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fix: allow allowed_private_hosts to override DNS validation (Fixes #5122) #5136

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fix: allow allowed_private_hosts to override DNS validation (Fixes #5122) #5136

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52 changes: 39 additions & 13 deletions src/tools/http_request.rs
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -59,7 +59,30 @@ impl HttpRequestTool {
anyhow::bail!("Blocked local/private host: {host}");
}

<<<<<<< Updated upstream
if !host_matches_allowlist(&host, &self.allowed_domains) {
=======
// Check if host is explicitly allowed via allowed_private_hosts
let explicitly_allowed = host_matches_allowlist(&host, &self.allowed_private_hosts);
let is_private = is_private_or_local_host(&host);

// Block private hosts that aren't explicitly allowed
if is_private && !explicitly_allowed {
anyhow::bail!(
"Blocked local/private host: {host}. \
To allow this host, add it to http_request.allowed_private_hosts in config.toml"
);
}

if explicitly_allowed {
tracing::warn!(
"http_request: allowing host '{host}' via allowed_private_hosts"
);
}

// Check allowed_domains only if not explicitly allowed
if !explicitly_allowed && !host_matches_allowlist(&host, &self.allowed_domains) {
>>>>>>> Stashed changes
anyhow::bail!("Host '{host}' is not in http_request.allowed_domains");
}

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -583,7 +606,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn validate_requires_allowlist() {
let security = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy::default());
let tool = HttpRequestTool::new(security, vec![], 1_000_000, 30, false);
let tool = HttpRequestTool::new(security, vec![], vec![], vec![], 1_000_000, 30);
let err = tool
.validate_url("https://example.com")
.unwrap_err()
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -699,7 +722,7 @@ mod tests {
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::ReadOnly,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
});
let tool = HttpRequestTool::new(security, vec!["example.com".into()], 1_000_000, 30, false);
let tool = HttpRequestTool::new(security, vec!["example.com".into()], vec![], vec![], 1_000_000, 30);
let result = tool
.execute(json!({"url": "https://example.com"}))
.await
Expand All @@ -714,7 +737,7 @@ mod tests {
max_actions_per_hour: 0,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
});
let tool = HttpRequestTool::new(security, vec!["example.com".into()], 1_000_000, 30, false);
let tool = HttpRequestTool::new(security, vec!["example.com".into()], vec![], vec![], 1_000_000, 30);
let result = tool
.execute(json!({"url": "https://example.com"}))
.await
Expand All @@ -735,9 +758,10 @@ mod tests {
let tool = HttpRequestTool::new(
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy::default()),
vec!["example.com".into()],
10,
30,
false,
vec![], // blocked_domains
vec![], // allowed_private_hosts
10,
30,
);
let text = "hello world this is long";
let truncated = tool.truncate_response(text);
Expand All @@ -750,9 +774,10 @@ mod tests {
let tool = HttpRequestTool::new(
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy::default()),
vec!["example.com".into()],
vec![], // blocked_domains
vec![], // allowed_private_hosts
0, // max_response_size = 0 means no limit
30,
false,
);
let text = "a".repeat(10_000_000);
assert_eq!(tool.truncate_response(&text), text);
Expand All @@ -763,9 +788,10 @@ mod tests {
let tool = HttpRequestTool::new(
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy::default()),
vec!["example.com".into()],
vec![],
vec![],
5,
30,
false,
);
let text = "hello world";
let truncated = tool.truncate_response(text);
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -993,19 +1019,19 @@ mod tests {

#[test]
fn allow_private_hosts_permits_localhost() {
let tool = test_tool_with_private(vec!["localhost"], true);
let tool = test_tool_with_private(vec!["localhost"], vec![], vec!["localhost"]);
assert!(tool.validate_url("https://localhost:8080").is_ok());
}

#[test]
fn allow_private_hosts_permits_private_ipv4() {
let tool = test_tool_with_private(vec!["192.168.1.5"], true);
let tool = test_tool_with_private(vec!["192.168.1.5"], vec![], vec!["192.168.1.5"]);
assert!(tool.validate_url("https://192.168.1.5").is_ok());
}

#[test]
fn allow_private_hosts_permits_rfc1918_with_wildcard() {
let tool = test_tool_with_private(vec!["*"], true);
let tool = test_tool_with_private(vec!["*"], vec![], vec!["*"]);
assert!(tool.validate_url("https://10.0.0.1").is_ok());
assert!(tool.validate_url("https://172.16.0.1").is_ok());
assert!(tool.validate_url("https://192.168.1.1").is_ok());
Expand All @@ -1014,7 +1040,7 @@ mod tests {

#[test]
fn allow_private_hosts_still_requires_allowlist() {
let tool = test_tool_with_private(vec!["example.com"], true);
let tool = test_tool_with_private(vec!["example.com"], vec![], vec!["192.168.1.5"]);
let err = tool
.validate_url("https://192.168.1.5")
.unwrap_err()
Expand All @@ -1027,7 +1053,7 @@ mod tests {

#[test]
fn allow_private_hosts_false_still_blocks() {
let tool = test_tool_with_private(vec!["*"], false);
let tool = test_tool_with_private(vec!["*"], vec![], vec![]);
assert!(
tool.validate_url("https://localhost:8080")
.unwrap_err()
Expand Down
19 changes: 12 additions & 7 deletions src/tools/web_fetch.rs
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -435,31 +435,36 @@ fn validate_target_url(
anyhow::bail!("Host '{host}' is in {tool_name}.blocked_domains");
}

let private_host_allowed =
is_private_or_local_host(&host) && host_matches_allowlist(&host, allowed_private_hosts);
// Check if host is explicitly allowed via allowed_private_hosts
let explicitly_allowed = host_matches_allowlist(&host, allowed_private_hosts);
let is_private = is_private_or_local_host(&host);

if is_private_or_local_host(&host) && !private_host_allowed {
// Block private hosts that aren't explicitly allowed
if is_private && !explicitly_allowed {
anyhow::bail!(
"Blocked local/private host: {host}. \
To allow this host, add it to {tool_name}.allowed_private_hosts in config.toml"
);
}

if private_host_allowed {
if explicitly_allowed {
tracing::warn!(
"{tool_name}: allowing private/local host '{host}' via allowed_private_hosts"
"{tool_name}: allowing host '{host}' via allowed_private_hosts"
);
}

if !private_host_allowed && !host_matches_allowlist(&host, allowed_domains) {
// Check allowed_domains only if not explicitly allowed
if !explicitly_allowed && !host_matches_allowlist(&host, allowed_domains) {
anyhow::bail!("Host '{host}' is not in {tool_name}.allowed_domains");
}

if !private_host_allowed {
// Only validate DNS resolution if not explicitly allowed
if !explicitly_allowed {
validate_resolved_host_is_public(&host)?;
}

Ok(url.to_string())

}

fn append_chunk_with_cap(buffer: &mut Vec<u8>, chunk: &[u8], hard_cap: usize) -> bool {
Expand Down
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