48 89 50 10 <49> 8b 55 18 48 89 50 18 49 8b 55 20 48 89 50 20 41 0f b6 55 28 88 RSP: 0018:ffffce44820077a0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: ffff8c6b403f9014 RBX: ffff8c6b55825730 RCX: 304994edf9cf506b RDX: d8b11eb7f0fdb699 RSI: ffff8c6b403f9010 RDI: ffff8c6b403f9010 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 00000000ffffffff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8c6b4e8fb000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffce44820077a8 R15: ffff8c6b4abd1540 FS: 00007f4dc6813740(0000) GS:ffff8c6c1d378000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 000000010eb42000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> prelim_ref_insert+0x1c1/0x270 find_parent_nodes+0x12a6/0x1ee0 ? __entry_text_end+0x101f06/0x101f09 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 btrfs_is_data_extent_shared+0x167/0x640 ? fiemap_process_hole+0xd0/0x2c0 extent_fiemap+0xa5c/0xbc0 ? __entry_text_end+0x101f05/0x101f09 btrfs_fiemap+0x7e/0xd0 do_vfs_ioctl+0x425/0x9d0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x75/0xc0 Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 3e74859 upstream. When we call btrfs_read_folio() to bring a folio uptodate, we unlock the folio. The result of that is that a different thread can modify the mapping (like remove it with invalidate) before we call folio_lock(). This results in an invalid page and we need to try again. In particular, if we are relocating concurrently with aborting a transaction, this can result in a crash like the following: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 76 PID: 1411631 Comm: kworker/u322:5 Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_reclaim_bgs_work RIP: 0010:set_page_extent_mapped+0x20/0xb0 RSP: 0018:ffffc900516a7be8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffea009e851d08 RBX: ffffea009e0b1880 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc900516a7b90 RDI: ffffea009e0b1880 RBP: 0000000003573000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff88c07fd2f3f0 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000194754b575be R12: 0000000003572000 R13: 0000000003572fff R14: 0000000000100cca R15: 0000000005582fff FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88c07fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000407d00f002 CR4: 00000000007706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x78/0xc0 ? page_fault_oops+0x2a8/0x3a0 ? __switch_to+0x133/0x530 ? wq_worker_running+0xa/0x40 ? exc_page_fault+0x63/0x130 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? set_page_extent_mapped+0x20/0xb0 relocate_file_extent_cluster+0x1a7/0x940 relocate_data_extent+0xaf/0x120 relocate_block_group+0x20f/0x480 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x152/0x320 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x3d/0x120 btrfs_reclaim_bgs_work+0x2ae/0x4e0 process_scheduled_works+0x184/0x370 worker_thread+0xc6/0x3e0 ? blk_add_timer+0xb0/0xb0 kthread+0xae/0xe0 ? flush_tlb_kernel_range+0x90/0x90 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x40 ? flush_tlb_kernel_range+0x90/0x90 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> This occurs because cleanup_one_transaction() calls destroy_delalloc_inodes() which calls invalidate_inode_pages2() which takes the folio_lock before setting mapping to NULL. We fail to check this, and subsequently call set_extent_mapping(), which assumes that mapping != NULL (in fact it asserts that in debug mode) Note that the "fixes" patch here is not the one that introduced the race (the very first iteration of this code from 2009) but a more recent change that made this particular crash happen in practice. Fixes: e7f1326 ("btrfs: set page extent mapped after read_folio in relocate_one_page") CC: [email protected] # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zhaoyang Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit e3975aa upstream. No device was set which caused serial_base_ctrl_add to crash. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000050 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 368 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.12.25-amd64 #1 Debian 6.12.25-1 RIP: 0010:serial_base_ctrl_add+0x96/0x120 Call Trace: <TASK> serial_core_register_port+0x1a0/0x580 ? __setup_irq+0x39c/0x660 ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x111/0x310 jsm_uart_port_init+0xe8/0x180 [jsm] jsm_probe_one+0x1f4/0x410 [jsm] local_pci_probe+0x42/0x90 pci_device_probe+0x22f/0x270 really_probe+0xdb/0x340 ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x54/0x90 ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110 driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0 __driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0 bus_for_each_dev+0x8c/0xe0 bus_add_driver+0x112/0x1f0 driver_register+0x72/0xd0 jsm_init_module+0x36/0xff0 [jsm] ? __pfx_jsm_init_module+0x10/0x10 [jsm] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310 do_init_module+0x60/0x230 Tested with Digi Neo PCIe 8 port card. Fixes: 84a9582 ("serial: core: Start managing serial controllers to enable runtime PM") Cc: stable <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dustin Lundquist <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

…in meson_ddr_pmu_create() [ Upstream commit 097469a ] The Amlogic DDR PMU driver meson_ddr_pmu_create() function incorrectly uses smp_processor_id(), which assumes disabled preemption. This leads to kernel warnings during module loading because meson_ddr_pmu_create() can be called in a preemptible context. Following kernel warning and stack trace: [ 31.745138] [ T2289] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: (udev-worker)/2289 [ 31.745154] [ T2289] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x28/0x38 [ 31.745172] [ T2289] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 2289 Comm: (udev-worker) Tainted: GW 6.14.0-0-MANJARO-ARM #1 59519addcbca6ba8de735e151fd7b9e97aac7ff0 [ 31.745181] [ T2289] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 31.745183] [ T2289] Hardware name: Hardkernel ODROID-N2Plus (DT) [ 31.745188] [ T2289] Call trace: [ 31.745191] [ T2289] show_stack+0x28/0x40 (C) [ 31.745199] [ T2289] dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x198 [ 31.745205] [ T2289] dump_stack+0x20/0x50 [ 31.745209] [ T2289] check_preemption_disabled+0xec/0xf0 [ 31.745213] [ T2289] debug_smp_processor_id+0x28/0x38 [ 31.745216] [ T2289] meson_ddr_pmu_create+0x200/0x560 [meson_ddr_pmu_g12 8095101c49676ad138d9961e3eddaee10acca7bd] [ 31.745237] [ T2289] g12_ddr_pmu_probe+0x20/0x38 [meson_ddr_pmu_g12 8095101c49676ad138d9961e3eddaee10acca7bd] [ 31.745246] [ T2289] platform_probe+0x98/0xe0 [ 31.745254] [ T2289] really_probe+0x144/0x3f8 [ 31.745258] [ T2289] __driver_probe_device+0xb8/0x180 [ 31.745261] [ T2289] driver_probe_device+0x54/0x268 [ 31.745264] [ T2289] __driver_attach+0x11c/0x288 [ 31.745267] [ T2289] bus_for_each_dev+0xfc/0x160 [ 31.745274] [ T2289] driver_attach+0x34/0x50 [ 31.745277] [ T2289] bus_add_driver+0x160/0x2b0 [ 31.745281] [ T2289] driver_register+0x78/0x120 [ 31.745285] [ T2289] __platform_driver_register+0x30/0x48 [ 31.745288] [ T2289] init_module+0x30/0xfe0 [meson_ddr_pmu_g12 8095101c49676ad138d9961e3eddaee10acca7bd] [ 31.745298] [ T2289] do_one_initcall+0x11c/0x438 [ 31.745303] [ T2289] do_init_module+0x68/0x228 [ 31.745311] [ T2289] load_module+0x118c/0x13a8 [ 31.745315] [ T2289] __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x274/0x390 [ 31.745320] [ T2289] invoke_syscall+0x74/0x108 [ 31.745326] [ T2289] el0_svc_common+0x90/0xf8 [ 31.745330] [ T2289] do_el0_svc+0x2c/0x48 [ 31.745333] [ T2289] el0_svc+0x60/0x150 [ 31.745337] [ T2289] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x80/0x118 [ 31.745341] [ T2289] el0t_64_sync+0x1b8/0x1c0 Changes replaces smp_processor_id() with raw_smp_processor_id() to ensure safe CPU ID retrieval in preemptible contexts. Cc: Jiucheng Xu <[email protected]> Fixes: 2016e21 ("perf/amlogic: Add support for Amlogic meson G12 SoC DDR PMU driver") Signed-off-by: Anand Moon <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ee684de ] As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned) number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points before the section data in the memory. Consider the situation below where: - prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here - prog_end = prog_start + prog_size prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end | | | | v v v v .....................|################################|............ The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as a reproducer: $ readelf -S crash Section Headers: [Nr] Name Type Address Offset Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align ... [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040 0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8 $ readelf -s crash Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries: Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name ... 6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated. This is also reported by AddressSanitizer: ================================================================= ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490 READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0 #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76) #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856 #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928 #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930 #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067 #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090 #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8 #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4) #8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667) #9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34) 0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b) #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600) #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018) #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740 The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check `while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions"). Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue. [1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions") Reported-by: lmarch2 <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <[email protected]> Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5d2ea5a ] Upon RQ destruction if the firmware command fails which is the last resource to be destroyed some SW resources were already cleaned regardless of the failure. Now properly rollback the object to its original state upon such failure. In order to avoid a use-after free in case someone tries to destroy the object again, which results in the following kernel trace: refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 37589 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148 Modules linked in: rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) rfkill mlx5_core(OE) mlxdevm(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) ib_core(OE) psample mlxfw(OE) mlx_compat(OE) macsec tls pci_hyperv_intf sunrpc vfat fat virtio_net net_failover failover fuse loop nfnetlink vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vmw_vmci vsock xfs crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce virtio_console virtio_gpu virtio_blk virtio_dma_buf virtio_mmio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod xpmem(OE) CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 37589 Comm: python3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE ------- --- 6.12.0-54.el10.aarch64 #1 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148 lr : refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148 sp : ffff80008b81b7e0 x29: ffff80008b81b7e0 x28: ffff000133d51600 x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 00000000ffffffea x24: ffff00010ae80f00 x23: ffff00010ae80f80 x22: ffff0000c66e5d08 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffff0000c66e0000 x19: ffff00010ae80340 x18: 0000000000000006 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000020 x15: ffff80008b81b37f x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 2e656572662d7265 x12: ffff80008283ef78 x11: ffff80008257efd0 x10: ffff80008283efd0 x9 : ffff80008021ed90 x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 00000000000bffe8 x6 : c0000000ffff7fff x5 : ffff0001fb8e3408 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff800179993000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000133d51600 Call trace: refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148 mlx5_core_put_rsc+0x88/0xa0 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_core_destroy_rq_tracked+0x64/0x98 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_ib_destroy_wq+0x34/0x80 [mlx5_ib] ib_destroy_wq_user+0x30/0xc0 [ib_core] uverbs_free_wq+0x28/0x58 [ib_uverbs] destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x34/0x78 [ib_uverbs] uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x48/0x240 [ib_uverbs] __uverbs_cleanup_ufile+0xd4/0x1a8 [ib_uverbs] uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0x48/0x120 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_close+0x2c/0x100 [ib_uverbs] __fput+0xd8/0x2f0 __fput_sync+0x50/0x70 __arm64_sys_close+0x40/0x90 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x74/0xd0 do_el0_svc+0x48/0xe8 el0_svc+0x44/0x1d0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 Fixes: e2013b2 ("net/mlx5_core: Add RQ and SQ event handling") Signed-off-by: Patrisious Haddad <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3181433ccdd695c63560eeeb3f0c990961732101.1745839855.git.leon@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6e9f2df ] syzkaller reported a null-ptr-deref in txopt_get(). [0] The offset 0x70 was of struct ipv6_txoptions in struct ipv6_pinfo, so struct ipv6_pinfo was NULL there. However, this never happens for IPv6 sockets as inet_sk(sk)->pinet6 is always set in inet6_create(), meaning the socket was not IPv6 one. The root cause is missing validation in netlbl_conn_setattr(). netlbl_conn_setattr() switches branches based on struct sockaddr.sa_family, which is passed from userspace. However, netlbl_conn_setattr() does not check if the address family matches the socket. The syzkaller must have called connect() for an IPv6 address on an IPv4 socket. We have a proper validation in tcp_v[46]_connect(), but security_socket_connect() is called in the earlier stage. Let's copy the validation to netlbl_conn_setattr(). [0]: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000070-0x0000000000000077] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 12928 Comm: syz.9.1677 Not tainted 6.12.0 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:txopt_get include/net/ipv6.h:390 [inline] RIP: 0010: Code: 02 00 00 49 8b ac 24 f8 02 00 00 e8 84 69 2a fd e8 ff 00 16 fd 48 8d 7d 70 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 53 02 00 00 48 8b 6d 70 48 85 ed 0f 84 ab 01 00 RSP: 0018:ffff88811b8afc48 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff11023715f8a RCX: ffffffff841ab00c RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffffc90007d9e000 RDI: 0000000000000070 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffed1023715f9d R09: ffffed1023715f9e R10: ffffed1023715f9d R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff888123075f00 R13: ffff88810245bd80 R14: ffff888113646780 R15: ffff888100578a80 FS: 00007f9019bd7640(0000) GS:ffff8882d2d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f901b927bac CR3: 0000000104788003 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 80000000 Call Trace: <TASK> calipso_sock_setattr+0x56/0x80 net/netlabel/netlabel_calipso.c:557 netlbl_conn_setattr+0x10c/0x280 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c:1177 selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper+0xd3/0x1b0 security/selinux/netlabel.c:569 selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked security/selinux/netlabel.c:597 [inline] selinux_netlbl_socket_connect+0xb6/0x100 security/selinux/netlabel.c:615 selinux_socket_connect+0x5f/0x80 security/selinux/hooks.c:4931 security_socket_connect+0x50/0xa0 security/security.c:4598 __sys_connect_file+0xa4/0x190 net/socket.c:2067 __sys_connect+0x12c/0x170 net/socket.c:2088 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2098 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2095 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:2095 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xaa/0x1b0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f901b61a12d Code: 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f9019bd6fa8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f901b925fa0 RCX: 00007f901b61a12d RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000200000000140 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f901b701505 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f901b5b62a0 R15: 00007f9019bb7000 </TASK> Modules linked in: Fixes: ceba183 ("calipso: Set the calipso socket label to match the secattr.") Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]> Reported-by: John Cheung <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAP=Rh=M1LzunrcQB1fSGauMrJrhL6GGps5cPAKzHJXj6GQV+-g@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ffb34a6 ] Reorder the initialization sequence in `usbhs_probe()` to enable runtime PM before accessing registers, preventing potential crashes due to uninitialized clocks. Currently, in the probe path, registers are accessed before enabling the clocks, leading to a synchronous external abort on the RZ/V2H SoC. The problematic call flow is as follows: usbhs_probe() usbhs_sys_clock_ctrl() usbhs_bset() usbhs_write() iowrite16() <-- Register access before enabling clocks Since `iowrite16()` is performed without ensuring the required clocks are enabled, this can lead to access errors. To fix this, enable PM runtime early in the probe function and ensure clocks are acquired before register access, preventing crashes like the following on RZ/V2H: [13.272640] Internal error: synchronous external abort: 0000000096000010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [13.280814] Modules linked in: cec renesas_usbhs(+) drm_kms_helper fuse drm backlight ipv6 [13.289088] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 195 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7+ #98 [13.296640] Hardware name: Renesas RZ/V2H EVK Board based on r9a09g057h44 (DT) [13.303834] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [13.310770] pc : usbhs_bset+0x14/0x4c [renesas_usbhs] [13.315831] lr : usbhs_probe+0x2e4/0x5ac [renesas_usbhs] [13.321138] sp : ffff8000827e3850 [13.324438] x29: ffff8000827e3860 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff8000827e3ca0 [13.331554] x26: ffff8000827e3ba0 x25: ffff800081729668 x24: 0000000000000025 [13.338670] x23: ffff0000c0f08000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff0000c0f08010 [13.345783] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff0000c3b52080 x18: 00000000ffffffff [13.352895] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff8000827e36ce [13.360009] x14: 00000000000003d7 x13: 00000000000003d7 x12: 0000000000000000 [13.367122] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000aa0 x9 : ffff8000827e3750 [13.374235] x8 : ffff0000c1850b00 x7 : 0000000003826060 x6 : 000000000000001c [13.381347] x5 : 000000030d5fcc00 x4 : ffff8000825c0000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [13.388459] x2 : 0000000000000400 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000c3b52080 [13.395574] Call trace: [13.398013] usbhs_bset+0x14/0x4c [renesas_usbhs] (P) [13.403076] platform_probe+0x68/0xdc [13.406738] really_probe+0xbc/0x2c0 [13.410306] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x120 [13.414653] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x154 [13.418825] __driver_attach+0x90/0x1a0 [13.422647] bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xe0 [13.426470] driver_attach+0x24/0x30 [13.430032] bus_add_driver+0xe4/0x208 [13.433766] driver_register+0x68/0x130 [13.437587] __platform_driver_register+0x24/0x30 [13.442273] renesas_usbhs_driver_init+0x20/0x1000 [renesas_usbhs] [13.448450] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x1d4 [13.452276] do_init_module+0x54/0x1f8 [13.456014] load_module+0x1754/0x1c98 [13.459750] init_module_from_file+0x88/0xcc [13.464004] __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x1c4/0x328 [13.468689] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x104 [13.472426] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0 [13.477113] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [13.480415] el0_svc+0x30/0xcc [13.483460] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138 [13.487800] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c [13.491453] Code: 2a0103e1 12003c42 12003c63 8b010084 (79400084) [13.497522] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: f1407d5 ("usb: renesas_usbhs: Add Renesas USBHS common code") Signed-off-by: Lad Prabhakar <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda <[email protected]> Tested-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0153f36 ] When the XDP program is loaded, the XDP callback adds new Tx queues. This means that the callback must update the Tx scheduler with the new queue number. In the event of a Tx scheduler failure, the XDP callback should also fail and roll back any changes previously made for XDP preparation. The previous implementation had a bug that not all changes made by the XDP callback were rolled back. This caused the crash with the following call trace: [ +9.549584] ice 0000:ca:00.0: Failed VSI LAN queue config for XDP, error: -5 [ +0.382335] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x50a2250a90495525: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ +0.010710] CPU: 103 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/103 Not tainted 6.14.0-net-next-mar-31+ #14 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ +0.010175] Hardware name: Intel Corporation M50CYP2SBSTD/M50CYP2SBSTD, BIOS SE5C620.86B.01.01.0005.2202160810 02/16/2022 [ +0.010946] RIP: 0010:__ice_update_sample+0x39/0xe0 [ice] [...] [ +0.002715] Call Trace: [ +0.002452] <IRQ> [ +0.002021] ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x29 [ +0.003922] ? die_addr+0x3c/0x60 [ +0.003319] ? exc_general_protection+0x17c/0x400 [ +0.004707] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 [ +0.004879] ? __ice_update_sample+0x39/0xe0 [ice] [ +0.004835] ice_napi_poll+0x665/0x680 [ice] [ +0.004320] __napi_poll+0x28/0x190 [ +0.003500] net_rx_action+0x198/0x360 [ +0.003752] ? update_rq_clock+0x39/0x220 [ +0.004013] handle_softirqs+0xf1/0x340 [ +0.003840] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xf/0x1f0 [ +0.003925] __irq_exit_rcu+0xc2/0xe0 [ +0.003665] common_interrupt+0x85/0xa0 [ +0.003839] </IRQ> [ +0.002098] <TASK> [ +0.002106] asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 [ +0.004184] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xd3/0x690 Fix this by performing the missing unmapping of XDP queues from q_vectors and setting the XDP rings pointer back to NULL after all those queues are released. Also, add an immediate exit from the XDP callback in case of ring preparation failure. Fixes: efc2214 ("ice: Add support for XDP") Reviewed-by: Dawid Osuchowski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Tested-by: Jesse Brandeburg <[email protected]> Tested-by: Saritha Sanigani <[email protected]> (A Contingent Worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3382a1e ] Commit a1e40ac ("net: gso: fix udp gso fraglist segmentation after pull from frag_list") detected invalid geometry in frag_list skbs and redirects them from skb_segment_list to more robust skb_segment. But some packets with modified geometry can also hit bugs in that code. We don't know how many such cases exist. Addressing each one by one also requires touching the complex skb_segment code, which risks introducing bugs for other types of skbs. Instead, linearize all these packets that fail the basic invariants on gso fraglist skbs. That is more robust. If only part of the fraglist payload is pulled into head_skb, it will always cause exception when splitting skbs by skb_segment. For detailed call stack information, see below. Valid SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skbs - consist of two or more segments - the head_skb holds the protocol headers plus first gso_size - one or more frag_list skbs hold exactly one segment - all but the last must be gso_size Optional datapath hooks such as NAT and BPF (bpf_skb_pull_data) can modify fraglist skbs, breaking these invariants. In extreme cases they pull one part of data into skb linear. For UDP, this causes three payloads with lengths of (11,11,10) bytes were pulled tail to become (12,10,10) bytes. The skbs no longer meets the above SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST conditions because payload was pulled into head_skb, it needs to be linearized before pass to regular skb_segment. skb_segment+0xcd0/0xd14 __udp_gso_segment+0x334/0x5f4 udp4_ufo_fragment+0x118/0x15c inet_gso_segment+0x164/0x338 skb_mac_gso_segment+0xc4/0x13c __skb_gso_segment+0xc4/0x124 validate_xmit_skb+0x9c/0x2c0 validate_xmit_skb_list+0x4c/0x80 sch_direct_xmit+0x70/0x404 __dev_queue_xmit+0x64c/0xe5c neigh_resolve_output+0x178/0x1c4 ip_finish_output2+0x37c/0x47c __ip_finish_output+0x194/0x240 ip_finish_output+0x20/0xf4 ip_output+0x100/0x1a0 NF_HOOK+0xc4/0x16c ip_forward+0x314/0x32c ip_rcv+0x90/0x118 __netif_receive_skb+0x74/0x124 process_backlog+0xe8/0x1a4 __napi_poll+0x5c/0x1f8 net_rx_action+0x154/0x314 handle_softirqs+0x154/0x4b8 [118.376811] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:bug&]kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4278! [118.376829] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:traps&]Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [118.470774] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]Kernel Offset: 0x178cc00000 from 0xffffffc008000000 [118.470810] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]PHYS_OFFSET: 0x40000000 [118.470827] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [118.470848] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]pc : [0xffffffd79598aefc] skb_segment+0xcd0/0xd14 [118.470900] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]lr : [0xffffffd79598a5e8] skb_segment+0x3bc/0xd14 [118.470928] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]sp : ffffffc008013770 Fixes: a1e40ac ("gso: fix udp gso fraglist segmentation after pull from frag_list") Signed-off-by: Shiming Cheng <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 905fe08 ] When driver handles the napi rx polling requests, the netdev might have been released by the dellink logic triggered by the disconnect operation on user plane. However, in the logic of processing skb in polling, an invalid netdev is still being used, which causes a panic. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000f1 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:dev_gro_receive+0x3a/0x620 [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> ? __die_body+0x68/0xb0 ? page_fault_oops+0x379/0x3e0 ? exc_page_fault+0x4f/0xa0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? __pfx_t7xx_ccmni_recv_skb+0x10/0x10 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 7)] ? dev_gro_receive+0x3a/0x620 napi_gro_receive+0xad/0x170 t7xx_ccmni_recv_skb+0x48/0x70 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 7)] t7xx_dpmaif_napi_rx_poll+0x590/0x800 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 7)] net_rx_action+0x103/0x470 irq_exit_rcu+0x13a/0x310 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x56/0x90 </IRQ> Fixes: 5545b7b ("net: wwan: t7xx: Add NAPI support") Signed-off-by: Jinjian Song <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 87f7ce2 ] There is no disagreement that we should check both ptp->is_virtual_clock and ptp->n_vclocks to check if the ptp virtual clock is in use. However, when we acquire ptp->n_vclocks_mux to read ptp->n_vclocks in ptp_vclock_in_use(), we observe a recursive lock in the call trace starting from n_vclocks_store(). ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.15.0-rc6 #1 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- syz.0.1540/13807 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ptp_vclock_in_use drivers/ptp/ptp_private.h:103 [inline] ffff888035a24868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ptp_clock_unregister+0x21/0x250 drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:415 but task is already holding lock: ffff888030704868 (&ptp->n_vclocks_mux){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: n_vclocks_store+0xf1/0x6d0 drivers/ptp/ptp_sysfs.c:215 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux); lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux); *** DEADLOCK *** .... ============================================ The best way to solve this is to remove the logic that checks ptp->n_vclocks in ptp_vclock_in_use(). The reason why this is appropriate is that any path that uses ptp->n_vclocks must unconditionally check if ptp->n_vclocks is greater than 0 before unregistering vclocks, and all functions are already written this way. And in the function that uses ptp->n_vclocks, we already get ptp->n_vclocks_mux before unregistering vclocks. Therefore, we need to remove the redundant check for ptp->n_vclocks in ptp_vclock_in_use() to prevent recursive locking. Fixes: 73f3706 ("ptp: support ptp physical/virtual clocks conversion") Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <[email protected]> Acked-by: Richard Cochran <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

apopple added 2 commits September 29, 2015 14:50

bt/ipmi: Add Aspeed BT IPMI host driver

446301e

This patch adds a simple device driver to expose the iBT interface on Aspeed chips as a character device (/dev/bt). Signed-off-by: Alistair Popple <[email protected]>

apopple merged this pull request into openbmc:dev Sep 29, 2015

Kenthliu mentioned this pull request Nov 5, 2015

Kernel crash caused by network setting. #17

Closed

Provide feedback

Saved searches

Use saved searches to filter your results more quickly

Uh oh!

Fix GPIO Kconfig bug & add BT host driver #1

Fix GPIO Kconfig bug & add BT host driver #1

apopple commented Sep 29, 2015

Uh oh!

Uh oh!

Fix GPIO Kconfig bug & add BT host driver #1

Fix GPIO Kconfig bug & add BT host driver #1

Conversation

apopple commented Sep 29, 2015

Uh oh!

Uh oh!