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ws: forward top-level TLS options (rejectUnauthorized, ca, ...) to the connection - #31397

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@robobun

@robobun robobun commented May 25, 2026 •

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What

The npm ws package accepts TLS options as top-level options on the WebSocket client constructor and forwards them to the underlying https.request/tls.connect:

new WebSocket("wss://localhost:8443", { rejectUnauthorized: false });

Bun's ws shim (src/js/thirdparty/ws.js) only read TLS options from options.tls (Bun's internal shape) or from an agent. It never read the top-level keys, so rejectUnauthorized: false was silently dropped and connecting to a self-signed wss:// server failed with TLS handshake failed.

Fixes #31396.

Reproduction

import WebSocket from "ws";
// wss:// server with a self-signed cert
const ws = new WebSocket(`wss://localhost:${port}`, { rejectUnauthorized: false });
ws.on("open", () => console.log("open"));   // never fired
ws.on("error", err => console.error(err.message)); // "TLS handshake failed"

Node connects; Bun failed. Passing the same option via Bun's tls: { rejectUnauthorized: false } shape already worked — proving the native TLS layer was fine and the bug was purely option plumbing in the shim.

Cause

In the constructor, TLS was read only from options.tls:

tlsOptions = options?.tls;

Top-level rejectUnauthorized/ca/cert/key/… were never consulted.

Fix

When no explicit options.tls object is given, collect the TLS keys the native WebSocket understands (the set SSLConfig.fromJS parses) off the top-level options:

tlsOptions = $isObject(options.tls) ? options.tls : extractTlsOptions(options);
  • An explicit options.tls stays authoritative, preserving Bun's existing shape.
  • Booleans (rejectUnauthorized, …) are forwarded with a !== undefined check so an explicit false is honored.
  • The agent path (HttpsProxyAgent, …) keeps its conservative key subset — agents put connection options in connectOpts that aren't all valid Bun TLS options (e.g. an array-form ALPNProtocols, which SSLConfig.fromJS rejects).

Verification

New tests in test/js/first_party/ws/ws-tls-options.test.ts (alongside the existing ws-proxy.test.ts) stand up a self-signed wss:// server via Bun.serve({ tls }) and connect through the ws shim:

  • rejectUnauthorized: false connects (fails before this change, passes after).
  • Without the option, the self-signed server is still rejected (the option is actually doing something).
  • An agent carrying ca plus a top-level servername connects — both TLS sources reach the handshake, covering the merge path.

The ws and ws-proxy suites are otherwise unchanged from their baseline.

@robobun

robobun commented May 25, 2026 •

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Updated 12:20 AM PT - Sep 8th, 2026

❌ @robobun, your commit 0ca973b has 2 failures in Build #112476 (All Failures):


🧪   To try this PR locally:

bunx bun-pr 31397

That installs a local version of the PR into your bun-31397 executable, so you can run:

bun-31397 --bun

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coderabbitai Bot commented May 25, 2026 •

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Review Change Stack

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Walkthrough

Centralizes TLS option extraction and whitelisting, applies it to agent option extraction, updates BunWebSocket to use explicit options.tls or derive from top-level TLS fields and to merge agent TLS when appropriate, and adds tests covering self-signed and merge behaviors.

Changes

WebSocket TLS options support

Layer / File(s) Summary
TLS extraction helpers and agent rewiring
src/js/thirdparty/ws.js
Adds tlsBooleanKeys, tlsScalarKeys, tlsFileKeys, tlsValueKeys, agentTlsValueKeys and extractTlsOptions(source, valueKeys); rewires extractAgentOptions to use the helper for agent tls extraction.
BunWebSocket constructor TLS initialization
src/js/thirdparty/ws.js
Constructor treats options.tls as authoritative only when it's an object; otherwise derives tlsOptions from top-level TLS fields using extractTlsOptions(options).
Agent TLS merging with top-level options
src/js/thirdparty/ws.js
If options.tls was not an explicit object, merges agentOpts.tls into existing tlsOptions, with top-level TLS keys winning conflicts.
TLS validation tests
test/js/first_party/ws/ws-tls-options.test.ts
Adds a test suite that starts a self-signed TLS WebSocket server and verifies: top-level rejectUnauthorized: false allows connection; omission causes TLS handshake failure; agent connectOpts CA and top-level servername both apply; ALPNProtocols as string[] is accepted; explicit tls: {} prevents agent TLS from overriding.
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Check name Status Explanation
Title check ✅ Passed The title clearly and specifically describes the main change: forwarding top-level TLS options to the WebSocket connection, matching the core purpose of the PR.
Description check ✅ Passed The description provides comprehensive context including what was changed, how it was verified, and the reproduction case, though it uses a non-standard two-section format rather than the required template.
Linked Issues check ✅ Passed The PR fully addresses issue #31396 by implementing TLS option forwarding to allow connections to self-signed wss:// servers with top-level { rejectUnauthorized: false } option, with tests verifying the fix works.
Out of Scope Changes check ✅ Passed All changes are directly scoped to fixing TLS option forwarding in the ws shim and adding targeted tests; no unrelated modifications are present.

✏️ Tip: You can configure your own custom pre-merge checks in the settings.


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Comment thread src/js/thirdparty/ws.js Resolved
Comment thread src/js/thirdparty/ws.js Resolved
Comment thread src/js/thirdparty/ws.js Resolved

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Actionable comments posted: 1

🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.

Inline comments:
In `@src/js/thirdparty/ws.js`:
- Around line 193-194: The bug is that extractTlsOptions drops explicit falsy
TLS scalar values so keys like secureOptions, clientRenegotiationLimit,
clientRenegotiationWindow, and passphrase are lost when options.tls is absent;
update extractTlsOptions to copy a key when it exists on the source (e.g., using
Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(source, key) or key in source) instead of
checking truthiness, so tlsValueKeys are preserved; confirm tlsOptions
assignment (the code around extractTlsOptions, tlsValueKeys, options.tls,
tlsOptions and the merge { ...agentOpts.tls, ...tlsOptions }) will now allow
falsy values to override agentOpts.tls.
🪄 Autofix (Beta)

Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:

  • Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
  • Create a new PR with the fixes

ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration

Configuration used: Organization UI

Review profile: ASSERTIVE

Plan: Pro

Run ID: d9b435cf-6ae2-45fb-a46b-f996f579ad3e

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between ecc9ee5 and 3aaf125.

📒 Files selected for processing (2)
  • src/js/thirdparty/ws.js
  • test/js/first_party/ws/ws-tls-options.test.ts

Comment thread src/js/thirdparty/ws.js Resolved
Comment thread src/js/thirdparty/ws.js Resolved

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All earlier nits are addressed and I have nothing further — deferring only because the precedence rules around rejectUnauthorized / agent-vs-top-level merging are TLS-verification semantics that deserve a human sign-off.

Extended reasoning...

Overview

This PR changes src/js/thirdparty/ws.js (Bun's npm ws compat shim) to forward top-level TLS options (rejectUnauthorized, ca, cert, key, …) on the WebSocket client constructor into the native WebSocket's tls option, matching how the real npm ws package forwards them to https.request/tls.connect. It adds a key-whitelist extractor (extractTlsOptions) split into boolean/scalar/file buckets, an isForwardableFileValue guard for shapes SSLConfig.fromJS can't parse, and a merge step that combines agent-supplied TLS with top-level keys unless an explicit options.tls object was passed. A new test file (test/js/first_party/ws/ws-tls-options.test.ts, ~143 lines, 6 cases) covers the primary fix plus each edge case raised in review.

Security risks

The change directly governs when TLS certificate verification is enabled for a wss:// connection. The interesting surface is the precedence between three sources — explicit options.tls, extracted top-level keys, and agent.connectOpts — and specifically whether an agent's rejectUnauthorized: false (semantically aimed at the proxy hop) can leak into the target handshake. That leak existed in an intermediate commit and was fixed in 3aaf125 (guarded on !explicitTls) with a test asserting the agent's value cannot disable verification when tls: {} is passed. I don't see a remaining path that weakens verification relative to pre-PR behavior; the net effect is that users can now turn it off via the Node-canonical top-level option, which is the intended compat fix.

Level of scrutiny

Medium-high. The implementation is option plumbing in a JS shim (no native code touched), but it controls TLS verification and the merge/override rules took five review iterations to settle (agent merge vs replace, ALPNProtocols string[] throw, explicit-tls authoritativeness, falsy scalar preservation, key: [{pem,passphrase}] object-array throw). Each was addressed with a targeted regression test, and the bug-hunting pass on b390313 found nothing new. Still, the subtlety of the precedence semantics is exactly the kind of thing a maintainer should glance at rather than auto-merge.

Other factors

No CODEOWNERS entry for src/js/thirdparty/. The single CI failure (test/bundler/transpiler/transpiler.test.js on Windows) is unrelated to this change. All prior inline comments — mine and CodeRabbit's — are resolved. I have not previously posted a review body on this PR, only inline nits, so this deferral is not redundant.

@robobun

robobun commented May 25, 2026

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CI is green on every lane except windows-2019-x64-test-bun, which failed in isolation. The sibling Windows lane (windows-11-aarch64-test-bun) and all six Linux lanes (debian/ubuntu × x64/aarch64 + baselines) pass on this same commit (b390313).

This change is JS-only (src/js/thirdparty/ws.js + a TS test) with no platform-specific code paths, so a failure isolated to one of the two Windows lanes is unrelated flake rather than a real regression. The diff itself is green. Flagging for a maintainer to re-run that lane / merge.

@robobun
robobun force-pushed the farm/3cdf7917/ws-top-level-tls-options branch from b390313 to 64975c0 Compare May 27, 2026 13:48
@robobun

robobun commented May 27, 2026

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Rebased onto latest main and force-pushed.

The previous red on this PR was entirely the flaky Windows Bun.Transpiler...stack overflows tests in test/bundler/transpiler/transpiler.test.js — all three Windows lanes, with zero ws/TLS involvement. That test's fix landed on main in #31382 ("Deepen the lots-of-for-loop fixture so the transpiler stack-overflow tests throw on Windows"), but this branch was 21 commits behind and predated it. Rather than re-roll the same flake, I rebased so the branch picks up that fixture fix.

  • Rebase was conflict-free (this branch only touches src/js/thirdparty/ws.js + test/js/first_party/ws/ws-tls-options.test.ts; none of the incoming commits touch ws.js).
  • The ws TLS diff is unchanged (145 lines in ws.js, 143-line test).
  • Re-verified locally on the merged tree with a debug build: ws-tls-options.test.ts passes 6/6.

New CI run is in flight against the rebased tree.

Comment thread src/js/thirdparty/ws.js Resolved

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All six rounds of prior feedback are addressed and the test coverage is solid — I don't see anything left to flag, but since this is TLS-verification plumbing (precedence around rejectUnauthorized/ca between top-level, agent, and explicit tls), I'd like a human to sign off rather than auto-approve.

Extended reasoning...

Overview

This PR changes src/js/thirdparty/ws.js so Bun's ws shim forwards top-level TLS options (rejectUnauthorized, ca, cert, key, servername, …) to the native WebSocket's tls option, matching how npm ws forwards them to https.request/tls.connect. It adds ~120 lines of new logic: three key whitelists (tlsBooleanKeys, tlsScalarKeys, tlsFileKeys), an extractTlsOptions helper with per-bucket falsy-handling, an isForwardableFileValue/isRepresentableFileElement shape guard, and merge-precedence rules between top-level options, agent connectOpts, and an explicit Bun tls:{} object. A new 7-case test file exercises the happy path, the negative path, the agent-merge path, the explicit-override path, and three no-op→throw guards.

Security risks

The change is squarely in TLS-verification territory. It does not weaken any default — it forwards user-supplied options that were previously dropped — but the precedence logic determines whether rejectUnauthorized: false from one source (e.g. an agent's proxy-hop connectOpts) can leak into the target handshake. One of my earlier review rounds (3aaf125) caught and fixed exactly that leak, and the explicitTls guard plus the "keeps an explicit tls object authoritative" test now cover it. I don't see a remaining vector, but the consequence of a precedence mistake here is silently disabled certificate verification, which is why I'm not auto-approving.

Level of scrutiny

Medium-high. This is JS-only option plumbing (no native/crypto changes), but it took six review iterations to converge — each round surfaced a real edge (agent-vs-top-level shadowing, ALPNProtocols string[] throwing, explicit-tls override leak, falsy-scalar handling, {pem,passphrase} array and bare-object forms throwing). That history says the surface is subtle enough that a maintainer familiar with SSLConfig.fromJS and the agent/proxy semantics should give it a final read.

Other factors

All inline comments from me and CodeRabbit are resolved; the bug-hunting system found nothing on e57956c. Test coverage is good and each case maps to a specific review round. The robobun CI-status comment still references an older commit (64975c0) with a failure, so the latest commit's CI state isn't visible in the thread yet — worth confirming green before merge. No CODEOWNERS entry covers this path.

@robobun
robobun force-pushed the farm/3cdf7917/ws-top-level-tls-options branch from e57956c to 2111ced Compare June 21, 2026 04:07
@robobun

robobun commented Jun 21, 2026

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Rebased onto latest main and force-pushed to clear the merge conflicts.

The only conflicts were in src/js/thirdparty/ws.js, from #32522 ("lint(src/js): flag duplicate property reads between an if condition and its body"), which refactored the same regions my commits touch:

The ws TLS diff is otherwise unchanged. Verified on the rebased tree: ws-tls-options.test.ts passes 7/7, ws-proxy.test.ts at its baseline (16 pass, 3 pre-existing unrelated failures), and audited the new code against the new oxlint rule (my if conditions read only locals or computed source[key], neither of which the rule flags).

@robobun

robobun commented Jun 21, 2026

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The only red on the latest run (build 63719, sha 2111ced) is the Lint JavaScript GitHub Actions job, which failed with:

$ oxlint --config=oxlint.json --format=github src/js
/usr/bin/bash: line 1: oxlint: command not found
error: script "lint" exited with code 127

That's a runner-provisioning hiccup (the oxlint binary wasn't on PATH), not a lint violation in this diff. Unrelated PR #32549 hit the identical oxlint: command not found failure in the same ~2-minute window; PRs that ran at other times passed lint. All BuildKite test lanes that have completed are green (windows-11-aarch64, debian-13-x64-asan, musl builds), with zero test failures.

The ws TLS code is lint-clean (its if conditions read only locals or computed source[key], neither of which the new bun/no-duplicate-conditional-property-access rule flags). Re-running the Lint JavaScript job once oxlint is provisioned should clear it. Flagging for a maintainer since a re-run needs a human / infra, not a code change.

@Luligu

Luligu commented Aug 28, 2026 •

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Hello,
any news on this fix ?

Any code for Node.js running with bun runtime and using wss silently fails!

@robobun

robobun commented Aug 28, 2026

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Status: the fix is complete and tested. The shim now forwards the top-level TLS options (rejectUnauthorized, ca, cert, key, ...) to the connection, with seven tests covering the main path and the edge cases from review. All review feedback is addressed and the full test suite passed on every CI platform on the last run. The remaining step is a maintainer sign-off, since this touches TLS verification semantics.

main has moved since the last push, so I am rebasing the branch now to keep it mergeable.

Until it lands, two workarounds exist on current Bun releases:

  1. Pass the options under Bun's tls key, which the shim already honors:
    new WebSocket("wss://localhost:8443", { tls: { rejectUnauthorized: false } });
  2. Or set NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 in the environment (disables verification process-wide, so prefer option 1).

@Luligu

Luligu commented Aug 28, 2026

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Status: the fix is complete and tested. The shim now forwards the top-level TLS options (rejectUnauthorized, ca, cert, key, ...) to the connection, with seven tests covering the main path and the edge cases from review. All review feedback is addressed and the full test suite passed on every CI platform on the last run. The remaining step is a maintainer sign-off, since this touches TLS verification semantics.

main has moved since the last push, so I am rebasing the branch now to keep it mergeable.

Until it lands, two workarounds exist on current Bun releases:

  1. Pass the options under Bun's tls key, which the shim already honors:
    new WebSocket("wss://localhost:8443", { tls: { rejectUnauthorized: false } });
  2. Or set NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 in the environment (disables verification process-wide, so prefer option 1).

I'm well aware of this trick thanks.

Hope this will be fixed asap.

Comment thread src/js/thirdparty/ws.js Resolved
Comment thread src/js/thirdparty/ws.js Resolved
Comment thread src/js/thirdparty/ws.js Resolved
Comment thread src/js/thirdparty/ws.js Resolved
Comment thread src/js/thirdparty/ws.js Resolved
Comment thread src/js/thirdparty/ws.js Resolved
Comment thread src/js/thirdparty/ws.js Resolved
Comment thread src/js/thirdparty/ws.js Resolved
Comment thread src/js/thirdparty/ws.js Resolved
Comment thread src/js/thirdparty/ws.js Resolved

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Re-reviewed after 3d97664. No new issues found; since this changes how rejectUnauthorized and other TLS-verification options are collected and merged, a human look is still worthwhile.

Checked in this pass:

  • extractTlsOptions now gates every key on ObjectPrototypeHasOwnProperty.$call and builds both the result and the agent-merge object with __proto__: null, so a polluted Object.prototype.rejectUnauthorized no longer reaches the native TLS config.
  • The reworked helper uses $isJSArray/$isTypedArrayView and module-load-captured ArrayBuffer.isView/Blob/ArrayBuffer; the table-driven tlsKeyKinds lookup replaced the Array#includes hot-path call.
  • crl, ecdhCurve, sigalgs, and allowPartialTrustChain are now in the forwarded key set, matching what SSLConfig.fromJS accepts.
  • extractAgentOptions reusing the same helper tightens the agent path from prototype-chain destructuring to own-property reads — stricter than base, which fails closed.
Extended reasoning...

Overview

This PR makes Bun's ws third-party shim honor top-level TLS options on the WebSocket constructor (rejectUnauthorized, ca, cert, key, …), matching the npm ws package. The change adds a table-driven extractTlsOptions() helper in src/js/thirdparty/ws.js that reads a fixed set of keys off the options object, classifies them (bool/scalar/file), filters shapes the native SSLConfig.fromJS parser would reject, and merges the result with agent-supplied TLS options. extractAgentOptions() is refactored to reuse the same helper. A new test file exercises the accept/reject/merge/skip paths against a self-signed Bun.serve({ tls }).

Since the prior review, the branch was squashed to a single commit (3d97664) that reworked the helper: it now captures Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty, ArrayBuffer.isView, ArrayBuffer, and Blob at module load; gates every read on an own-property check; builds the result and the agent-merge spread with { __proto__: null }; switched Array.isArray → $isJSArray and added $isTypedArrayView; replaced the Array#includes classification with a { __proto__: null } kind table; and added the four previously-missing SSLConfig keys (crl, ecdhCurve, sigalgs, allowPartialTrustChain).

Security risks

The change directly governs whether TLS certificate verification runs for wss:// connections created via the ws shim. The primary risk in earlier revisions — a polluted Object.prototype.rejectUnauthorized = false flowing through the new prototype-chain read into every socket — is closed by the own-property guard and null-prototype containers. The precedence rule (an explicit options.tls blocks agent TLS from merging, so an agent's proxy-hop rejectUnauthorized: false cannot weaken target verification) is preserved and now covered by a test. The remaining options.tls read itself still walks the prototype chain, but that behavior is unchanged from the base branch and not widened by this PR. The instanceof NativeBlob/NativeArrayBuffer checks are still Symbol.hasInstance-tamperable in principle, but they gate only whether a file-shaped value is forwarded; a false result is a no-op and a false positive causes SSLConfig.fromJS to throw — both fail closed rather than weakening verification.

Level of scrutiny

High. REVIEW.md explicitly names rejectUnauthorized as the canonical example of a security flag requiring prototype-pollution-safe own-property lookups, and this PR is precisely about plumbing that flag through a new code path in a builtin module. The approval guidelines exclude security-sensitive code (auth, crypto, permissions) from auto-approval; TLS certificate verification is squarely in that category, so this defers to a human even with a clean re-run.

Other factors

The bug hunt exited on dry_streak with no new findings on the reworked code. Three of the four concerns raised in the previous review round are reflected in the current diff; the one remaining item (the agent-merge test's servername: "localhost" not being independently load-bearing, since it matches the URL hostname) was flagged as an optional nit and is already visible on the PR. There are open github-actions[bot] inline comments from before the squash; the subsequent commit plausibly addresses them and they are not human-reviewer objections.

@robobun
robobun force-pushed the farm/3cdf7917/ws-top-level-tls-options branch from 3d97664 to 62dd9bd Compare September 8, 2026 00:51
Comment thread src/js/thirdparty/ws.js Resolved

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Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.

The latest push brings back an issue flagged in an earlier review; replied in that comment's thread.

@robobun
robobun force-pushed the farm/3cdf7917/ws-top-level-tls-options branch from 62dd9bd to 837b823 Compare September 8, 2026 01:25

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Nothing blocking. The comments below are optional suggestions. There is no need to push a fix for them before merging.

…e connection

The npm ws package accepts TLS options as top-level options on the
WebSocket constructor and forwards them to https.request/tls.connect:

  new WebSocket("wss://localhost:8443", { rejectUnauthorized: false });

Bun's ws shim only read TLS options from options.tls, so top-level keys
were silently dropped and connecting to a self-signed wss:// server
failed with "TLS handshake failed".

Collect the TLS keys the native WebSocket understands (the set
SSLConfig.fromJS parses) off the top-level options when no explicit
options.tls object is given. An explicit options.tls stays a hard
override. Agent connect options merge underneath the top-level keys
instead of being dropped wholesale.

Shapes the native parser cannot represent stay a no-op rather than
becoming a constructor throw: a string[] ALPNProtocols, and the
{ pem, passphrase } object form of key/cert (bare or in an array).
Explicit falsy scalars (passphrase: "", secureOptions: 0) are
preserved, while an empty file/identity value (ca: "") is treated as
absent since the native parser would otherwise see a real empty CA set.
@robobun
robobun force-pushed the farm/3cdf7917/ws-top-level-tls-options branch from 837b823 to 0ca973b Compare September 8, 2026 02:14

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The latest push addresses the last open nit — the tamper-resistance test now passes Buffer.from(tls.key) so ArrayBufferIsView is actually exercised, and the dead Array.prototype.includes clobber is gone. I have nothing further; a human look is still worthwhile since this changes how rejectUnauthorized reaches the TLS layer.

What was reviewed:

  • extractTlsOptions reads own properties only via captured hasOwnProperty.$call and returns { __proto__: null } — a polluted Object.prototype.rejectUnauthorized cannot flow through (covered by the subprocess test).
  • Explicit options.tls stays a hard override; agent connectOpts cannot leak rejectUnauthorized: false into it (guarded by !explicitTls, tested).
  • Merge order { ...agentTls, ...tlsOptions } lets top-level keys win on conflict; the object-form key/cert and array ALPNProtocols are skipped rather than forwarded into a constructor throw.
  • Key list now includes crl/sigalgs/ecdhCurve/allowPartialTrustChain; globals (ArrayBuffer.isView, Blob, ArrayBuffer) are captured at module load.
Extended reasoning...

Overview

This PR modifies src/js/thirdparty/ws.js to forward top-level TLS options (rejectUnauthorized, ca, cert, key, etc.) from the ws WebSocket constructor's options object into Bun's native WebSocket TLS config, matching upstream ws behavior. It adds a table-driven extractTlsOptions() helper that whitelists exactly the keys SSLConfig.fromJS parses, categorized by copy semantics (bool/scalar/file), and refactors extractAgentOptions() to share it. A new test file with 9 tests covers the positive path, the negative (still rejects without the flag), agent+top-level merge, conflict precedence, unrepresentable value shapes staying no-ops, prototype-pollution safety, and tamper resistance.

Security risks

The primary risk surface is rejectUnauthorized — a bug here could silently disable TLS certificate verification. Across five review iterations the following were raised and addressed: prototype pollution (now own-property reads via captured hasOwnProperty.$call, { __proto__: null } result and merge objects); agent rejectUnauthorized: false leaking into an explicit tls: {} (now blocked by the !explicitTls guard with a dedicated test); top-level keys shadowing agent-supplied ca/cert (now merged with top-level winning on conflict, tested both ways); and previously-ignored option shapes (ALPNProtocols: string[], key: {pem, passphrase}) turning into constructor throws (now filtered by isForwardableFileValue). Globals used in type checks are captured at module load and $-intrinsics replace user-overridable machinery. The default remains fail-closed: absent an own rejectUnauthorized property, verification stays on.

Level of scrutiny

High. This is TLS verification plumbing in a builtin module — REVIEW.md explicitly calls out rejectUnauthorized as requiring prototype-pollution-safe own-property lookups and fail-closed semantics, and the approval guidelines exclude security-sensitive code paths from bot approval. The change is well-scoped (pure JS option marshalling, no native changes) and now thoroughly tested, but the consequence of a subtle mistake is silent MITM exposure, so a maintainer should sign off.

Other factors

This is the fifth review pass; every prior finding has a corresponding fix and test in the current diff. The final commit (0ca973b) addressed the last open nit by making the tamper-resistance test non-vacuous (Buffer inputs reach ArrayBufferIsView; the irrelevant .includes clobber was dropped). No human CHANGES_REQUESTED review is outstanding. The remaining unresolved github-actions[bot] inline comments are automated and their content is not visible to me; they do not block but a human may want to glance at them.

@Jarred-Sumner

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Superseded by #44618, which consolidates the open TLS pull requests. This fix and its tests are in there, either as written, rewritten smaller, or merged with the other PRs that patched the same cause (see the "By area" list in that PR). Closing in favor of it.

Jarred-Sumner added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 6, 2026
…, #42325)

npm ws gives every constructor option to https.request(), so ca,
rejectUnauthorized, cert, key, pfx or minVersion are written at the top level or
on the agent. The shim read TLS options only from the Bun-only `tls` option and
five keys of the agent, and dropped the rest without an error: a private CA was
not trusted, a client certificate in a pfx was not sent, a minVersion was not
enforced.

Merge the top-level options with the agent's the way http.Agent does, so the
agent wins (measured on Node v26.3.0 with ws 8.18.3), and translate the result
with nodeClientTlsToNative(). An explicit `tls` option still replaces both, and
its pfx is unsealed too.
Jarred-Sumner added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 6, 2026
…bSocket (#31397, #41648)

The ws shim forwards these three options; the native client honours them since
the WebSocket server-identity change.
Jarred-Sumner added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 7, 2026
…, #42325)

npm ws gives every constructor option to https.request(), so ca,
rejectUnauthorized, cert, key, pfx or minVersion are written at the top level or
on the agent. The shim read TLS options only from the Bun-only `tls` option and
five keys of the agent, and dropped the rest without an error: a private CA was
not trusted, a client certificate in a pfx was not sent, a minVersion was not
enforced.

Merge the top-level options with the agent's the way http.Agent does, so the
agent wins (measured on Node v26.3.0 with ws 8.18.3), and translate the result
with nodeClientTlsToNative(). An explicit `tls` option still replaces both, and
its pfx is unsealed too.
Jarred-Sumner added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 7, 2026
…bSocket (#31397, #41648)

The ws shim forwards these three options; the native client honours them since
the WebSocket server-identity change.
Jarred-Sumner added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 8, 2026
…, #42325)

npm ws gives every constructor option to https.request(), so ca,
rejectUnauthorized, cert, key, pfx or minVersion are written at the top level or
on the agent. The shim read TLS options only from the Bun-only `tls` option and
five keys of the agent, and dropped the rest without an error: a private CA was
not trusted, a client certificate in a pfx was not sent, a minVersion was not
enforced.

Merge the top-level options with the agent's the way http.Agent does, so the
agent wins (measured on Node v26.3.0 with ws 8.18.3), and translate the result
with nodeClientTlsToNative(). An explicit `tls` option still replaces both, and
its pfx is unsealed too.
Jarred-Sumner added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 8, 2026
…bSocket (#31397, #41648)

The ws shim forwards these three options; the native client honours them since
the WebSocket server-identity change.
Jarred-Sumner added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 10, 2026
…, #42325)

npm ws gives every constructor option to https.request(), so ca,
rejectUnauthorized, cert, key, pfx or minVersion are written at the top level or
on the agent. The shim read TLS options only from the Bun-only `tls` option and
five keys of the agent, and dropped the rest without an error: a private CA was
not trusted, a client certificate in a pfx was not sent, a minVersion was not
enforced.

Merge the top-level options with the agent's the way http.Agent does, so the
agent wins (measured on Node v26.3.0 with ws 8.18.3), and translate the result
with nodeClientTlsToNative(). An explicit `tls` option still replaces both, and
its pfx is unsealed too.
Jarred-Sumner added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 10, 2026
…bSocket (#31397, #41648)

The ws shim forwards these three options; the native client honours them since
the WebSocket server-identity change.
Jarred-Sumner added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 10, 2026
…ps, WebSocket, SQL) (#44618)

### What does this PR do?

Consolidates the open TLS pull requests into one. Each was reproduced on
`main` and, for `node:*` behavior, on Node v26.3.0 first. About a third
are ported as written, the rest are rewritten smaller or merged into one
fix where several PRs patched the same cause. One commit per fix, so it
can be read commit by commit.

Fixes #43520, fixes #31396, fixes #43635, fixes #37193, fixes #43846,
fixes #17932, fixes #41061, fixes #36887, fixes #31810, fixes #35240,
fixes #32234, fixes #44365, fixes #43807, fixes #42280, fixes #44517.
Addresses #41856 (SNI and `servername`; not `checkServerIdentity` for
SQL), #24845 (the spin is gone, shown with fault injection on Linux; not
run on macOS), #19754 (node-fetch forwards the agent's TLS options; the
Kubernetes client itself was not run).

#### The ones that matter most

| | On `main` | PRs |
|---|---|---|
| Client certificate disclosure | `https.request()` with a client
certificate sends it to a server it then refuses (wrong name,
`checkServerIdentity`, `destroy()` in `'secureConnect'`, `terminate()`
in `handshake`). A server can force it with a junk record behind its
Finished | #43946 |
| False `authorized` | Over a Duplex, `secureConnect` with `authorized
=== true` for a peer that failed the key proof; `secureConnect` for a
plaintext peer with `rejectUnauthorized: false` | #44422, #32929 |
| Cleartext https | `https.createServer()` without a usable key/cert
answers plain HTTP | #41672, #33539 |
| Revoked client certificates | An https mTLS server never sees `crl`,
so a revoked client is `authorized` | #41641 |
| Pooled sockets | Requests with different client certificates or CAs
share an `https.Agent` socket and session | #42498 |
| Silent plaintext | `tls: [...]` given to `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`
is plain TCP | #41490 |
| Server weakened by a client knob | `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`
turns off a server's client-certificate enforcement | #35245 |
| Pins never checked | `WebSocket` never calls `tls.checkServerIdentity`
and ignores `tls.serverName` | #41648 |
| `verify-full` dropped | `PGSSLMODE=verify-*` is lost next to a `TLS_*`
URL variable; `tls: true` sends no SNI | #44498 |
| Crashes | use-after-free from `destroy()` in `ALPNCallback` over a
Duplex; `abort()` on a late `setSession()`; SIGABRT in `fetch` with an
https proxy from the environment and a `Bun.file()` body | #44462,
#41671, #44458 |
| Stream corruption | A TLS `write()` can lose 16 KiB it reported as
written while another socket on the loop is stalled | #44529 |
| Hangs and spins | 100% CPU on a failing `send()`; a fatal `SSL_write`
leaves the socket open forever; `idleTimeout` never sheds a TLS client
that ignores `close_notify` | #34510, #38176, #42336 |
| Wrong certificate (regression since 1.3.14) | Connections accepted
before `stop()` / `close()` get the default certificate and skip their
entry's `requestCert` / `ca` | #42355 |
| Quadratic Duplex / proxy tunnel | Reading one chunk over a Duplex,
CPU: 8 MB 0.88 s → 0.14 s, 16 MB 3.18 s → 0.23 s, 32 MB 11.75 s → 0.39
s; `fetch` upload through CONNECT: 1.7 s → 0.18 s (debug build) | #44464
|

#### By area

- **fd engine, write path** (`openssl.c`, `socket.c`): #42352, #34510 +
#38176 + #42336 as one change, #44529, #44458, #44192. A rejected
`send()` ends the write side only and closes at the next writable event
unless the peer's bytes are still queued (a 413 sent before a reset is
still read). No new per-socket state. Also, on kqueue, **a FIN no longer
ends a socket that waits in the low-priority queue** (`loop.c`): with
more than 5 TLS handshakes at once, a client that ended right after its
handshake could be reset and its server socket report `socket hang up`,
because the eof that the sentinel read knote reports was acted on ahead
of the unread Finished. That is on `main` too (the macOS entry for
`node-tls-server.test.ts` in `test/flaky-tests.txt`: 7 of 48 recent
builds of other branches), and this branch made it likelier (6 of 8
builds), since Finished now leaves in one segment with the close_notify.
- **Error reporting, both engines**: #44422, #32929, #44516, #37094,
#41272 + #42324 + #44223 as one change, #44021, #37472, #43946, #33630.
One channel: a fatal error on an established session is reported, then
**the engine closes the connection itself**, whatever the owner does
with the report. `test/js/bun/net/tls-fatal-error-closes.test.ts`
asserts closed-and-nothing-delivered for every owner (node:tls,
`Bun.connect`, `Bun.listen`, `fetch` direct and through CONNECT,
`Bun.serve`, `WebSocket` direct and through a proxy, Postgres, MySQL,
Valkey, Duplex).
- **Duplex engine** (`SSLWrapper`, `UpgradedDuplex`): #44462, #43529,
#42332, #44464. #43877 + #44394 were in and are **out again**, see
"Worth a look" 5.
- **node:tls wrap lifecycle** (`net.ts`, `tls.ts`): #38007, #38058,
#38028 + #38122 + #38076 as one change (six copies of the attach code
become two helpers), #38311, #39008, #38154, #42340 + #42343 + #42339 +
#42453 as one change, #43791, #42425, #44085, #42683, #39088, #39040,
#40375, and what was still real of #36534.
- **SNI, ALPN, server contexts**: #43080, #42050, #37195 + #43849 as one
change (**one** SNI matcher for TCP and HTTP/3), #42355, #42285, #33253,
part of #37896, part of #37013. A `tls.Server` has one `SSL_CTX`.
- **Verification and options**: #44738, #41490, #37005 + the cwd pin of
#40984, #31811, #43982, #33483 + #35245, #41810, #32235, #44441, #38092.
- **node:tls API and CA store**: #41671, #38145, #32824, #43594, #39997,
#41696, #33534, #34748, #42991, #42996, #42970.
- **node:https, Agent, `ws`, node-fetch**: #41672 (https half), #41641,
#38261, #42498, #44346, #35609, #31397, #42325.
- **WebSocket client**: #41648, #37487 + #43048 as one change.
- **SQL, Redis**: #33666, #41711, #44498, part of #42054.
- **Tests only**: #41426, #40040, #44395, #44016, #37860, #40591,
#44440, #41424.

Found on the way and fixed here: an upload that a TLS 1.2 server
interrupts with a renegotiation never completes on `main` (0 of 32 runs
over `https.request`, `fetch`, `node:tls` and `Bun.connect`: the
renegotiation ClientHello lands inside an application record that is
still unsent, or the socket gets no `drain` again) and completes here,
with two tests from robobun; the fix for #40653 (final flight and first
write in one segment) stopped working whenever another TLS socket on the
loop was stalled, on `main` too; the `tls.Server` prototype pinned the
last server constructed and every `SSL_CTX` it owned;
`Object.create(process.env).NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"` turned
verification off process-wide once a `SHARE_ENV` worker existed; two
debug panics when wrapping a shut-down or still-connecting socket; a
`fetch` POST through a proxy sent its headers twice when the origin
renegotiated; `BlockList` ignored IPv6 zone ids; a test now ties
`root_certs.der` to `certdata.txt`.

#### Behavior changes

- **A server's `ca` without `requestCert` no longer asks for a client
certificate** (`Bun.serve`, `Bun.listen`, HTTP/3, node:tls). It matches
the docs and Node. On `main` such a server refused clients with no
certificate but served any unrelated self-signed one, so it was never
authentication. **Set `requestCert: true` to require a certificate.** A
matrix test pins that `requestCert: true` still refuses no certificate
and an untrusted one on 8 kinds of server, TLS 1.2 and 1.3, with
`NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` unset and `0`.
- `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0` no longer relaxes a server.
- `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` hear of a fatal TLS error after the
handshake through `error(socket, err)`. With no `error` handler the
socket just closes.
- HTTP/3 server names match like TCP: `*.` covers exactly one label,
case is ignored, a trailing dot is ignored, the last registration of a
name wins.
- `requestCert` on node:https is `=== true`, as in Node.
- An array where a generated options dictionary is expected throws
(`tls: []`, `jest.useFakeTimers([])`).
- `key` / `cert` arrays serve every identity. A client that can use both
gets ECDSA, where `main` served whichever pair came last.
- `ecdhCurve` is forwarded by node:https, `ws` and node-fetch now, so a
group BoringSSL lacks (`X448`) throws there as it already does in
`tls.createServer`.
- A wrapped socket's error is re-emitted on the TLS socket as in Node,
so `raw.destroy(err)` with a listener on `raw` only is uncaught, as in
Node.
- `sql.options.tls` is always an object, never `true`. `RedisClient`
sends SNI.
- `tls: { secureContext }` alone asks for TLS on `Bun.listen` /
`Bun.connect` (it was plain TCP), and a value that is not a
`SecureContext` throws. The context is served as it is: the
`requestCert` / `rejectUnauthorized` it was created with hold whatever
the options next to it say, and `requestCert` in the options over a
context that does not ask throws at `listen()`.
- `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` reaches every client once assigned (`fetch`,
`WebSocket`, `Bun.connect`, `RedisClient`, `Bun.SQL`, `S3Client`, proxy
tunnels) and servers again. A list that selects no cipher throws
`ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_MATCH` at the assignment. `fetch.preconnect()` dials
nothing after an assignment.
- The warning for an unreadable `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` is Node's one
line, without the `warn:` prefix.
- `BUN_CONFIG_WS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT` (default 30 s): how long a `WebSocket`
client waits for the server to close the connection after the closing
handshake.

#### Worth a look in review

1. **#44529**: the kernel-refused remainder of a TLS write moves from
the loop's one slot onto the connection (in the existing rare struct),
so the write BIO never refuses a sealed record. Nothing is allocated on
an unstalled path (200 writes: 0 appends, same `send()` count as
`main`), memory with 16 stalled writers is lower than on `main` (276 KB
vs 340 KB, which `main` holds inside BoringSSL's buffers), `us_socket_t`
stays 80 bytes. It needs a bound on how long a deferred close waits, or
a peer that stops reading pins the fd past `destroy()`:
`US_SSL_CLOSE_AFTER_SPILL_TIMEOUT` is a fixed 10 s, not re-armed on
progress. Separate commits, but the fix that keeps the client
certificate off the wire beside a stalled socket builds on them.
2. **The default name check of node:tls also runs inside the
handshake**, so a wrong-name server gets no client certificate on TLS
1.2 either. JS still runs it after every successful handshake, so a
difference between the two matchers can only refuse. Error objects are
byte-identical.
3. **#44441** widens trust by design: a self-issued leaf whose
`keyUsage` lacks `keyCertSign` (`dotnet dev-certs`) is its own anchor
when the store holds a byte-identical copy. No BoringSSL change. Expired
pin, same subject with another key, wrong EKU and a pinned intermediate
are tested to fail.
4. **#32235** only adds Ed25519 and ECDSA P-521 to the verify list. A
captured ClientHello shows `main`'s list with the two inserted;
`rsa_pkcs1_sha1` stays.

5. **A stream that a TLS socket wraps, when that TLS socket closes.** An
earlier state of this branch lost data here while CI was green (found by
#44709's report): with the peer closing first, 4 of 8 MiB arrived with
TLS in TLS, 4 of 32 MiB on the http2 `emit("connection")` path, and a
`write()` with no `'error'` listener ended the process. Three
Node-parity changes only hold together: destroying the wrapped stream at
the close (#38028 + #38122 + #38076, #38154) is safe only if every write
has really completed (#43877), which in turn needs Node's handling of
the peer's close_notify, which needs half-open sockets that the GC can
collect. So:
- #43877 + #44394 are reverted and reopened. A write over a stream
completes once the stream has taken the ciphertext, as on `main`.
- Until the verdict on the peer lets the session through, the
application cannot have written over it. There the wrapped stream is
destroyed as in Node, with the sessions below it. That keeps the release
of the connection after a failed handshake, a rejected certificate and
an early `destroy()`. The same for an http2 socket the application never
got, and for `resetAndDestroy()`.
- After that it is `main`'s teardown: a `net.Socket` only gets the
engine's `end()`, closes at its peer's FIN, keeps its own timeout and
reports its own errors. Any other stream is destroyed with the TLS
socket.

The regular suites cannot see any of this (999 files were green on every
broken variant), so it was steered by eleven seeded differential fuzzers
run on this build, `main`, Node v26.3.0 and the earlier state: close,
`end()`, `destroy()`, `destroySoon()`, resets, hung and half-open peers,
paused writers, timeouts, two and three sessions deep, over TCP and over
Duplexes, before, at and after the handshake, and http2 requests. See
"How did you verify".

#### Known limits

- `fetch` with a `checkServerIdentity` function still sends the client
certificate (not the request) to a server the function refuses. On TLS
1.2 any verdict a JS callback gives is too late, as in Node.
- `addContext()` / `SNICallback` still do not apply to a server-side
socket on the stream engine (`emit("connection", duplex)`, TLS in TLS,
unflushed writes, named pipes), as on `main`.
- A CA bundled in a pfx extends an explicit `ca` only, for `ws` /
node-fetch / `WebSocket`: the native `ca` can only replace the default
store, and that store keeps `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR`.
- P-521 leaves work on TLS 1.3 only. TLS 1.2 needs secp521r1 in every
ClientHello (`it.todo`).
- Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch(url, { protocol:
"http3" })` is `HTTP3Unsupported`, as with an explicit `ciphers`.
- `addCACert()` by hand does not extend the chains of a context with
several identities.
- A throwing `ALPNCallback` sends `no_application_protocol` on both
engines. Node sends nothing and its client sees `ECONNRESET`.
- TLS in TLS, peer FIN while the outer handshake runs: the inner socket
gets one `write EPIPE`, where Node gives `ECONNRESET` (`main` gives it
no error at all).
- `@SECLEVEL` in `ciphers` is dropped by the `ws` / node-fetch shims,
which used to ignore `ciphers`. node:tls keeps throwing
`ERR_SSL_INVALID_COMMAND`.
- Beside a stalled TLS socket only the first record (16 KiB) of the
first write leaves with the handshake flight. The rest goes record by
record, which is what bounds the memory of stalled writers.
- After a fatal error on an established session the socket emits
`'error'` and then `'close'`. Node emits `'error'` and leaves the socket
open.
- A paused reader whose own write the kernel rejects loses what it had
not read yet, with an `EPIPE`, as on Node. `main` reports no error there
and delivers it.
- On `main` too: a `Bun.listen` socket without `allowHalfOpen` that has
unsent ciphertext when the client's `shutdown()` arrives loses that
ciphertext (32 KiB), and over plain TCP `end()` with the peer still
sending is a close over unread input, so a reset.
- Differences from both `main` and Node that the differential runs below
found and that stay, all with a peer that aborts: `ECONNRESET` instead
of a clean `'end'` after the socket's own `'finish'` when the peer
destroyed with unread data; under TLS 1.2, a zero-length `write()`
followed by `destroy()` in `'secureConnection'` leaves the client
without `'secureConnect'` (a plain `destroy()` there matches Node); a
TLS 1.2 client that destroys in `'secureConnect'` gets no `'session'`; a
`ClientRequest` whose handshake fails with an alert emits `'error'` and
`'close'` but no `'finish'` (`writableFinished` is true).
- Once `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS` is assigned, `fetch.preconnect()` opens
nothing: `fetch()` then uses a context of its own, and a socket warmed
under the default one would never be picked up.
- A TLS `send()` that the kernel refuses outside a `write()` call (the
drain of unsent ciphertext) is reported with the close, as `read EPIPE`
/ `read ECONNRESET`. Node says `write EPIPE`. `main` does not report it
at all.
- Once the application has a session over a `net.Socket` (TLS in TLS,
http2 `emit("connection")`), a peer that never sends its FIN holds that
socket after the TLS socket closed, as on `main`. Node destroys it. Two
tests of #38154 are `todo` for this. Closing it any earlier (at its
`'finish'`, say) makes the kernel drop what it has not sent yet as soon
as the peer's close_notify arrives.
- Plaintext that was queued on a socket before it was wrapped (STARTTLS
with a backlog) is dropped when the TLS socket is destroyed, or its
handshake fails, before the session is accepted. Node drops it too,
except on `destroySoon()`. `main` sends it.
- Over a stream that is no `net.Socket`, `end()` can still cut what that
stream has buffered, and there is no backpressure, both as on `main`
(#43877).
- `tls.secureContext` (the undocumented door node:tls uses) is not read
by a Windows named pipe listener, which builds its context from the
options. On `upgradeTLS({ isServer: true })` the options next to it are
the policy, as with Node's `SetVerifyMode`.
- `selectServerName()` rebuilds the name tree per ClientHello for
injected sockets of a server with `addContext()` entries: 0.4 µs for 1
entry, 3.7 µs for 10, 41 µs for 100, against 631–1111 µs for a
handshake.

#### Not included

Left open, because they need a decision or are not TLS: #43877 + #44394
(see "Worth a look" 5; #43874 stays open with them), #38548, #38591
(both shrink who is trusted), #41589 (`verify-full` vs
`NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`), #37197, #41706, #43216, #33487,
#33545, #36707, #32435, #37255, #28691, #40275, #30314 (features),
#38120 (needs the BoringSSL fork, as did #33517, which the stale bot has
closed since), #38529 (needs a Windows measurement), #34342, #38232,
#43089, #44454, #40451, #42710, #44527, #38088, #38093, #41898. #37896,
#42054 and #37013 stay open for the halves not taken.
`http.createServer({ key, cert })` keeps serving TLS on purpose.

One open question: `tls: {}` (an object that names no TLS option) is
plain TCP on `Bun.listen` / `Bun.connect`, here and on `main`. It is the
same trap as `tls: []`, but changing it changes a Bun default, so it is
left alone.

### How did you verify your code works?

- Every new test fails on `main` for the stated reason and passes here,
except guards that pin existing behavior, each shown to fail when its
clause is removed. `node:*` tests also pass on Node v26.3.0; the few
that cannot say which Node version has the behavior.
- 212 test files that touch TLS, sockets, http, http2, fetch, WebSocket,
SQL, Valkey and workers: 6154 pass, 2 fail. Both are seen on `main` too:
`serve.test.ts` "root range port" (the box runs as root), and
`worker_threads.test.ts` "terminate(): nothing of the worker's runs
after the request", which is flaky there and passed in the run below.
- 58 of those files the way the ASAN lane runs them (LeakSanitizer +
`BUN_JSC_validateExceptionChecks`): 58 files, 48 of them with leak
checking, 4132 pass, 3 fail. All three also fail on `main`:
`serve.test.ts` "root range port", `node-net.test.ts` "should not leak
when connect({path}) fails synchronously on a reused handle" (times out
under this environment), `worker_threads.test.ts` "process.exit() with a
shell cp in flight" (a `ShellCpTask` leak).
- 647 vendored `test-tls-*`, `test-https-*`, `test-net-*`,
`test-http2-*`: the only two failures also fail on `main`.
- The SNI matcher was diffed against both old matchers: 3 seeds × 1.23 M
lookups × 3 registration flavours, every difference in one of the
intended classes, TCP and HTTP/3 identical on every lookup.
- The headline rows were also driven by hand with scripts against this
build, `main` and Node v26.3.0: cleartext https, `crl`, `tls: []` / `{
secureContext }`, the `ca` / `requestCert` matrix, the client
certificate on a wrong-name server, late `setSession()`, `destroy()` in
`ALPNCallback`, `[rsa, ec]` identities with an intermediate from `ca`,
`WebSocket` `checkServerIdentity`, a corrupted record, the Duplex read
above, `tls.DEFAULT_CIPHERS`.
- The `setSession()` guard was checked against the real `abort()` at 43
handshake states.
- `bun run rust:check-all`: 12 of 12 targets. `tsc`, oxlint, source
lints, prettier, rustfmt, mordant clean.
- usockets' `_Nonnull` is compiled out of debug builds, so 105 of those
files were also run on a local release ASAN build with the CI runner's
environment (92 with leak checking): 4595 pass, 1 fail,
`child_process.test.ts` "spawn reports EPERM after dropping privileges",
which cannot pass as root and fails on `main` too.
- The close of a TLS socket over another stream ("Worth a look" 5):
eleven seeded differential fuzzers, 8,424 scenarios compared, each run
on a release ASAN build of this branch, on `main`, on Node v26.3.0 and
on the earlier state of the branch. Against `main`:
- Data that `main` delivers in full is cut in 5 scenarios, and about 150
that `main` cuts arrive in full. Of the 5, in 2 `main` never notices the
peer's close and keeps the socket for good, 2 call `end()` on the middle
one of three sessions over an in-memory Duplex, and 1 does the same on
Node.
- No dead timeout, no silent reset and no uncaught error that `main`
does not have (4 uncaught errors fewer).
- A socket stays open where `main` closes it in 109, and closes where
`main` keeps it in 295. 92 of the 109 do the same on Node or on the
earlier state (a `destroy()` that an in-memory Duplex does not show its
peer, half-open peers). 14 wait for a peer that paused reading and so
does not read the FIN (#42332's backpressure, as in Node); the socket's
own timeout fires there. 3 are left: one on a 5 ms timer, two with three
sessions over an in-memory Duplex.
- The earlier state of the branch cut data in 173 of the 400 scenarios
of one of them, where `main` cuts none and this cuts none.
- 23 new tests pin what they found. Each earlier attempt at this fix
fails the ones that describe it, the earlier state of the branch fails
7, and all pass on Node.
- After that change: 999 test files on the release ASAN build (20,246
pass; the 11 files that fail need a database, Docker, DNS or a non-root
user, or share a temp directory with a parallel run and pass alone), 61
on the debug build.
- TLS over a file descriptor (`openssl.c`, the path of `fetch`,
`Bun.serve`, `tls.connect`, `Bun.connect`) got the same treatment after
the rebase: seeded differential fuzzers on CI's release build of this
branch, on `main` and, for `node:*`, on Node v26.3.0. Every runtime also
against itself for the noise floor, injected faults and known bugs of
`main` as positive controls, and a difference counts only if it shows in
5 of 5 fresh processes.
- `node:tls` over TCP: 11,500 scenarios (one connection with Node as the
oracle line by line; 2 to 60 connections beside stalled neighbours; raw
peers that break the handshake). HTTPS: about 136,000 runs over
`Bun.serve` + `fetch`, `node:https`, `node:http2` and `wss://`, also
with the two ends in different runtimes. `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` /
`upgradeTLS`: 11,500 scenarios and 720 slow connections, with writers
driven by what `write()` returns, beside up to 6 stalled, dripping,
closing or resetting neighbours, and plain TCP as a second oracle. No
crash, hang, duplication, reordering or silent truncation, and no change
in time or in connection reuse.
- They found six things that `main` does better, none of which any test
showed. All are fixed, each with a test that fails on the build before:
what the peer sent lost behind a rejected `send()` (23 scenarios, and an
early HTTPS response lost with only `EPIPE`), the same silently for a
paused reader, `server.close()` never calling back on a half-open server
after a ClientHello and a reset (17), `closeAllConnections()` taking 12
s with a stalled client, `end()` losing up to 1.3 of 4 MiB that
`write()` had reported while the peer still uploads, and `end()` a
little after a stall never closing beside other stalled TLS sockets. The
last two fixes also deliver the 1 to 2 MiB that `main` loses there, and
close the socket that `main` keeps for good without such neighbours.
- All of them again after every fix, on CI's release build of it. That
caught one regression of a fix itself (a reader stopped for backpressure
lost 86,385 bytes, 1 of 6,000 scenarios), fixed too. On the last build:
scenarios that lose data where `main` does not 23 → 2, and Node loses it
in both, with the same `EPIPE`; `server.close()` that never calls back
17 → 0; connections held 4 → 0; requests that end in an error only where
`main` has a response 6 → 0. With a Node server in another process, a
request ends in an error only in 8 and 10 of 1,500 scenarios here, 5 and
3 on `main`, 10 with Node as the client.
- `Bun.connect` / `Bun.listen` on the last build against `main`, in
scenarios: hangs 0 against 1,031, sockets and fds never released 0
against 965, corrupted data 0 against 345, `abort()` 0 against 26
(`setSession()` after the handshake), writers that never close 0 against
101 of 720 connections. No kind of failure shows here and not on `main`.
About a third of the slow connections close later than on `main`, in 1
to 16 s instead of at once, waiting for unsent ciphertext or for the
peer's close_notify, and 79 more of them deliver all that `write()`
reported. RSS and time with 16 to 256 stalled writers are the same.
- What they found that `main` does worse: a `WebSocket` that calls
`close()` with sends pending loses messages in 81 of 999 scenarios (0
here), 37 server sockets left open, 10 `server.close()` that never call
back, 20 write callbacks that never run.
- The kqueue fix cannot be run on Linux. The `connectionListener` count
test now says what became of a missing connection, which is how the
cause was found (`'tlsClientError'` "socket hang up", then `read
ECONNRESET` at the client of the same port, after its
`'secureConnect'`). On macOS x64 it failed every attempt of the three
builds before the fix and passed at the first attempt of the build with
it.
- Windows and macOS were only run by CI. Four new tests asserted what
only the Linux kernel does (a FIN read ahead of a reset, unread bytes
surviving a reset, loopback buffer sizes, `fstat()` on a socket) and now
say so per platform.

---------

Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: robobun <117481402+robobun@users.noreply.github.com>
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WebSocket npm fails TLS handshake with self signed certificates

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