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chore: update actions #10542
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chore: update actions #10542
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Reviewer's GuideThis PR systematically updates pinned GitHub Actions in workflow and composite action definitions by replacing older commit hashes with the latest stable versions for checkout, caching, setup, artifact handling, and deployment steps. File-Level Changes
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Hey there - I've reviewed your changes and they look great!
Blocking issues:
- This GitHub Actions workflow file uses
pull_request_targetand checks out code from the incoming pull request. When usingpull_request_target, the Action runs in the context of the target repository, which includes access to all repository secrets. Normally, this is safe because the Action only runs code from the target repository, not the incoming PR. However, by checking out the incoming PR code, you're now using the incoming code for the rest of the action. You may be inadvertently executing arbitrary code from the incoming PR with access to repository secrets, which would let an attacker steal repository secrets. This normally happens by running build scripts (e.g.,npm buildandmake) or dependency installation scripts (e.g.,python setup.py install). Audit your workflow file to make sure no code from the incoming PR is executed. Please see https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/ for additional mitigations. (link)
Prompt for AI Agents
Please address the comments from this code review:
## Security Issues
### Issue 1
<location> `.github/workflows/docs.yaml:43` </location>
<issue_to_address>
**security (yaml.github-actions.security.pull-request-target-code-checkout):** This GitHub Actions workflow file uses `pull_request_target` and checks out code from the incoming pull request. When using `pull_request_target`, the Action runs in the context of the target repository, which includes access to all repository secrets. Normally, this is safe because the Action only runs code from the target repository, not the incoming PR. However, by checking out the incoming PR code, you're now using the incoming code for the rest of the action. You may be inadvertently executing arbitrary code from the incoming PR with access to repository secrets, which would let an attacker steal repository secrets. This normally happens by running build scripts (e.g., `npm build` and `make`) or dependency installation scripts (e.g., `python setup.py install`). Audit your workflow file to make sure no code from the incoming PR is executed. Please see https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/ for additional mitigations.
*Source: opengrep*
</issue_to_address>Help me be more useful! Please click 👍 or 👎 on each comment and I'll use the feedback to improve your reviews.
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This pull request has been automatically locked since there has not been any recent activity after it was closed. Please open a new issue for related bugs. |
Summary by Sourcery
Update GitHub Actions versions across workflows and composite actions to the latest stable releases
Enhancements: