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fetch: strip IPv6 brackets before TLS cert verification - #30674
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Updated 4:01 PM PT - Aug 27th, 2026
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 5 included reviews per hour; 0 remain after this review. WalkthroughTLS hostname selection now removes surrounding brackets from IPv6 literals for HTTP and WebSocket TLS paths. Fetch and WebSocket regression tests cover certificate verification and successful IPv6 connections. ChangesIPv6 TLS hostname bracket normalization
Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to This change normalizes IPv6 hostnames before TLS verification across affected HTTP and WebSocket paths, with targeted regression tests passing. No actionable merge-blocking risk remains after normal checks and review. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Description checkExplanation The description explains the problem, implementation, affected paths, regression tests, and verification results. Although it does not use the template headings exactly, it provides the required information in equivalent sections. Comment |
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Inline comments:
In `@test/js/web/fetch/fetch.tls.test.ts`:
- Around line 129-138: The test currently asserts stdout, stderr and exitCode in
one object equality; change it to assert stdout and stderr first and then assert
exitCode last: after awaiting proc.stdout.text(), proc.stderr.text(), and
proc.exited into stdout, stderr, exitCode, replace the single expect({ stdout,
stderr, exitCode }).toEqual(...) with separate assertions such as
expect(stdout).toBe("native: Hello World\ncallback hostname: ::1\njs: Hello
World\n"), expect(stderr).toBe(""), and finally expect(exitCode).toBe(0) so
stdout/stderr failures are reported before the process exit code (refer to proc,
stdout, stderr, exitCode in this test).
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src/http/http.zigtest/js/web/fetch/fetch.tls.test.ts
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CI status: diff-green, lane-broken. The only failures across all lanes of https://buildkite.com/bun/bun/builds/54232 are on
These tests were added by the recent keepalive PRs (#30627 / #30640) and appear to be deterministically broken on this ASAN lane (same failure on unrelated PR #54218 / My |
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Latest build https://buildkite.com/bun/bun/builds/54348 at sha 8400029 shows the same two failures ( |
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Heads-up from #35886, merged as f4d864b: The hunk in this PR that wraps |
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Rebased onto main and resolved the conflict in Main moved under this PR: #35886 changed Resolution: keep main's signature and Host-header removal, keep this PR's Verified on the new base: |
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All inline feedback from earlier rounds is now addressed in code — the latest push wraps both h3::ClientContext::connect hostname arguments in strip_ipv6_brackets, closing the last same-class site I'd flagged. I found no further issues; since this sits in the TLS certificate-verification path, a quick human look is still worthwhile.
What was reviewed:
strip_ipv6_bracketsis a pure bounds-checked slice; non-bracketed input (DNS names, IPv4) passes through unchanged, so no regression surface.- Traced all
get_tls_hostnamereturn paths, both h3 connect sites, and the three WebSocket hostname stores — all now strip consistently; the h3 session pool key uses the stripped form at both callers, so no cache-key mismatch. - Confirmed the change only enables the IP-SAN branch where it previously fell through to DNS-name matching (which could never succeed on
[::1]), so verification is not weakened. - Tests:
isIPv6()gated, bind explicitly to::1, spreadbunEnv, drain pipes concurrently, assert stdout before exitCode, wireoncloseto reject.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
The PR fixes GitHub issue #30668: bracketed IPv6 literals ([::1]) leaked from the URL parser into TLS certificate verification and SNI, causing is_ip_address / net.isIP to return false and skip the IP-SAN branch, so valid certs with IP:::1 SANs were rejected. A 5-line helper strip_ipv6_brackets is added in src/http/lib.rs and applied at every return path of get_tls_hostname (proxy hostname, explicit server_name, URL hostname), at both HTTP/3 connect call sites, at the two WebSocket upgrade-client hostname stores, and at the WebSocket proxy tunnel's sni_hostname. Two new test files (fetch.tls.ipv6.test.ts, websocket.tls.ipv6.test.ts) exercise both the native cert-check fast path and the user-supplied checkServerIdentity callback against https://[::1]:port/ and wss://[::1]:port/, gated on isIPv6().
Since the previous review round, only commit 0745590 landed, wrapping the two h3::ClientContext::connect hostname arguments — exactly the same-class site my last inline comment identified. Looking at ClientContext::connect, the same host_z is passed as both the connect target and the SNI, and the session pool key (s.matches(hostname, ...)) now sees the stripped form consistently from both callers.
Security risks
This is the TLS server-identity verification path, so the relevant question is whether stripping brackets can weaken verification. It cannot: a bracketed literal like [::1] is not a valid DNS name and would never match any DNS SAN or CN, so prior behavior was "always reject" for bracketed IPv6 URLs. Post-fix, the bare ::1 is handed to the IP-SAN comparator, which is the correct RFC 6125 / Node.js checkServerIdentity treatment for IP literals. Non-bracketed hostnames pass through byte-identical, so DNS-name and IPv4 verification are untouched. The server_name branch also strips — a user who explicitly passes servername: "[::1]" now gets the same IP-SAN treatment, which mirrors Node's urlToHttpOptions normalization contract. No new bypass, downgrade, or laxer default is introduced.
Level of scrutiny
Medium-high. The production diff is ~15 lines and mechanically obvious — a pure slice helper applied at seven well-understood call sites — but it lives in certificate verification, which the approval guidelines call out as a path where a human should sign off regardless of change size. This has also been through six review iterations with the author responding to each round, so the change has already had substantial automated scrutiny.
Other factors
All prior inline feedback was addressed by code changes rather than just thread resolution: isIPv6() skip guards added, servers bound explicitly to ::1, bunEnv spread per harness convention, WebSocket client and proxy-tunnel sites fixed, and HTTP/3 sites fixed. The one nit the author declined (standalone test files vs. appending to fetch.tls.test.ts) cites the existing fetch.tls.wildcard.test.ts precedent in-tree and is a reasonable judgment call. Tests follow harness conventions (concurrent pipe drain, Promise.withResolvers with onclose wired to reject, stdout asserted before exitCode). The PR body's evidence block shows both tests failing on main and passing with the fix. No CODEOWNERS entries cover the touched paths. Exit reason was dry_streak with zero new findings.
The URL parser preserves the surrounding brackets on IPv6 hostnames
("[::1]"). When that form reached TLS certificate verification, two
paths broke:
- Native fast path: strings::is_ip_address("[::1]") returns false, so
check_x509_server_identity took the DNS-name branch and never compared
against the cert's IP SAN entries.
- User-supplied tls.checkServerIdentity callback: the hostname was
handed to the user verbatim; if the user then forwarded it to
node:tls.checkServerIdentity, net.isIP("[::1]") === 0 meant the same
DNS-name fallthrough and ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID.
Node.js strips brackets in urlToHttpOptions before either path runs.
Mirror that at the single chokepoint get_tls_hostname in src/http/lib.rs,
so every fetch TLS consumer (native cert check, SNI's is_ip_address
check, and the user-supplied checkServerIdentity callback) sees the
bare address.
Test gated on isIPv6() (matches valkey-tls-verify.test.ts) and placed
in its own file so the subprocess env doesn't race with other concurrent
tests in fetch.tls.test.ts. Asserts stdout/stderr before exitCode per
CLAUDE.md.
Fixes #30668
CI on f537883 hit an unrelated flake on the debian-13 x64-asan lane (test/js/web/fetch/fetch-tcp-keepalive.test.ts: "fetch sockets have TCP keepalive enabled" + "node:http globalAgent (keepAlive: true) enables SO_KEEPALIVE", both checking SO_KEEPALIVE via /proc/net/tcp). Same tests failed on unrelated PR #54218 at the same sha snapshot, confirming flake rather than regression — this PR doesn't touch TCP keepalive code.
Also correct the file-placement note: the standalone file follows the fetch.tls.wildcard.test.ts precedent, not env isolation.
The WebSocket client stored the bracketed URL host, so check_server_identity took the DNS-name branch and never matched the cert's IP SAN, and the SNI is_ip_address gate sent the bracketed literal as servername. Store the hostname bracket-stripped at the two set sites and in the proxy tunnel's sni_hostname, reusing bun_http::strip_ipv6_brackets (now pub). Same class as the fetch fix in this PR.
The h3 client passed the bracketed url.hostname straight to ClientContext::connect, which uses it as both the dial host and the SNI/verification name. Same class as the fetch and WebSocket fixes in this PR.
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Inline comments:
In `@src/http/lib.rs`:
- Around line 1223-1229: Update strip_ipv6_brackets to remove surrounding
brackets only when the inner bytes parse as an IP address, preserving the
original host for bracketed non-IP values such as “[example.com]” and for
unbracketed inputs.
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src/http/lib.rssrc/http_jsc/websocket_client/WebSocketProxyTunnel.rssrc/http_jsc/websocket_client/WebSocketUpgradeClient.rstest/js/web/fetch/fetch.tls.ipv6.test.tstest/js/web/websocket/websocket.tls.ipv6.test.ts
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A bracketed non-IP server_name such as "[example.com]" must keep failing validation verbatim, matching Node.js.
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I re-reviewed after the latest push and didn't find any bugs. All earlier concerns from this bot have been addressed — the fix now covers the WebSocket upgrade client, the WebSocket proxy tunnel, and both HTTP/3 ClientContext::connect sites in addition to get_tls_hostname; both tests bind the server to ::1, gate on isIPv6(), and spread bunEnv per harness convention. Because this touches the TLS certificate-verification hostname across every client protocol path, a human sign-off is still worthwhile.
What was reviewed:
strip_ipv6_brackets: bounds-guarded slice, only strips when the inner value passesis_ipv6_address, so[example.com]and non-bracketed hosts pass through unchanged — fails closed toward the pre-fix behavior.- Confirmed the helper is applied at every TLS-hostname consumer named in prior rounds (three
get_tls_hostnamereturns, two h3 connect sites, twoWebSocketUpgradeClienthostname stores,WebSocketProxyTunnelSNI). - Tests: subprocess pipes drained via
Promise.all, stdout/stderr asserted before exitCode,port: 0,Promise.withResolverswithonclosewired to reject, standalone-file precedent (fetch.tls.wildcard.test.ts) exists.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
The PR strips surrounding [/] from IPv6 literal hostnames before they reach TLS SNI and certificate-identity checks, fixing #30668 where fetch('https://[::1]:PORT/') rejected a cert carrying IP:::1 in its SAN. A new strip_ipv6_brackets helper in src/http/lib.rs is applied at all three return paths of get_tls_hostname, both HTTP/3 ClientContext::connect call sites, both WebSocketUpgradeClient hostname-store sites, and the WebSocketProxyTunnel SNI hostname. Two new tests exercise https://[::1] (native fast path + user checkServerIdentity callback) and wss://[::1] end-to-end against a local Bun.serve bound to ::1 with the harness cert.
Since the previous review round, commits c5b5063, bb1425b, 82f6f3a, and 6a4f301 addressed every concern I had raised: the WebSocket and HTTP/3 same-class sites are now covered, the tests bind explicitly to ::1 and use the {...bunEnv, KEY: undefined} spread convention, and the helper now guards on is_ipv6_address(inner) so a pathological [not-an-ip] host is left untouched rather than being silently unbracketed.
Security risks
This is a TLS certificate-verification path. The change moves verification from a false negative (bracketed [::1] fell into the DNS-name branch and never matched the IP SAN, so valid certs were rejected) to correct IP-SAN matching. It does not relax any check: the only inputs whose treatment changes are strings of the exact form [<valid IPv6>], which now take the IP branch instead of the DNS branch. Non-IPv6 bracketed values, IPv4 literals, and DNS names are unaffected. The helper's slice indexing is bounds-guarded by host.len() >= 2. I see no way for this to accept a certificate that would previously have been correctly rejected, but hostname-normalization in cert verification is exactly the surface where subtle mistakes become bypasses, so a maintainer should confirm the consumer set is complete.
Level of scrutiny
High — REVIEW.md flags TLS/crypto paths as requiring human sign-off, and this change fans a shared predicate out across four client protocol paths (h1/h2 fetch, h3 fetch, WebSocket direct, WebSocket proxy tunnel). The helper itself is trivial and the call-site edits are mechanical, but "every route to the effect goes through one shared predicate" is a claim a maintainer familiar with the client TLS plumbing should confirm — in particular whether any remaining SNI/verification consumer (e.g. connection-pool keying, alt-svc hostnames) still reads url.hostname directly.
Other factors
The tests follow harness conventions closely (concurrent pipe drain, stdout/stderr asserted before exit code, port: 0, using for server/proc, skipIf(!isIPv6()) with a stated reason, Promise.withResolvers with the failure event wired to reject). The PR's own gate evidence shows both tests failing on the unfixed debug build and passing with the fix. The standalone-file placement cites fetch.tls.wildcard.test.ts, which does exist as a single-concern sibling in the same directory, so the precedent holds even though CLAUDE.md's default is to add to the existing file. The bug-hunt exit reason was dry_streak (ran to completion with no findings).
Fixes oven-sh#30668 ### Problem - `fetch('https://[::1]:PORT/')` with `rejectUnauthorized: true` fails with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID` even when the cert carries an `IP:::1` SAN. A user-supplied `checkServerIdentity` callback receives the bracketed `"[::1]"`, so forwarding it to `node:tls.checkServerIdentity` also rejects (`net.isIP("[::1]") === 0` falls through to CN matching). - The URL parser keeps the surrounding `[` `]` on IPv6 hostnames. That form reached both TLS verification paths: the native fast path (`check_x509_server_identity` gates on `is_ip_address`, which rejects brackets and takes the DNS-name branch) and the user callback. ### Fix - Add `strip_ipv6_brackets` and apply it to every return path of `get_tls_hostname` in `src/http/lib.rs` (proxy hostname, `tls_props.server_name`, `url.hostname`). - Node.js strips brackets in `urlToHttpOptions` before the hostname reaches `tls.checkServerIdentity`. This mirrors that contract at the single chokepoint, so the native cert check, the SNI `is_ip_address` check, and the user callback all see the bare `::1`. Since oven-sh#35886, the proxy-tunnel inner handshake also routes through `get_tls_hostname`, so it is covered too. - The WebSocket client has the same class of bug: it stored the bracketed URL host for its own verification and SNI. Store it bracket-stripped at the two set sites in `WebSocketUpgradeClient.rs` and in the proxy tunnel's `sni_hostname`, reusing the same helper (now `pub`). - The HTTP/3 client also passed the bracketed `url.hostname` straight to `ClientContext::connect`, which uses it as both the QUIC dial host and the SNI/verification name. Both call sites now strip brackets. - Non-bracketed hostnames pass through unchanged. DNS names and IPv4 literals are unaffected. - Verified: `test/js/web/fetch/fetch.tls.ipv6.test.ts` exercises both fetch paths end to end against `https://[::1]:port/` and asserts the callback receives `"::1"`. `test/js/web/websocket/websocket.tls.ipv6.test.ts` does the same for `wss://[::1]:port/`. Both fail without the fix and pass with it. `fetch.tls.test.ts` and `fetch.tls.wildcard.test.ts` still pass. ### Background - `get_tls_hostname` is the one place the HTTP client picks the name used for SNI and certificate verification. Every TLS consumer of fetch reads it. - A certificate matches an IP literal through its IP SAN entries, not its DNS entries. The checker picks the IP branch only when `is_ip_address(hostname)` is true, which requires the bare address form. - The test is gated on `isIPv6()` (Buildkite Linux agents have no IPv6) and lives in a standalone file for this one concern, following the `fetch.tls.wildcard.test.ts` precedent. <!-- robobun:evidence:begin --> --- **[review]** gate passed · iteration 12 · 5 files touched <details><summary>fails on main (without fix)</summary> ```console ASAN without fix: 2 FAILED $ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/mechgate.xml" "test/js/web/fetch/fetch.tls.ipv6.test.ts" "test/js/web/websocket/websocket.tls.ipv6.test.ts" bun test v1.4.1 (65362b5) test/js/web/fetch/fetch.tls.ipv6.test.ts: 87 | stderr: "pipe", 88 | }); 89 | const [stdout, stderr, exitCode] = await Promise.all([proc.stdout.text(), proc.stderr.text(), proc.exited]); 90 | // Asserting stdout/stderr before exitCode produces a more useful failure 91 | // message when the subprocess crashes unexpectedly. 92 | expect(stdout).toBe("native: Hello World\ncallback hostname: ::1\njs: Hello World\n"); ^ error: expect(received).toBe(expected) - "native: Hello World - callback hostname: ::1 - js: Hello World - " + "" - Expected - 4 + Received + 1 at <anonymous> (/workspace/bun/test/js/web/fetch/fetch.tls.ipv6.test.ts:92:18) (fail) fetch with IPv6 literal hostname verifies the certificate [1062.55ms] test/js/web/websocket/websocket.tls.ipv6.test.ts: 58 | env: cleanEnv, 59 | stdout: "pipe", 60 | stderr: "pipe", 61 | }); 62 | const [stdout, stderr ... (truncated) release without fix: all passed bun test v1.4.1-canary.1 (bb1425b) test/js/web/fetch/fetch.tls.ipv6.test.ts: (pass) fetch with IPv6 literal hostname verifies the certificate [39.11ms] test/js/web/websocket/websocket.tls.ipv6.test.ts: (pass) wss to an IPv6 literal verifies the certificate [8.18ms] 2 pass 0 fail 6 expect() calls Ran 2 tests across 2 files. [128.00ms] __F:0:S:0 ``` </details> <details><summary>passes on PR (with fix)</summary> ```console ASAN with fix: all passed $ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/mechgate.xml" "test/js/web/fetch/fetch.tls.ipv6.test.ts" "test/js/web/websocket/websocket.tls.ipv6.test.ts" bun test v1.4.1 (65362b5) test/js/web/fetch/fetch.tls.ipv6.test.ts: (pass) fetch with IPv6 literal hostname verifies the certificate [1232.17ms] test/js/web/websocket/websocket.tls.ipv6.test.ts: (pass) wss to an IPv6 literal verifies the certificate [397.30ms] 2 pass 0 fail 6 expect() calls Ran 2 tests across 2 files. [3.68s] __F:0:S:0 release with fix: all passed $ bun scripts/build.ts --profile=release [configured] bun-profile → bun (stripped) in 662ms (unchanged) ninja: Entering directory `/workspace/bun/build/release' [1/26] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/bsd.c.o [2/26] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/context.c.o [3/26] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/eventing/epoll_kqueue.c.o [4/26] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/crypto/openssl.c.o [5/26] cxx obj/unified/UnifiedSource-packages_bun_usockets_src_crypto-0.cpp.o [6/26] cxx obj/unified/UnifiedSource-src_jsc_bindings_node-0.cpp.o [7/26] cxx obj/unified/UnifiedSource-src_jsc_bindings-5.cpp.o [8/26] cxx obj/unified/UnifiedSource-src_uws_sys-0.cpp.o [9/26] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/fault_inject.c.o [10/26] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/eventing/libuv.c.o [11/26] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/loop.c.o [12/26] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/node_quic_shim.c.o [13/26] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/socket.c.o [14/26] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/udp.c.o [15/26] cxx obj/unified/UnifiedSource-src_jsc_bindings-4.cpp.o [16/26] cxx obj/src/jsc/bindings/bindings.cpp.o [17/26] cc obj/packages/bun-usockets/src/quic.c.o [18/26] cxx obj/unified/UnifiedSource-src_j ... (truncated) ``` </details> <details><summary>diff hotspot</summary> ``` src/http/lib.rs | 21 +++-- .../websocket_client/WebSocketProxyTunnel.rs | 4 +- .../websocket_client/WebSocketUpgradeClient.rs | 10 ++- test/js/web/fetch/fetch.tls.ipv6.test.ts | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++ test/js/web/websocket/websocket.tls.ipv6.test.ts | 66 +++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 188 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) ``` </details> **gate history** · 5 passed · 0 rejected · iteration 12 <details><summary>evidence per changed file</summary> ``` file reads edits tests src/http/lib.rs 11 14 11 src/http_jsc/websocket_client/WebSocketProxyTunnel.rs 1 1 7 src/http_jsc/websocket_client/WebSocketUpgradeClient.rs 4 5 7 test/js/web/fetch/fetch.tls.ipv6.test.ts 1 2 7 test/js/web/websocket/websocket.tls.ipv6.test.ts 0 1 0 ``` </details> **root cause** · written by the author bot Bun passed IPv6 hostnames to TLS certificate verification with their URL brackets still attached, so names like "[::1]" or "[ff:ff::ff]" never matched the certificate's IP entries and valid connections were rejected. The fix normalizes the hostname before verification by stripping the surrounding brackets across the fetch, WebSocket, and HTTP/3 TLS paths, so the bare IPv6 literal is used for SNI and certificate checks, matching Node's behavior. Brackets are removed only when the inner value parses as an IPv6 address, so bracketed non-IP names such as "[example.com]" still fail validation as… <!-- robobun:evidence:end --> --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
) ### What does this PR do? `fetch()` fixes for proxying, TLS identity and error reporting, plus one feature: a connection session object, `Bun.FetchSession`. ### Bugs | # | Before | After | |---|---|---| | B1 | A proxy's non-200 reply to `CONNECT` resolved as the https origin's `Response` (status, headers, body). | Any non-2xx reply rejects with `ERR_PROXY_TUNNEL`; the error carries the proxy's `status`, `statusText` and `headers`. A 2xx reply starts the tunnel (RFC 9110 §9.3.6), so a forged `2xx` + body fails the TLS handshake instead. A 2xx reply now returns before any of its header fields are interpreted: they used to leak into the state that parses the tunneled response (`204` left `Content-Length: 0` behind, `Connection: close` cost the tunnel its keep-alive, `Content-Encoding` selected a decoder). `handle_response_metadata` in `src/http/lib.rs`. A `101` reply is a refusal like any other non-2xx status (it was `UnrequestedUpgrade`). Invalid `tls` options on a tunneled request report what they report on a direct one (`FailedToOpenSocket` / `InvalidCRL`, not `ECONNREFUSED`), and a failed handshake inside the tunnel is a certificate error only when the peer got as far as sending a certificate. | | B2 | `fetch(url, { unix })` with `HTTP_PROXY` set wrote an absolute-form request line and `Proxy-Authorization` down the unix socket. | A `unix` request never reads the proxy env (`FetchTasklet::get`). | | B3 | `https://[::1]:port` verified the certificate against `[::1]` and sent it as SNI. | #30674 landed the same fix on `main` while this was open; this branch now uses that one `strip_ipv6_brackets` (moved to `bun_url` and re-exported from `bun_http`) and extends it to HTTP/3's host and SNI and to NO_PROXY's bracketed entries. | | B4 | Two requests with different `tls.checkServerIdentity` closures shared a pooled socket; the second callback never ran. | A request that passes its own callback neither takes nor returns a pooled socket on its `https:` hops (`Flags::bypass_pool`); an `http:` hop, where the callback cannot run, pools as usual. A `Bun.FetchSession`'s callback runs once per connection and the session's requests reuse it. This gives up the connection reuse #40308 added for per-request callbacks (one handshake per request again); moving the callback to a session gets it back, and that is what the #40308 test now covers. | | B5 | Reported: a response stream aborted shortly after the head ends cleanly. | Not reproducible on `main` (nor on 1.4.1) across reader / `for await` / `text()` / clone / tee / `pipeThrough` consumers, sync / microtask / macrotask aborts, plain, TLS and CONNECT-tunnel transports; #35093 and #42125 fixed the known paths. Added the consumer × abort-timing matrix as a test. | | B6 | `Header 'Authorization' has invalid value: 'Bearer …'`. | `Header 'Authorization' has invalid value`. | | B7 | `fetch("file://any.host/path")` read the local file. | Rejects with `ERR_INVALID_FILE_URL_HOST` unless the host is empty or `localhost`, on Windows too: Node reads such a URL as a UNC path there, which `fetch()` never did (it dropped the host and read the local path). `fileURLToPath`'s other rule comes with it: a path with an encoded `/` (on Windows also `\`) rejects with `ERR_INVALID_FILE_URL_PATH`, where it used to be decoded into a real separator (`file:///tmp/..%2F..%2Fetc/hosts` read `/etc/hosts`). | | B8 | `delete process.env.HTTPS_PROXY` (and any assignment after a delete) had no effect on fetch. Overwrites already worked. | `process.env`'s `put` and `deleteProperty` match the proxy variable names and sync the native env map, the way `TZ` and `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` are handled. That makes the write-through accessors unnecessary, so they are gone: a proxy variable is an ordinary property, a write to an object that merely inherits from `process.env` stays on that object, `"HTTP_PROXY" in process.env` is `false` when it was never set (it used to be `true`), and a delete removes it. On Windows the sync moved into `editWindowsEnvVar`, next to the `SetEnvironmentVariableW` call; I could not run that path. `SHARE_ENV` workers delete through the same helper. `ALL_PROXY` is synced the same way; `ProxyEnvSlots` became an array indexed by one list of names. The same now holds for `TZ` and `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED`: a write to an object inheriting from `process.env` used to change the process's timezone, or turn certificate verification off for the parent, and leave nothing on the object. | | B9 | `NO_PROXY`: commas only, no `*.`, no CIDR, IPv6 only bracketed, IP literals suffix-matched (`0.0.1` matched `127.0.0.1`), one casing read. | One matcher, `bun_dotenv::no_proxy` (the duplicate in `bun_http` is gone): comma or whitespace separated, `*.example.com`, CIDR for v4 and v6, bracketed or bare IPv6, `host:port` compares the effective port (for `WebSocket` too, which now passes it), an IP-literal host only matches an address or block (`::ffff:a.b.c.d` counts as `a.b.c.d`; addresses are parsed strictly and identically on every platform, so `127.1` is not one), `no_proxy` is the list and `NO_PROXY` is read when that is unset or empty, as curl, node and undici do; ports and CIDR prefixes are ASCII digits only. `test` still matches `example.test`, like curl and Go. | | B10 | see below | | B10: - `ALL_PROXY` / `all_proxy` is the fallback, for `http:` and `https:` targets alike, when the scheme-specific variable is unset. A `socks*://` value is ignored since the client cannot speak it; a value with no scheme is an HTTP proxy, as for curl and for `HTTP_PROXY` (going direct instead would silently bypass the proxy). curl reads `ALL_PROXY`; node does not, and the docs say so. - URL userinfo is sent as `Authorization: Basic …` unless the request has an `Authorization` header (node's `fetch` rejects such a URL; the docs note the difference), and the `path` of a connection error leaves it out. The existing cross-origin redirect rule strips it; that rule compared `URL::origin`, which includes the userinfo, so a same-host `Location` without it counted as cross-origin. It compares scheme, host and port now. `URL::parse` (the internal one) now takes userinfo from the authority when the input has a scheme: everything before the last `@` ahead of the first `/?#`, split at the first `:`. `http://user@host:8080` used to parse as the hostname `user@host`. Scheme-less scp-like `git@host:path` keeps its old reading. - `checkServerIdentity` runs under `rejectUnauthorized: false` / `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` when the chain verifies, as Node does; its verdict is not enforced. A request pinned to `protocol: "http2" | "http3"` goes ahead without the advisory call, as before (the callback only runs on HTTP/1.1). - `code` is errno-style for socket failures: `ECONNREFUSED` (or, for a host with one address, whatever `connect(2)` failed with: `ETIMEDOUT`, `EHOSTUNREACH`, ...; when every address of a name fails uSockets reports a refusal), `ECONNRESET`, `ETIMEDOUT`. A TLS handshake the peer did not complete used to be `ConnectionRefused` too; it is its own `http::Error::TLSHandshakeFailed` now and reports `EPROTO`, which is what Node reports for it. A synchronous `socket()`/`connect()`/poll-registration failure reports its errno instead of `FailedToOpenSocket` on POSIX; an unloadable CA and Windows keep `FailedToOpenSocket`. Messages start with the code. - The 5 minute idle timeout is unchanged and already documented on `timeout`. `NO_PROXY` still applies to an explicit `proxy` by default; `proxy: { url, respectNoProxy: false }` insists on the proxy and `proxy: false` opts out of the environment. `null`, `""` and `undefined` keep meaning "inherit"; `proxy: true` throws `ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE`. ### Features **`Bun.FetchSession`** (`session.fetch(url, init)`, or `fetch(url, { session })`): `session.fetch` is `fetch()` with the session, bound, so it goes wherever a `fetch` function is accepted (`new SomeClient({ fetch: session.fetch })`) and a `Request` cannot lose the session the way a `session` member of its init can. It has no `preconnect`, so it is typed as the call signature, not `typeof fetch`. A request is one count on its session from the moment `fetch()` reads the `session` option (the option is a property of `init`, so a getter read after it could otherwise collect the session), which keeps a `JsRef` to its wrapper that is strong only while the count is not zero: one Strong per busy session, none per request. The constructor's dictionary is `FetchSessionInit`: `tls`, `proxy` (`{ url, headers, respectNoProxy }` or `false`), `keepAlive` (`false` or `{ idleTimeout, maxIdleSockets }`), `unix`. Request options win over the session's: a request's `tls` replaces the session's as a whole, a request's `unix` drops the session's explicit proxy and a request's explicit `proxy` drops the session's `unix`, and `keepalive: true` on the request wins over `keepAlive: false`. Each session is a partition of the keep-alive pool: `PoolOptions::id` is part of the pool key for pooled sockets, HTTP/2 sessions and pending connects, and HTTP/3 sessions, so connections are never shared across sessions or with plain `fetch()`. `close()` / `using` closes the idle connections, HTTP/3 ones included (`us_quic_socket_close` got a Rust binding); so does collecting the session, which a request in flight prevents. `keepAlive.idleTimeout` / `maxIdleSockets` do not apply to HTTP/3, and `maxIdleSockets` counts per kind of connection (plain, TLS, each `tls` configuration, unix). **No `lookup` hook.** An earlier state of this branch had a per-request `lookup(hostname, { port })` callback for dialing a vetted address. It is gone: released Bun already does that with the address in the URL, the name in `Host` and `tls.serverName` (SNI and certificate verification follow `serverName`, `:authority` follows `Host`), and the callback was the only thing here that made the HTTP thread wait on JS. What was missing for that recipe was a way to keep the environment proxy from being judged against the address, which `proxy: false` now is. The docs describe the recipe and tests pin it: https and http, IPv4 and `[::1]`, HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2, a `serverName` the certificate does not list being rejected, `proxy: false` winning over `HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY` for an IP-literal URL and being part of what a connection is shared by. ### Other consumers of the HTTP client `fetch.preconnect()` and `--fetch-preconnect` no longer dial an origin the environment proxies. They used to open a direct connection that bypassed the proxy and that no request could use. `bun install`, `bun upgrade`, S3 and the other `AsyncHTTP` users now see a refused `CONNECT` as the error `ProxyConnectFailed` instead of a response with the proxy's status. `bun install` prints the status, `error: ProxyConnectFailed (407) downloading package manifest bar` (was `GET https://… - 407`), and retries only a 5xx reply, as before. The blocking `send_sync` callers (`bun info`, `bun upgrade`, `bun create`, ...) fail with `ProxyConnectFailed`. They take no session, and their keep-alive pool is partition 0 as before. `Env::get_http_proxy` lost its three constant parameters. `Bun.s3` now resolves the environment proxy per request URL through the same `get_http_proxy_for` as everything else: the variable for the endpoint's scheme (with the `ALL_PROXY` fallback) unless `NO_PROXY` exempts it. It used `HTTP_PROXY` for every endpoint, https ones included, and never consulted `NO_PROXY`. `fetch("s3://…", { proxy: false })` connects directly; an explicit `proxy` there is used as given, as before. ### Cost Measured with the CI release binaries of this branch and of its merge-base with `main`, client pinned to 8 cores, server in another process, `perf stat -e instructions:u` (wall time on the box was noise). | request | main (`c8b9b58`) | this PR (`9df87a7`) | Δ | |---|---|---|---| | `fetch(url)`, keep-alive | 33,201 | 33,619 | +1.3% | | same, 64 in flight | 24,753 | 25,037 | +1.1% | | `fetch(url, { method, headers, redirect })` | 50,218 | 45,991 | -8.4% | | `POST` with a string body | 42,855 | 38,783 | -9.5% | | `keepalive: false` | 41,729 | 37,537 | -10.0% | | https, `tls: { ca }`, keep-alive | 75,569 | 71,428 | -5.5% | | same, 64 in flight | 68,564 | 64,556 | -5.8% | | https, new handshake per request | 1,528,639 | 1,524,690 | -0.3% | Instructions per request, medians of 5 interleaved runs with the startup cost subtracted. Wall time per request was within run-to-run noise in every row. `RssAnon` after 20,000 requests is 12–15 MB with either binary. `RssAnon` at startup is identical (3.78 MB both). The larger `RssFile` of this PR's binary is a property of every PR build's text layout (an unrelated PR's binary shows the same 27 MB against the main build's 13 MB), not of this change. An earlier state of this branch cost +4% to +9% in these rows. What was done about it: the twelve option keys `fetch()` probes on its init object are atomized once per VM (they are `BunCommonStrings.h` entries, read with `JSValue::get_common_string`) instead of allocating and atomizing a `StringImpl` per probe, and `method` / `signal` use the existing builtin names; `URL::parse` looks for an `@` with one scan before it looks for the authority; the HTTP thread's new queue (sessions to close) sits behind an atomic flag; the CONNECT reply a failed `HTTPClientResult` can carry is boxed. ### Where this can go The shape follows what the platform already has so that it could be standardized later: a scoped object with its own `fetch()` (as `ServiceWorkerGlobalScope` and `BackgroundFetchManager` have), a session being a caller-defined *network partition key* in the Fetch spec's terms. A cookie jar would plug into the existing `credentials` member and a cache into the existing `cache` modes, which Bun ignores today; neither needs a new per-request option. ### How did you verify your code works? - `test/js/web/fetch/fetch-session.test.ts` (new): session pool isolation, `close()`, `keepAlive`, option precedence, proxy policy, pinning a request to an address, `session.fetch`. - `proxyInternals` in `bun:internal-for-testing` exposes the NO_PROXY matcher, the env proxy resolution and the client's URL parser; `proxy.test.ts` has the tables (about 150 NO_PROXY cases, 50 environments, 22 URLs). - Existing files: `proxy.test.ts` (B1, B8, B9, `ALL_PROXY`, 2xx tunnels, per-session tunnels, workers, `s3://`), `bun-install.test.ts` and `bun-info.test.ts` (refused `CONNECT`), `fetch-http2-client.test.ts` (advisory callback), `fetch-http3-client.test.ts` (session isolation and `close()`), `fetch.unix.test.ts` (B2), `fetch.tls.test.ts` (B3, B4, B10), `fetch.stream.test.ts` (B5), `fetch_headers.test.js` (B6), `fetch.test.ts` (B7, userinfo, error codes). - Tests that asserted the old behaviour are updated: refused `CONNECT` surfaced as a `Response` (`proxy.test.ts`, `proxy-stress-errors.test.ts`, `proxy-stress-lifecycle.test.ts`), per-request callbacks sharing a connection (`fetch.tls.test.ts`, `proxy.test.ts`), PascalCase codes and un-prefixed messages. Every file above passes on a debug build (`bun bd test <file>`), along with `websocket-proxy.test.ts`, `worker_threads.test.ts`, the `test-process-env*.js` node tests, `proxy-stress-*.test.ts`, the bun-types test, the source lints and `bun run rust:check-all`. The new tests fail on a build of `main`. `fetch.test.ts` has the same 18–20 debug-build timeouts and root-only failures with and without this change. Windows ran in CI only. The first run there showed a refused connect reporting `ENOTCONN` (the `WSAENOTCONN` of uSockets' zero-byte `recv()` probe); that path now reads `SO_ERROR` for the cause and a bare `WSAENOTCONN` falls back to `ECONNREFUSED`. The `process.env` Proxy's `set` trap now leaves a write to an inheriting object on that object. Not run locally: `cargo test -p bun_url` does not link locally (`highway_memmem`), so the `URL::parse` change is covered through the JS tests; C++ was not clang-formatted locally.
… client verified (#43672) ### Problem - A TLS 1.2 server that renegotiates closes an open `wss://127.0.0.1` WebSocket: `["open", "close 1006"]`. `wss://localhost` works. The certificate is valid for the IP address. 1.4.0 keeps the connection open, 1.4.1 and later close it. - Cause: `WebSocket::handle_handshake` (`src/http_jsc/websocket_client.rs`) checks the certificate name again after a renegotiation, against the SNI on the `SSL*`. An IP address host sends no SNI. - #40055 made an empty name fail closed, on purpose. Its [review thread](#40055 (comment)) says the connected client has "no hostname to fall back to". ### Fix - The upgrade client hands the hostname it verified to the connected client (`did_connect`, `WebSocket::didConnect`). The renegotiation check uses that name. It still fails closed on an empty name. - Alternative: return before the name check, because BoringSSL requires the same certificate across a renegotiation (`SSL_R_SERVER_CERT_CHANGED`). I kept the check: `REVIEW.md` asks TLS checks to fail closed, and `node:tls` in Bun checks the name again. A maintainer can ask for the smaller diff. - Behind an HTTPS proxy with a `ws://` target, that name is the proxy host. A proxy at an IP address is fixed too. - Verified: `test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts` (7 new tests, main fails 3). More in Notes. ### Background - Two objects make the WebSocket client. The upgrade client (`HTTPClient`) connects, verifies the certificate and upgrades. On `101` it gives the socket to the connected client (`WebSocket`). - uSockets calls `on_handshake` for each completed TLS handshake. The connected client only sees a renegotiation. - SNI is the server name in the TLS ClientHello. RFC 6066 does not allow an IP address there. <details><summary>Notes</summary> **Reproduction.** The peer is a `node` TLS 1.2 server, because a BoringSSL server cannot renegotiate. It answers the WebSocket upgrade by hand and calls `socket.renegotiate()` when the first client frame arrives. Then it sends a text frame and a Close frame. uSockets reports the finished renegotiation right before it delivers the next application data. So a handler that closes the socket there also loses that data. **The new tests on each build** (Linux x64, `tls: { ca }`, no other option): | test | 1.4.0 | 1.4.1 | 1.4.2 | main 367d939 | this PR | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | `wss://localhost` stays open | pass | pass | pass | pass | pass | | `wss://127.0.0.1` stays open | pass | fail | fail | fail | pass | | `wss://[::1]` stays open | fail | fail | fail | fail | pass | | HTTPS proxy at `localhost` stays open | pass | pass | pass | pass | pass | | HTTPS proxy at `127.0.0.1` stays open | pass | fail | fail | fail | pass | | `wss://localhost` closes on a changed certificate | pass | pass | pass | pass | pass | | `wss://127.0.0.1` closes on a changed certificate | pass | pass | pass | pass | pass | Each failure is `["open", "close 1006"]`. The regression is the IPv4 rows. `wss://[::1]` could not connect with certificate verification before #30674, which is not in a release yet. On main it connects and then fails on the renegotiation like the IPv4 host. **The changed-certificate tests.** The server calls `socket.setKeyCert()` with a second certificate before it renegotiates. The client trusts both certificates and both are valid for the host, so only the rule "a renegotiation must present the same certificate" can refuse the second one. BoringSSL enforces that rule inside the handshake (`vendor/boringssl/ssl/handshake.cc`, `ssl_verify_peer_cert`, and the `SSL_set_renegotiate_mode` comment in `ssl.h`). The server reports how the renegotiation ended, and the tests expect `client sent alert 47` (illegal_parameter), so a fixture that fails for another reason does not pass. These tests pass with and without this PR. They record the property that the alternative in the Fix section depends on. **History of the check.** The name check in this handler is older than the Rust port. Until #40055 it ran only when the `SSL*` had an SNI, and returned without a check when it had none. In the #40055 review the bot asked for the stored-hostname fallback that the upgrade client has. The reply made the empty case fail closed and noted that this handler has no stored hostname. This PR adds that hostname and keeps the fail-closed line. **Why the name goes through C++.** C++ creates the connected client (`WebSocket::didConnect` calls `Bun__WebSocketClientTLS__init`), so the upgrade client has no direct link to it. The name travels like `secure` (the custom `SSL_CTX`), as one more argument. C++ does not keep it. C++ cannot derive the name from the URL: behind an HTTPS proxy the verified name is the proxy host. **Renegotiation failures that this PR does not change.** All three fail the same way for `localhost` and for an IP address. - `wss://` through an HTTP CONNECT proxy, when the target renegotiates between the upgrade request and the `101`: close 1006. `WebSocketProxyTunnel::on_handshake` calls `on_proxy_tls_handshake_complete()` a second time, the upgrade request buffer is already taken, and the client terminates with `FailedToWrite`. #37094 makes that call single-shot. A renegotiation after the first frame through the same proxy works. - The server sends a frame while the renegotiation is in progress: close 1006. BoringSSL forbids application data inside a renegotiation (`vendor/boringssl/PORTING.md`, "Interleaving application data with the new handshake is forbidden"). - The client calls `send()` while the renegotiation is in progress: the frame stays in `bufferedAmount` and is not sent after the renegotiation. The connection stays open. #37094 describes a lost drain after a renegotiation in uSockets. I did not test this case against that branch. **A renegotiation with no check, not changed here.** `wss://` through an `https://` proxy runs in tunnel mode, and the upgrade client keeps the outer TLS socket to the proxy. After the upgrade it has released the C++ WebSocket, so its `handle_handshake` reads `rejectUnauthorized` as false and makes no check when the proxy renegotiates. This is the same on main. BoringSSL still refuses a changed certificate there, and a failed renegotiation still closes the connection. A check added there cannot fail, so no test can show it, and #41648 rewrites that block. **#41648** (open) adds `tls.serverName` and `tls.checkServerIdentity` to the WebSocket client. Its `serverName` value flows through the same `hostname` field, so the renegotiation check follows it with no extra change. It also adds an early return in this handler when the user installed `checkServerIdentity`. A test merge of the two branches has no conflict. **Connect time.** A certificate that does not match the host is still rejected at connect time. A probe to `wss://127.0.0.2` against the same certificate closes with 1015 `TLS handshake failed` on this branch. This PR does not change the check in the upgrade client. **Suites run on the debug (ASAN) build:** `test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts` (16 pass, and the 7 new tests 12 times in a row in their final form), `websocket.test.js` (2 tests need the public internet and fail in my sandbox), `websocket-proxy.test.ts`, `websocket.tls.ipv6.test.ts`, `websocket-unix.test.ts`, `websocket-client.test.ts`, `websocket-upgrade.test.ts`, `websocket-handshake-event.test.ts`, the proxy tunnel leak and reentrancy tests, `websocket-close-code.test.ts`, `websocket-close-connecting.test.ts`, `websocket-permessage-deflate.test.ts`, `websocket-custom-headers.test.ts`, `websocket-subprotocol-strict.test.ts`, `test-ws-bidir-proxy.test.ts`, `websocket-syscall-fault.test.ts`, and `test/internal/source-lints/`. **Self-review.** Changes that came from it: this text now cites the #40055 thread, states the release scope, and lists the failures that this PR leaves. The changed-certificate tests are new. Not done: a separate tracking issue for those failures. They are listed above, one has an open PR and one is a documented BoringSSL limit. Checked and found correct: the new `FfiSlice` argument has the same ABI in Rust and C++ on the six release targets (LLVM IR compared), and the `node -e` script survives the Windows command-line quoting. </details> <!-- robobun:evidence:begin --> --- **[human-review]** gate passed · iteration 2 · 7 files touched <details><summary>fails on main (without fix)</summary> ```console ASAN without fix: 3 FAILED $ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/pr_gate.xml" test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts bun test v1.4.3 (367d939) test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts: HTTP/1.1 GET https://localhost:33083/ User-Agent: Bun/1.4.3-debug Accept: */* Host: localhost:33083 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br, zstd < 200 OK < Content-Type: text/plain < Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2026 09:20:39 GMT < Connection: keep-alive < Keep-Alive: timeout=5 < Transfer-Encoding: chunked (pass) allow renegotiation in fetch [70.03ms] (pass) should fail if renegotiation fails using fetch [13.14ms] (pass) allow renegotiation in https module [1319.27ms] (pass) should fail if renegotiation fails using https [96.99ms] (pass) allow renegotiation in tls module [51.91ms] (pass) pauseOnConnect acts on the first handshake only, not on a renegotiation [134.02ms] (pass) should not crash when socket is closed inside the renegotiation handshake callback [358.77ms] (pass) should terminate the connection when the peer exceeds the renegotiation limit over a duplex socket [375.31ms] (pass) should fail if renegotiation fails using tls modul ... (truncated) release without fix: all passed bun test v1.4.3-canary.1 (6a8afd1) test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts: HTTP/1.1 GET https://localhost:35097/ User-Agent: Bun/1.4.3 Accept: */* Host: localhost:35097 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br, zstd < 200 OK < Content-Type: text/plain < Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2026 09:20:41 GMT < Connection: keep-alive < Keep-Alive: timeout=5 < Transfer-Encoding: chunked (pass) allow renegotiation in fetch [13.08ms] (pass) should fail if renegotiation fails using fetch [2.78ms] (pass) allow renegotiation in https module [25.73ms] (pass) should fail if renegotiation fails using https [3.34ms] (pass) allow renegotiation in tls module [4.74ms] (pass) pauseOnConnect acts on the first handshake only, not on a renegotiation [92.51ms] (pass) should not crash when socket is closed inside the renegotiation handshake callback [12.24ms] (pass) should terminate the connection when the peer exceeds the renegotiation limit over a duplex socket [213.05ms] (pass) should fail if renegotiation fails using tls module [2.91ms] (pass) WebSocket to 127.0.0.1 stays open when the server renegotiates [47.37ms] (pass) WebSocket to localhost closes when the server changes its certificate in a re ... (truncated) ``` </details> <details><summary>passes on PR (with fix)</summary> ```console ASAN with fix: all passed $ BUN_DEBUG_QUIET_LOGS=1 bun scripts/build.ts --profile=debug --quiet test "--reporter=junit" "--reporter-outfile=/tmp/pr_gate.xml" test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts bun test v1.4.3 (367d939) test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts: HTTP/1.1 GET https://localhost:43895/ User-Agent: Bun/1.4.3-debug Accept: */* Host: localhost:43895 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br, zstd < 200 OK < Content-Type: text/plain < Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2026 09:21:20 GMT < Connection: keep-alive < Keep-Alive: timeout=5 < Transfer-Encoding: chunked (pass) allow renegotiation in fetch [64.57ms] (pass) should fail if renegotiation fails using fetch [13.96ms] (pass) allow renegotiation in https module [1330.12ms] (pass) should fail if renegotiation fails using https [99.46ms] (pass) allow renegotiation in tls module [54.86ms] (pass) pauseOnConnect acts on the first handshake only, not on a renegotiation [135.56ms] (pass) should not crash when socket is closed inside the renegotiation handshake callback [309.32ms] (pass) should terminate the connection when the peer exceeds the renegotiation limit over a duplex socket [398.04ms] (pass) should fail if renegotiation fails using tls modul ... (truncated) release with fix: all passed $ bun scripts/build.ts --profile=release [configured] bun-profile → bun (stripped) in 875ms (unchanged) ninja: Entering directory `/workspace/bun/build/release' [1/110] cxx obj/codegen/JSSink.cpp.o [2/110] cxx obj/src/jsc/bindings/ZigGlobalObject.cpp.o [3/110] cxx obj/codegen/ZigGeneratedClasses.cpp.o [4/110] cxx obj/unified/UnifiedSource-src_jsc_bindings_webcore-2.cpp.o [5/110] cxx obj/unified/UnifiedSource-src_jsc_bindings_node-0.cpp.o [6/110] cxx obj/unified/UnifiedSource-src_jsc_bindings-1.cpp.o [7/110] cxx obj/src/jsc/bindings/napi.cpp.o [8/110] cxx obj/unified/UnifiedSource-src_jsc_bindings-4.cpp.o [9/110] cxx obj/unified/UnifiedSource-src_jsc_bindings-2.cpp.o [10/110] cxx obj/unified/UnifiedSource-src_jsc_bindings-0.cpp.o [11/110] cxx obj/src/jsc/bindings/BunObject.cpp.o [12/110] cxx obj/src/jsc/bindings/bindings.cpp.o [13/110] cxx obj/unified/UnifiedSource-src_jsc_bindings-3.cpp.o [14/110] cxx obj/unified/UnifiedSource-src_runtime_webview-0.cpp.o [15/110] cxx obj/unified/UnifiedSource-src_jsc_bindings_webcore-3.cpp.o [16/110] cxx obj/unified/UnifiedSource-src_jsc_modules-0.cpp.o [17/110] gen generated_host_exports.rs generated_host_exports.rs: 121 exports ... (truncated) ``` </details> <details><summary>diff hotspot</summary> ``` src/http_jsc/websocket_client.rs | 18 ++- src/http_jsc/websocket_client/CppWebSocket.rs | 11 +- .../websocket_client/WebSocketUpgradeClient.rs | 3 + src/jsc/bindings/headers.h | 4 +- src/jsc/bindings/webcore/WebSocket.cpp | 11 +- src/jsc/bindings/webcore/WebSocket.h | 2 +- test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts | 148 ++++++++++++++++++++- 7 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) ``` </details> **gate history** · 2 passed · 0 rejected · iteration 2 <details><summary>evidence per changed file</summary> ``` file reads edits tests src/http_jsc/websocket_client.rs 3 3 32 src/http_jsc/websocket_client/CppWebSocket.rs 1 2 32 src/http_jsc/websocket_client/WebSocketUpgradeClient.rs 3 3 32 src/jsc/bindings/headers.h 0 0 33 src/jsc/bindings/webcore/WebSocket.cpp 1 0 33 src/jsc/bindings/webcore/WebSocket.h 0 0 32 test/js/node/tls/renegotiation.test.ts 3 0 32 ``` </details> <!-- robobun:evidence:end --> --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
… IP host (#42766) ### Problem - `new Bun.SQL("postgres://u@[::1]:5432/db?sslmode=verify-full")` rejects a certificate that has `IP:::1` with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. `mysql://` does the same. - `parseOptions` copies `URL.hostname`, brackets kept, into `tls.serverName` (`src/js/internal/sql/shared.ts:2159`). Both adapters check the certificate against that text, and `"[::1]"` is not an IP address. - Both adapters send an IP literal as SNI (`127.0.0.1`). RFC 6066 section 3 forbids that. ### Fix - `SSLConfig::server_name_bytes()` (`src/sql_jsc/jsc.rs`) returns the name through `bun_core::ip_address::strip_ipv6_brackets`. The identity checks of both adapters read the name there. - New `SSLConfig::sni()` returns no name for an IP literal, bracketed or not. Both `adopt_tls` sites use it. libpq and fetch send none either. - Verified: `test/js/sql/sql-tls-ip-literal-host.test.ts` (new, 8 cases). 6 fail on main 0d73249, all pass here. ### Background - `sslmode=verify-full` checks that the certificate names the host. An IP host matches only an IP SAN entry, and only as a bare address (`check_x509_server_identity`, `src/boringssl/lib.rs:452`). - SNI is the host name a TLS client sends in its first message. `adopt_tls` sets it. - Considered a strip in `parseOptions` (the first version). That was a second copy of `strip_ipv6_brackets`, which fetch, RedisClient and Bun.connect use, and it changed `sql.options`. ### Downsides - Bun.SQL sends no SNI for an IP-literal name. A TLS proxy that routes on such a value loses it. - A zone-scoped address (`hostname: "::1%lo"`) still fails `verify-full`, and without brackets it still goes out as SNI: `is_ip_address` accepts no `%zone`. - Cost per TLS connection: one `is_ip_address` call (at most 45 bytes, no allocation) and a bracket check at each name read. <details><summary>Notes</summary> - History of this PR. The first version removed the brackets in `parseOptions` (JS). Main then gained `bun_core::ip_address::strip_ipv6_brackets` and moved every other client to it. A review noted that the JS helper disagreed with it (`[db]` lost its brackets too). aa4d699 moves the fix to the two native accessors and restores `parseOptions` to its state on main. So this PR no longer touches `src/js/internal/sql/shared.ts`, and it does not conflict with #42054 or #41761, which edit that block. - `sql.options.tls.serverName` and `sql.options.hostname` keep the brackets, as on main. Only the native reads see the bare address. - When this PR opened (canary 09bb546), Bun.SQL also accepted a certificate whose only SAN is `DNS:[::1]`, and a hostname mismatch gave an `Error` with an empty `code` and `message`. Main changed both since: #43873 makes a name that is not a hostname match no certificate name, and #43694 rejects the mismatch inside the handshake with `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`. This PR changes neither. - Probed on the debug build with a mock TLS server on 127.0.0.1 and an explicit `tls.serverName`. `"[::1]"` and `"::1"` under `verify-full`: connects, no SNI. `"[db]"` under `verify-full`: `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID`, as on main. `"[fe80::1%lo]"` under `require`: no SNI. `"fe80::1%lo"` and `"127.1"` under `require`: sent as SNI, because `is_ip_address` takes neither as an IP literal (#43979). `"localhost"`: sent as SNI. - Observed on main 0d73249: peer SNI `127.0.0.1` for host `127.0.0.1`. With this change: none. - The cases that dial `[::1]` gate on `isIPv6()` (Buildkite Linux has no IPv6 loopback). The other cases run on every lane. One of them dials 127.0.0.1 with `tls.serverName: "[::1]"`, so every lane checks a bracketed name against the `IP:::1` entry. - Two gaps in the same `parseOptions` block are on main and stay out of this PR: `tls.servername` (the Node spelling) is ignored, which #42054 owns, and `tls: true` without an sslmode derives no `serverName`, which #26369 tracks. A `BunFile` given as `tls` with an explicit sslmode loses the file there, which #41761 owns. - Same bug class as #30668, which #30674 fixed for fetch and WebSocket. The dial path already removes the brackets (`src/uws_sys/socket.rs:791`). - Other suites run on the merged debug build (main 601af5a): `postgres-pgsslmode-env`, `sql-mysql-tls-plaintext-injection`, all of `adapter-env-var-precedence`, and `test/js/bun/net/tls-reject-before-client-cert.test.ts` (121 pass, 9 skip). I ran the new file 40 times on the earlier head: 320 of 320 cases pass. The container TLS suites (`tls-sql`, `local-sql`) need Docker and run in CI. </details> <!-- robobun:evidence:begin --> --- **no test proof** · iteration 0 · platform-specific test(s) that do not run on this machine, deferring to CI, which covers all platforms: test/js/sql/adapter-env-var-precedence.test.ts <!-- robobun:evidence:end -->
Fixes #30668
Problem
fetch('https://[::1]:PORT/')withrejectUnauthorized: truefails withERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALIDeven when the cert carries anIP:::1SAN. A user-suppliedcheckServerIdentitycallback receives the bracketed"[::1]", so forwarding it tonode:tls.checkServerIdentityalso rejects (net.isIP("[::1]") === 0falls through to CN matching).[]on IPv6 hostnames. That form reached both TLS verification paths: the native fast path (check_x509_server_identitygates onis_ip_address, which rejects brackets and takes the DNS-name branch) and the user callback.Fix
strip_ipv6_bracketsand apply it to every return path ofget_tls_hostnameinsrc/http/lib.rs(proxy hostname,tls_props.server_name,url.hostname).urlToHttpOptionsbefore the hostname reachestls.checkServerIdentity. This mirrors that contract at the single chokepoint, so the native cert check, the SNIis_ip_addresscheck, and the user callback all see the bare::1. Since fetch: never derive TLS SNI or certificate identity from the Host request header #35886, the proxy-tunnel inner handshake also routes throughget_tls_hostname, so it is covered too.WebSocketUpgradeClient.rsand in the proxy tunnel'ssni_hostname, reusing the same helper (nowpub).url.hostnamestraight toClientContext::connect, which uses it as both the QUIC dial host and the SNI/verification name. Both call sites now strip brackets.test/js/web/fetch/fetch.tls.ipv6.test.tsexercises both fetch paths end to end againsthttps://[::1]:port/and asserts the callback receives"::1".test/js/web/websocket/websocket.tls.ipv6.test.tsdoes the same forwss://[::1]:port/. Both fail without the fix and pass with it.fetch.tls.test.tsandfetch.tls.wildcard.test.tsstill pass.Background
get_tls_hostnameis the one place the HTTP client picks the name used for SNI and certificate verification. Every TLS consumer of fetch reads it.is_ip_address(hostname)is true, which requires the bare address form.isIPv6()(Buildkite Linux agents have no IPv6) and lives in a standalone file for this one concern, following thefetch.tls.wildcard.test.tsprecedent.[review] gate passed · iteration 12 · 5 files touched
fails on main (without fix)
passes on PR (with fix)
diff hotspot
gate history · 5 passed · 0 rejected · iteration 12
evidence per changed file
root cause · written by the author bot
Bun passed IPv6 hostnames to TLS certificate verification with their URL brackets still attached, so names like "[::1]" or "[ff:ff::ff]" never matched the certificate's IP entries and valid connections were rejected. The fix normalizes the hostname before verification by stripping the surrounding brackets across the fetch, WebSocket, and HTTP/3 TLS paths, so the bare IPv6 literal is used for SNI and certificate checks, matching Node's behavior. Brackets are removed only when the inner value parses as an IPv6 address, so bracketed non-IP names such as "[example.com]" still fail validation as…