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Updated 12:20 AM PT - Sep 8th, 2026
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WalkthroughCentralizes TLS option extraction and whitelisting, applies it to agent option extraction, updates BunWebSocket to use explicit ChangesWebSocket TLS options support
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
In `@src/js/thirdparty/ws.js`:
- Around line 193-194: The bug is that extractTlsOptions drops explicit falsy
TLS scalar values so keys like secureOptions, clientRenegotiationLimit,
clientRenegotiationWindow, and passphrase are lost when options.tls is absent;
update extractTlsOptions to copy a key when it exists on the source (e.g., using
Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(source, key) or key in source) instead of
checking truthiness, so tlsValueKeys are preserved; confirm tlsOptions
assignment (the code around extractTlsOptions, tlsValueKeys, options.tls,
tlsOptions and the merge { ...agentOpts.tls, ...tlsOptions }) will now allow
falsy values to override agentOpts.tls.
🪄 Autofix (Beta)
Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
- Create a new PR with the fixes
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📒 Files selected for processing (2)
src/js/thirdparty/ws.jstest/js/first_party/ws/ws-tls-options.test.ts
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All earlier nits are addressed and I have nothing further — deferring only because the precedence rules around rejectUnauthorized / agent-vs-top-level merging are TLS-verification semantics that deserve a human sign-off.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
This PR changes src/js/thirdparty/ws.js (Bun's npm ws compat shim) to forward top-level TLS options (rejectUnauthorized, ca, cert, key, …) on the WebSocket client constructor into the native WebSocket's tls option, matching how the real npm ws package forwards them to https.request/tls.connect. It adds a key-whitelist extractor (extractTlsOptions) split into boolean/scalar/file buckets, an isForwardableFileValue guard for shapes SSLConfig.fromJS can't parse, and a merge step that combines agent-supplied TLS with top-level keys unless an explicit options.tls object was passed. A new test file (test/js/first_party/ws/ws-tls-options.test.ts, ~143 lines, 6 cases) covers the primary fix plus each edge case raised in review.
Security risks
The change directly governs when TLS certificate verification is enabled for a wss:// connection. The interesting surface is the precedence between three sources — explicit options.tls, extracted top-level keys, and agent.connectOpts — and specifically whether an agent's rejectUnauthorized: false (semantically aimed at the proxy hop) can leak into the target handshake. That leak existed in an intermediate commit and was fixed in 3aaf125 (guarded on !explicitTls) with a test asserting the agent's value cannot disable verification when tls: {} is passed. I don't see a remaining path that weakens verification relative to pre-PR behavior; the net effect is that users can now turn it off via the Node-canonical top-level option, which is the intended compat fix.
Level of scrutiny
Medium-high. The implementation is option plumbing in a JS shim (no native code touched), but it controls TLS verification and the merge/override rules took five review iterations to settle (agent merge vs replace, ALPNProtocols string[] throw, explicit-tls authoritativeness, falsy scalar preservation, key: [{pem,passphrase}] object-array throw). Each was addressed with a targeted regression test, and the bug-hunting pass on b390313 found nothing new. Still, the subtlety of the precedence semantics is exactly the kind of thing a maintainer should glance at rather than auto-merge.
Other factors
No CODEOWNERS entry for src/js/thirdparty/. The single CI failure (test/bundler/transpiler/transpiler.test.js on Windows) is unrelated to this change. All prior inline comments — mine and CodeRabbit's — are resolved. I have not previously posted a review body on this PR, only inline nits, so this deferral is not redundant.
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CI is green on every lane except This change is JS-only ( |
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Rebased onto latest The previous red on this PR was entirely the flaky Windows
New CI run is in flight against the rebased tree. |
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All six rounds of prior feedback are addressed and the test coverage is solid — I don't see anything left to flag, but since this is TLS-verification plumbing (precedence around rejectUnauthorized/ca between top-level, agent, and explicit tls), I'd like a human to sign off rather than auto-approve.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
This PR changes src/js/thirdparty/ws.js so Bun's ws shim forwards top-level TLS options (rejectUnauthorized, ca, cert, key, servername, …) to the native WebSocket's tls option, matching how npm ws forwards them to https.request/tls.connect. It adds ~120 lines of new logic: three key whitelists (tlsBooleanKeys, tlsScalarKeys, tlsFileKeys), an extractTlsOptions helper with per-bucket falsy-handling, an isForwardableFileValue/isRepresentableFileElement shape guard, and merge-precedence rules between top-level options, agent connectOpts, and an explicit Bun tls:{} object. A new 7-case test file exercises the happy path, the negative path, the agent-merge path, the explicit-override path, and three no-op→throw guards.
Security risks
The change is squarely in TLS-verification territory. It does not weaken any default — it forwards user-supplied options that were previously dropped — but the precedence logic determines whether rejectUnauthorized: false from one source (e.g. an agent's proxy-hop connectOpts) can leak into the target handshake. One of my earlier review rounds (3aaf125) caught and fixed exactly that leak, and the explicitTls guard plus the "keeps an explicit tls object authoritative" test now cover it. I don't see a remaining vector, but the consequence of a precedence mistake here is silently disabled certificate verification, which is why I'm not auto-approving.
Level of scrutiny
Medium-high. This is JS-only option plumbing (no native/crypto changes), but it took six review iterations to converge — each round surfaced a real edge (agent-vs-top-level shadowing, ALPNProtocols string[] throwing, explicit-tls override leak, falsy-scalar handling, {pem,passphrase} array and bare-object forms throwing). That history says the surface is subtle enough that a maintainer familiar with SSLConfig.fromJS and the agent/proxy semantics should give it a final read.
Other factors
All inline comments from me and CodeRabbit are resolved; the bug-hunting system found nothing on e57956c. Test coverage is good and each case maps to a specific review round. The robobun CI-status comment still references an older commit (64975c0) with a failure, so the latest commit's CI state isn't visible in the thread yet — worth confirming green before merge. No CODEOWNERS entry covers this path.
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Rebased onto latest The only conflicts were in
The ws TLS diff is otherwise unchanged. Verified on the rebased tree: |
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The only red on the latest run (build 63719, sha 2111ced) is the Lint JavaScript GitHub Actions job, which failed with: That's a runner-provisioning hiccup (the The ws TLS code is lint-clean (its |
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Hello, Any code for Node.js running with bun runtime and using wss silently fails! |
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Status: the fix is complete and tested. The shim now forwards the top-level TLS options (
Until it lands, two workarounds exist on current Bun releases:
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I'm well aware of this trick thanks. Hope this will be fixed asap. |
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Re-reviewed after 3d97664. No new issues found; since this changes how rejectUnauthorized and other TLS-verification options are collected and merged, a human look is still worthwhile.
Checked in this pass:
extractTlsOptionsnow gates every key onObjectPrototypeHasOwnProperty.$calland builds both the result and the agent-merge object with__proto__: null, so a pollutedObject.prototype.rejectUnauthorizedno longer reaches the native TLS config.- The reworked helper uses
$isJSArray/$isTypedArrayViewand module-load-capturedArrayBuffer.isView/Blob/ArrayBuffer; the table-driventlsKeyKindslookup replaced theArray#includeshot-path call. crl,ecdhCurve,sigalgs, andallowPartialTrustChainare now in the forwarded key set, matching whatSSLConfig.fromJSaccepts.extractAgentOptionsreusing the same helper tightens the agent path from prototype-chain destructuring to own-property reads — stricter than base, which fails closed.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
This PR makes Bun's ws third-party shim honor top-level TLS options on the WebSocket constructor (rejectUnauthorized, ca, cert, key, …), matching the npm ws package. The change adds a table-driven extractTlsOptions() helper in src/js/thirdparty/ws.js that reads a fixed set of keys off the options object, classifies them (bool/scalar/file), filters shapes the native SSLConfig.fromJS parser would reject, and merges the result with agent-supplied TLS options. extractAgentOptions() is refactored to reuse the same helper. A new test file exercises the accept/reject/merge/skip paths against a self-signed Bun.serve({ tls }).
Since the prior review, the branch was squashed to a single commit (3d97664) that reworked the helper: it now captures Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty, ArrayBuffer.isView, ArrayBuffer, and Blob at module load; gates every read on an own-property check; builds the result and the agent-merge spread with { __proto__: null }; switched Array.isArray → $isJSArray and added $isTypedArrayView; replaced the Array#includes classification with a { __proto__: null } kind table; and added the four previously-missing SSLConfig keys (crl, ecdhCurve, sigalgs, allowPartialTrustChain).
Security risks
The change directly governs whether TLS certificate verification runs for wss:// connections created via the ws shim. The primary risk in earlier revisions — a polluted Object.prototype.rejectUnauthorized = false flowing through the new prototype-chain read into every socket — is closed by the own-property guard and null-prototype containers. The precedence rule (an explicit options.tls blocks agent TLS from merging, so an agent's proxy-hop rejectUnauthorized: false cannot weaken target verification) is preserved and now covered by a test. The remaining options.tls read itself still walks the prototype chain, but that behavior is unchanged from the base branch and not widened by this PR. The instanceof NativeBlob/NativeArrayBuffer checks are still Symbol.hasInstance-tamperable in principle, but they gate only whether a file-shaped value is forwarded; a false result is a no-op and a false positive causes SSLConfig.fromJS to throw — both fail closed rather than weakening verification.
Level of scrutiny
High. REVIEW.md explicitly names rejectUnauthorized as the canonical example of a security flag requiring prototype-pollution-safe own-property lookups, and this PR is precisely about plumbing that flag through a new code path in a builtin module. The approval guidelines exclude security-sensitive code (auth, crypto, permissions) from auto-approval; TLS certificate verification is squarely in that category, so this defers to a human even with a clean re-run.
Other factors
The bug hunt exited on dry_streak with no new findings on the reworked code. Three of the four concerns raised in the previous review round are reflected in the current diff; the one remaining item (the agent-merge test's servername: "localhost" not being independently load-bearing, since it matches the URL hostname) was flagged as an optional nit and is already visible on the PR. There are open github-actions[bot] inline comments from before the squash; the subsequent commit plausibly addresses them and they are not human-reviewer objections.
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…e connection
The npm ws package accepts TLS options as top-level options on the
WebSocket constructor and forwards them to https.request/tls.connect:
new WebSocket("wss://localhost:8443", { rejectUnauthorized: false });
Bun's ws shim only read TLS options from options.tls, so top-level keys
were silently dropped and connecting to a self-signed wss:// server
failed with "TLS handshake failed".
Collect the TLS keys the native WebSocket understands (the set
SSLConfig.fromJS parses) off the top-level options when no explicit
options.tls object is given. An explicit options.tls stays a hard
override. Agent connect options merge underneath the top-level keys
instead of being dropped wholesale.
Shapes the native parser cannot represent stay a no-op rather than
becoming a constructor throw: a string[] ALPNProtocols, and the
{ pem, passphrase } object form of key/cert (bare or in an array).
Explicit falsy scalars (passphrase: "", secureOptions: 0) are
preserved, while an empty file/identity value (ca: "") is treated as
absent since the native parser would otherwise see a real empty CA set.
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The latest push addresses the last open nit — the tamper-resistance test now passes Buffer.from(tls.key) so ArrayBufferIsView is actually exercised, and the dead Array.prototype.includes clobber is gone. I have nothing further; a human look is still worthwhile since this changes how rejectUnauthorized reaches the TLS layer.
What was reviewed:
extractTlsOptionsreads own properties only via capturedhasOwnProperty.$calland returns{ __proto__: null }— a pollutedObject.prototype.rejectUnauthorizedcannot flow through (covered by the subprocess test).- Explicit
options.tlsstays a hard override; agentconnectOptscannot leakrejectUnauthorized: falseinto it (guarded by!explicitTls, tested). - Merge order
{ ...agentTls, ...tlsOptions }lets top-level keys win on conflict; the object-formkey/certand arrayALPNProtocolsare skipped rather than forwarded into a constructor throw. - Key list now includes
crl/sigalgs/ecdhCurve/allowPartialTrustChain; globals (ArrayBuffer.isView,Blob,ArrayBuffer) are captured at module load.
Extended reasoning...
Overview
This PR modifies src/js/thirdparty/ws.js to forward top-level TLS options (rejectUnauthorized, ca, cert, key, etc.) from the ws WebSocket constructor's options object into Bun's native WebSocket TLS config, matching upstream ws behavior. It adds a table-driven extractTlsOptions() helper that whitelists exactly the keys SSLConfig.fromJS parses, categorized by copy semantics (bool/scalar/file), and refactors extractAgentOptions() to share it. A new test file with 9 tests covers the positive path, the negative (still rejects without the flag), agent+top-level merge, conflict precedence, unrepresentable value shapes staying no-ops, prototype-pollution safety, and tamper resistance.
Security risks
The primary risk surface is rejectUnauthorized — a bug here could silently disable TLS certificate verification. Across five review iterations the following were raised and addressed: prototype pollution (now own-property reads via captured hasOwnProperty.$call, { __proto__: null } result and merge objects); agent rejectUnauthorized: false leaking into an explicit tls: {} (now blocked by the !explicitTls guard with a dedicated test); top-level keys shadowing agent-supplied ca/cert (now merged with top-level winning on conflict, tested both ways); and previously-ignored option shapes (ALPNProtocols: string[], key: {pem, passphrase}) turning into constructor throws (now filtered by isForwardableFileValue). Globals used in type checks are captured at module load and $-intrinsics replace user-overridable machinery. The default remains fail-closed: absent an own rejectUnauthorized property, verification stays on.
Level of scrutiny
High. This is TLS verification plumbing in a builtin module — REVIEW.md explicitly calls out rejectUnauthorized as requiring prototype-pollution-safe own-property lookups and fail-closed semantics, and the approval guidelines exclude security-sensitive code paths from bot approval. The change is well-scoped (pure JS option marshalling, no native changes) and now thoroughly tested, but the consequence of a subtle mistake is silent MITM exposure, so a maintainer should sign off.
Other factors
This is the fifth review pass; every prior finding has a corresponding fix and test in the current diff. The final commit (0ca973b) addressed the last open nit by making the tamper-resistance test non-vacuous (Buffer inputs reach ArrayBufferIsView; the irrelevant .includes clobber was dropped). No human CHANGES_REQUESTED review is outstanding. The remaining unresolved github-actions[bot] inline comments are automated and their content is not visible to me; they do not block but a human may want to glance at them.
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Superseded by #44618, which consolidates the open TLS pull requests. This fix and its tests are in there, either as written, rewritten smaller, or merged with the other PRs that patched the same cause (see the "By area" list in that PR). Closing in favor of it. |
…, #42325) npm ws gives every constructor option to https.request(), so ca, rejectUnauthorized, cert, key, pfx or minVersion are written at the top level or on the agent. The shim read TLS options only from the Bun-only `tls` option and five keys of the agent, and dropped the rest without an error: a private CA was not trusted, a client certificate in a pfx was not sent, a minVersion was not enforced. Merge the top-level options with the agent's the way http.Agent does, so the agent wins (measured on Node v26.3.0 with ws 8.18.3), and translate the result with nodeClientTlsToNative(). An explicit `tls` option still replaces both, and its pfx is unsealed too.
…, #42325) npm ws gives every constructor option to https.request(), so ca, rejectUnauthorized, cert, key, pfx or minVersion are written at the top level or on the agent. The shim read TLS options only from the Bun-only `tls` option and five keys of the agent, and dropped the rest without an error: a private CA was not trusted, a client certificate in a pfx was not sent, a minVersion was not enforced. Merge the top-level options with the agent's the way http.Agent does, so the agent wins (measured on Node v26.3.0 with ws 8.18.3), and translate the result with nodeClientTlsToNative(). An explicit `tls` option still replaces both, and its pfx is unsealed too.
…, #42325) npm ws gives every constructor option to https.request(), so ca, rejectUnauthorized, cert, key, pfx or minVersion are written at the top level or on the agent. The shim read TLS options only from the Bun-only `tls` option and five keys of the agent, and dropped the rest without an error: a private CA was not trusted, a client certificate in a pfx was not sent, a minVersion was not enforced. Merge the top-level options with the agent's the way http.Agent does, so the agent wins (measured on Node v26.3.0 with ws 8.18.3), and translate the result with nodeClientTlsToNative(). An explicit `tls` option still replaces both, and its pfx is unsealed too.
…, #42325) npm ws gives every constructor option to https.request(), so ca, rejectUnauthorized, cert, key, pfx or minVersion are written at the top level or on the agent. The shim read TLS options only from the Bun-only `tls` option and five keys of the agent, and dropped the rest without an error: a private CA was not trusted, a client certificate in a pfx was not sent, a minVersion was not enforced. Merge the top-level options with the agent's the way http.Agent does, so the agent wins (measured on Node v26.3.0 with ws 8.18.3), and translate the result with nodeClientTlsToNative(). An explicit `tls` option still replaces both, and its pfx is unsealed too.
…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618) ### What does this PR do? Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on `main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it can be read commit by commit. Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846, fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240, fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517. Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the Kubernetes client itself was not run). #### The ones that matter most | | On `main` | PRs | |---|---|---| | Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name, `checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()` in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its Finished | #43946 | | False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized === true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 | | Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 | | Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`, so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 | | Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 | | Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` is plain TCP | #41490 | | Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 | | Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity` and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 | | `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*` URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 | | Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462, #41671, #44458 | | Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 | | Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write` leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 | | Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 | | Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex, CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39 s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464 | #### By area - **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 + #38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected `send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`, because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for `node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8 builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify. - **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094, #41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630. One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then **the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts` asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls, `Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT, `Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL, Valkey, Duplex). - **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529, #42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see "Worth a look" 5. - **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058, #38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 + #42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040, #40375, and what was still real of #36534. - **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253, part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`. - **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of #40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092. - **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997, #41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970. - **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641, #38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325. - **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change. - **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054. - **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591, #44440, #41424. Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here, with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned; `Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a `fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties `root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`. #### Behavior changes - **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`. - `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the socket just closes. - HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label, case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a name wins. - `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node. - An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws (`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`). - `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last. - `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in `tls.createServer`. - A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node, so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in Node. - `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient` sends SNI. - `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a `SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the `requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a context that does not ask throws at `listen()`. - `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`, `WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws `ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials nothing after an assignment. - The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one line, without the `warn:` prefix. - `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket` client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing handshake. #### Worth a look in review 1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct), so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as `main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t` stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`: `US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them. 2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS 1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are byte-identical. 3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose `keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate are tested to fail. 4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted; `rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays. 5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by #44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a `write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can collect. So: - #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`. - Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`. - After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS socket. The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close, `end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers, paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See "How did you verify". #### Known limits - `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS 1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node. - `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS, unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`. - A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` / node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`. - P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every ClientHello (`it.todo`). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol: "http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`. - `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with several identities. - A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`. - TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it no error at all). - `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims, which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing `ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`. - Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers. - After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits `'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket open. - A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there and delivers it. - On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still sending is a close over unread input, so a reset. - Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()` followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a `ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and `'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true). - Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed under the default one would never be picked up. - A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE` / `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it at all. - Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS, http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its `'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon as the peer's close_notify arrives. - Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too, except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it. - Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main` (#43877). - `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`. - `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1 entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a handshake. #### Not included Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394 (see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591 (both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487, #33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features), #38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232, #43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896, #42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken. `http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose. One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is left alone. ### How did you verify your code works? - Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here, except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few that cannot say which Node version has the behavior. - 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket, SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too: `serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and `worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below. - 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer + `BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`: `serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak). - 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`, `test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`. - The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup. - The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{ secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`, `WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`. - The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43 handshake states. - `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean. - usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail, `child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges", which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too. - The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5): eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`: - Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150 that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on Node. - No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main` does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer). - A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where `main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three sessions over an in-memory Duplex. - The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none. - 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails 7, and all pass on Node. - After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246 pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61 on the debug build. - TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`, `Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of `main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in 5 of 5 fresh processes. - `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over `Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` / `upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping, closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change in time or in connection reuse. - They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before: what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12 s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that `write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours. - All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build: scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back 17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where `main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and 3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client. - `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0 against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26 (`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against 101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`. About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1 to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()` reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same. - What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls `close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0 here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call back, 20 write callbacks that never run. - The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its `'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with it. - Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now say so per platform. --------- Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>
What
The npm
wspackage accepts TLS options as top-level options on theWebSocketclient constructor and forwards them to the underlyinghttps.request/tls.connect:Bun's
wsshim (src/js/thirdparty/ws.js) only read TLS options fromoptions.tls(Bun's internal shape) or from anagent. It never read the top-level keys, sorejectUnauthorized: falsewas silently dropped and connecting to a self-signedwss://server failed withTLS handshake failed.Fixes #31396.
Reproduction
Node connects; Bun failed. Passing the same option via Bun's
tls: { rejectUnauthorized: false }shape already worked — proving the native TLS layer was fine and the bug was purely option plumbing in the shim.Cause
In the constructor, TLS was read only from
options.tls:Top-level
rejectUnauthorized/ca/cert/key/… were never consulted.Fix
When no explicit
options.tlsobject is given, collect the TLS keys the native WebSocket understands (the setSSLConfig.fromJSparses) off the top-leveloptions:options.tlsstays authoritative, preserving Bun's existing shape.rejectUnauthorized, …) are forwarded with a!== undefinedcheck so an explicitfalseis honored.HttpsProxyAgent, …) keeps its conservative key subset — agents put connection options inconnectOptsthat aren't all valid Bun TLS options (e.g. an array-formALPNProtocols, whichSSLConfig.fromJSrejects).Verification
New tests in
test/js/first_party/ws/ws-tls-options.test.ts(alongside the existingws-proxy.test.ts) stand up a self-signedwss://server viaBun.serve({ tls })and connect through thewsshim:rejectUnauthorized: falseconnects (fails before this change, passes after).caplus a top-levelservernameconnects — both TLS sources reach the handshake, covering the merge path.The
wsandws-proxysuites are otherwise unchanged from their baseline.